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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis challenges the idea that the EU anti-corruption policies’ main rationale is to 
root out corruption.  The research hypothesis is that EU anti-corruption policies are used 
not so much to control corruption as to control and diminish the powers of nation states 
and to redesign the classic power balance in these democratic states. The actors who end 
up being empowered are supranational, international and non-governmental entities: the 
EU/ the European Commission, International Organizations and domestic civil society 
with a pro-EU agenda. The domestic decision-makers are structurally disempowered by 
the anti-corruption policies. 
 
The lessons derived from the specific experience of Romania and Bulgaria have a general 
value because their model inspired the recent decision of the European Commission to 
introduce the same anti-corruption policies across the EU. 
Table of Contents 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 3 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
 Literature Review, Theoretical Framework and Methodology ........................................... 19 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
Content Analysis on European Commission’s Progress Reports for Bulgaria and Romania 
2000-2004. Consistency of EC evaluation discourse  ............................................................. 42 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
Consistency of the NGOs discourse on corruption. Watch dogs or regime enhancers . 
Relationship dynamics  with the Bulgarian/Romanian Governments 2004-2008 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
The role of European Commission in the NGOs  ................................................................. 178 
 
CHAPTER SIX 
Relevance of  Bulgarian/ Romanian case for the new EU Anti-corruption strategy for all 
27 Member States .................................................................................................................... 206 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
Conclusions .............................................................................................................................. 241 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
APADOR-CH  
CCP 
CSD 
EC 
EP 
EU 
FH 
IMF 
LDP 
NLP 
NMS II 
OSCE 
OJ 
OSI 
SAR 
SDP 
TIR 
Association for Protection of Human Rights in Romania – Helsinki Committee 
Coalition for a Clean Parliament  
Centre for Study of Democracy 
European Commission  
European Parliament 
European Union  
Freedom House 
International Monetary Fund  
Liberal Democratic Party 
National Liberal Party  
National Movement Simeon II 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe  
Official Journal  
Open Society Institute 
Romanian Academic Society 
Social Democratic Party 
Transparency International Romania 
TJA 
UN 
UNDP 
USAID  
WB 
Truth and Justice Alliance  
United Nations 
United Nations Development Program 
United States Agency for International Development  
World Bank  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
  
Introduction 
 
 
Ever since 1996, when James Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank, declared 
corruption as “public enemy number one” of economic development, the phenomenon 
became a matter of global concern and global governance.  At Stockholm in 2009, the 
EU declared that corruption was “a transnational threat that challenges the EU internal 
security”. The EU decided it needed to take charge, “since the problems associated with 
corruption cannot be adequately solved by Member States alone”.  In doing so, the 
Commission built up its Anti-Corruption strategy, based on mechanisms and policies 
developed in Bulgaria and Romania: “The only EU monitoring toll that also covers the 
anti-corruption issue is the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism for Romania and 
Bulgaria, which has managed over time to maintain or revive a certain momentum for 
reforms” (Commission 2011:9).    Also in 2014, the Commission would release its first 
Anti-Corruption Report for all EU countries, explicitly following the model of the CVM 
for Bulgaria and Romania: “The EU Anti-Corruption Report also builds on the 
Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM), a post-accession follow-up mechanism 
for Romania and Bulgaria that is managed by the European Commission” (Commission 
2014:38). 
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Significantly, the perception of corruption changed from being a parochial problem, 
affecting a few former communist countries (e.g. Bulgaria and Romania), to a problem 
of concern to all twenty-seven EU countries, with no experience of communism or such 
high levels of corruption.  
 
Against this background, the thesis signals an anomaly in the EU’s recent discourse 
against corruption. The EC decided to extend across all EU countries those anti-
corruption mechanisms and policies which were applied to Bulgaria and Romania.  Such 
mechanisms, however, did not prove efficient in fighting corruption, even after eighteen 
years.  Moreover, they had a negative impact on the functioning of the democratic 
institutions of these countries, exacerbating existing problems, as will be detailed later.  
The question then arises as to why the EU would want to promote a seemingly inefficient 
regime across all its member states, when it also had an undermining impact on the 
democratic process.  This conundrum directs attention to the problem of why these 
policies proved inefficient and to the EU’s strategies in addressing corruption. 
 
The EU’s response to such poor results has been to blame it on the inability or 
unwillingness of these countries to comply with the anti-corruption policies properly 
(Euractiv 2012; European Commission 2013).  Most studies discussing EU anti-
corruption policies (the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism) in Bulgaria and 
Romania endorse this idea: the responsibility for the inefficiency of the EU policies is 
explained by resistance from parts of the domestic political class to the introduction of 
stricter controls on corruption.  (Vachudova 2009; Spendzarova 2010; Spendzarova and 
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Vachudova 2012; Alegre, Susie et.al 2009; Carp 2014; Phinnemore 2010; Pridham 2007; 
Gallagher 2009).  The view taken here is that these arguments are unsatisfactory 
explanations either for the failure of these policies, or for their negative impact on the 
democratic systems.  The EU’s bid to promote them as a panacea would also, therefore, 
seem to be viewed with caution. 
 
The main conceptual problem is that the recipients of the anti-corruption policies in the 
targeted countries have been blamed, without first proving that the policies were adequate 
to deal with corruption.  Nor has there been any examination of the role of the main 
managers of the process – the European Commission, together with the IOs and NGOS 
involved in the process – and consideration of their responsibility in the negative 
outcomes of the anti-corruption policies.  The domestic political class has been 
scrutinised regarding its failures in the fight against corruption but the consistency 
between the EU’s official discourse of rooting out corruption and the way it has 
implemented its policies has not been critically analysed.  
 
Finally, neither the EU nor the existing literature have tried to explain why the EU would 
go against its own discourse of efficiency in solving systemic problems (such as 
corruption)  by promoting solutions which have proved inefficient and which, moreover, 
have proved detrimental to the existing democratic systems in these countries.   
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There is, however, a body of literature, outside the EU framework, which discusses 
corruption as a matter of global governance, when it has been carried out by IOs.  Such 
studies have published evidences which provide a different take on this aspect. It has been 
noticed that it is common for international actors who promote development policies  (e.g. 
IMF and WB) to construct or invent a set of problems – ideally a state of crisis – in order 
to justify their intervention in the internal affairs of a targeted country (Berstein 1990; 
Ferguson 1990; Gupta 1995; Escobar 1995; Evans 1997;  Polzer 2001; Moultrie 1998; 
Munro et. al 1999; Mazrui 1999; Camerer 1999; Hopkin 2002; Bratsis 2003; Bukovansky 
2006; Chang 2002; 2009; 2012).  
 
The implication of these findings is that the anti-corruption crusade is not an apolitical 
process that carries a genuine moral and economic justification. It is rather a credible 
pretext devised to advance neo-liberal interests.  This approach considers that corruption, 
its definition and its solutions are largely a construct, designed to carry a neo-liberal 
agenda of diminishing the public sector and undermining the credibility of the state as a 
manager of the economy, meanwhile legitimizing the intervention of international actors 
(IOs), of Non-Governmental Organizations that are not democratically accountable (e.g.  
‘watchdogs of corruption’) and global business corporations (Bukovansky 2006;   
Browne and Cloke 2004; Roden 2010 Bratsis 2003; 2014 Bediharnoglu 2016).   
 
Up until now, the EU’s anti-corruption policies have not been analysed from the 
perspective of a construct, which carries out the interests of those who devised them.  Nor 
has the EU’s rationale regarding its desire to solve an objective problem been contested.  
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Although, it has not addressed the issue of corruption until now, Critical Political 
Economy contains a theoretical strand which contests the EU official discourse and 
rationale.  CPE has a neo-Marxist, neo-Gramscian theoretical basis, which regards the 
EU’s main purpose as the promotion of a neo-liberal agenda, by whatever means this is 
enabled, such as: minimizing state regulatory powers over the economy, opening the 
decisional structures to international actors and non-governmental organizations (the so-
called “historical bloc”) sharing the same neo-liberal commitment, advancing the 
interests of transnational corporations, etc.  This approach rejects the mainstream, 
pluralist view that the EU/ EC is efficiency driven and that it has a technocratic, de-
politicized mode of governance.  The European Commission’s claim that its main purpose 
is to come up with efficient, technical solutions to various issues is only a smoke screen 
for advancing the interests and influence of neo-liberal forces. Following this logic, the 
EU discourse on corruption can be seen as a construct, designed to undermine the national 
state and to advance the influence of the “historical bloc”, rather than solve an objective 
problem.  
Main research question 
Before looking at whether the EC’s rationale in rooting out corruption is disingenuous, it 
will be necessary to discover plausible evidence for this. There are two main difficulties 
with this: there is no study in the EU framework to support the proposition with empirical 
evidences, including CPE studies. Secondly, all the mainstream literature on the topic 
accepts the EU rationale and discourse on corruption at face value.  
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A critical appraisal of the EU’s discourse on corruption, with analysis of whether its 
discourse is found to be consistent with its actions and interventions is lacking.    
Main research question 
Accordingly, the main research question guiding this study is whether EU anti-corruption 
policies have been devised not so much to reduce corruption as to create new mechanisms 
of control over the domestic political class of its member states, in such a way that these 
can be operated from Brussels.  This schema might offer a comprehensive answer to the 
inefficiency displayed by these policies, as well as the EU’s intention to promote them 
across all twenty-seven of its member states as a standardised prescription for fighting 
corruption.  
 
Checking the consistency between the EU discourse on corruption and the 
implementation of its anti-corruption policies will test the congruence of its strategy and 
the veracity of its commitment. The core of this process will rest on examining evaluative 
texts issued by the European Commission in the form of Progress Reports for Bulgaria 
and Romania, produced between 2000 and 2004, during the accession negotiations, 
followed by the post-accession CVM reports.  
 
The Progress Reports mark the genesis of the EU anti-corruption discourse and track its  
gradual development by the EC.   A type of linguistic analysis, known as Content 
Analysis, is applied to the Commission’s Progress Reports for Bulgaria and Romania, as 
a toolkit for checking the consistency of the EC discourse on corruption. Content Analysis 
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is a methodology that has been little used within EU studies and has never before been 
applied to the European Commission’s texts. Where a discourse needs to be analysed, it 
is appropriate to choose a linguistic methodology and Content Analysis fits this study, as 
it produces quantifiable data for measuring loaded comments.  The reason for the study 
is that this thesis departs from the assumption shared by the mainstream literature that the 
interplay of power and interests in this process lies only with the domestic political class. 
A more balanced enquiry would extend its scrutiny to the managers of the process itself: 
the European Union and a cluster of IOs and NGOs.  If corruption is to be rooted out, the 
commitment of all actors to this end needs to be critically tested.  
1.1 Relevance of the Bulgarian/Romanian case study for present EU anti-corruption 
policies 
 In 2014, the European Commission came up with its first Anti-corruption report for all 
EU member states, which proposed using the same anti-corruption policies and 
mechanisms as were applied to Bulgaria and Romania (European Commission 2014). In 
2015, the European Commission announced an Action Plan with mechanisms for 
criminalising corruption, and in particular high level political corruption, in all EU 
member states. 
 However, there are evidences which show that these policies were largely inefficient in 
their purpose.  Their results in the Bulgarian/Romanian case can be considered at best 
unsatisfactory. After eighteen years of EU monitoring (since 1998) and the gradual 
introduction of such policies, and after nine years of the Cooperation and Verification 
Mechanism, Bulgaria and Romania can be hardly regarded as a successful model, even 
according to the European Commission’s own criteria.  
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Bulgaria is still suffering the most dangerous and rampant organized crime, modelled on 
the Russian mafia and considered unique in the EU (Euractiv 2013). In eighteen  years of 
EU’s anti-corruption campaign  only two mafia mobs have been convicted (Commission 
2013a). In 2013 the European Parliament called Bulgaria “the weak link in democratic 
standards and a threat to European values across the continent, due to its inability to tackle 
corruption” (Euractiv 2013). Also, after seven years of CVM, Bulgaria has not improved 
at all in the Indexes of Transparency International where, in 2015,  its ranking was the 
lowest in the whole EU (69th place out of 178 countries in 2013), far behind the average 
of the 27 EU countries and even lower than one of the candidate states, Montenegro.   
Romania boasts some five hundred politicians sent to jail in the last six years, according 
to the Commission (Commission 2014). But, if we are to listen to the European 
Commission itself, this is not satisfactory because the Commission expresses “serious 
concern over the political situation and the ability to comply with fundamental principles 
of the Union” (Commission 2012b:2). Tougher monitoring was also envisaged for 
Romania with the next monitoring report due by the end of 2013.  Until 2014, Romania 
did not improve in the Indexes of Corruption, ranking the second worst after Bulgaria 
(Transparency International 2014). Only in the last two years it has improved in the 
indexes of corruption, which now (2016) places Romania higher than Bulgaria and Italy, 
at the same level with Greece (Euroactiv 2016). 
 
Rankings, however, are not the ultimate measure of success, as their criteria could distort 
the reality. There are other, perhaps more relevant indicators that the fight against 
corruption in these countries did not come up with the expected results. 
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One of the reasons mentioned insistently by the EU with regard to anti-corruption effort 
is that corruption decreases popular trust in the democratic institutions: the Government 
and the Parliament. This is one aspect where the seven years of CVM failed drastically. 
Not only that levels of trust in the democratically elected politicians did not increase but 
in fact they deteriorated if compared with the time span when the EU anti-coruption 
policies were not in place. In 2007, Romanians’ trust in their political parties, MPs and 
government was the lowest among all EU members, old and new together (Eurobarometer 
2007). In 2008, it was the turn of Bulgaria to record the lowest trust in its elected officials 
(Eurobarometer 2008)1 . To date (2014-2015), the situation has not changed. Bulgaria’s 
Democracy Index keeps going down, being ranked 52nd in the latest Economist 
Intelligence Unit study (EIU, 2011). Up to date, Bulgaria maintains the same low levels 
of trust (Eurobarometer 2013).The poll from 2015 in Romania shows that Romanians 
have most distrust in their Political Parties: 12.5% trust them. They are followed by 
Parliament, with 16.5%, and the Government with 28.6%. These figures are no better than 
those of 2004, when the ranking of distrust followed the same pattern2. Up to date, 
Romania has the second lowest levels of trust in its democratically elected institutions 
from EU, after Bulgaria (IRSOP 2015). 
  
Finally, the most important indicator is the level of poverty. The EU, together with other 
international actors and donors, maintains that there is a direct relationship between levels 
of corruption and poverty (World Bank 1997, 2000; European Commission 2014). The 
                                                          
1 Political parties were recorded as having perhaps the lowest trust ever in the history of Eurobarometer 9%; the 
Parliament scored 12%; the Government had 17%. 
2 Political parties the lowest (16.8%) – slightly better than nowadays though. Parliament and the Government were 
also given low scores: 18.9% for the former and 20.5%, the latter.http://www.ziare.com/social/romani/increderea-
romanilor-in-institutii-in-scadere-cine-se-bucura-totusi-de-simpatie-sondaj-inscop-1289569 
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poorest countries are also the most corrupted and vice versa. If we are to apply this 
criterion, then again, the EC methods showed no efficiency. Bulgaria and Romania 
remained the poorest countries of the EU, Bulgaria being the last of the 27, followed by 
Romania3 with the lowest standard of living in the EU. Moreover, Romania is a living 
example that contradicts the theory that minimizing corruption is a recipe for decreasing 
poverty. According with Transparency International, Romania made a significant leap in 
ranking in the last five years (if compared with itself): from a ranking of 75 in 2011, 
Romania jumped to a 58 in 20154. The poverty levels for the same time span (2011-2015) 
recorded a significant leap, too: in 2011, the poverty rate was 22.5%, while in 2015 it 
increased to a 25.4% (Eurostat 2016). In plain figures, it means that 1 in four people is 
poor in Romania.  It also contradicts the European Commission’s view that the more 
corrupted politicians are thrown into jail, the more successful the process is: the EC was 
praising Romania for sending to jail a staggering five hundred decision makers in seven 
years (European Commission 2014).  
 
Rampant organized crime in Bulgaria with no signs of relapse since 1990, low TI rankings 
in both cases (Bulgaria/Romania), increasing popular distrust in the democratic 
institutions and, finally, increasing poverty in both countries are rather pessimistic 
indicators for the efficiency of anti-corruption mechanisms devised by Brussels.   
                                                          
3 In 2014 Bulgaria had the highest percentage of population living in poverty or at the limit of it approx40%, 
followed very closely by Romania approx. 39%.  Source:   http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/File:At-risk-of_poverty_or_social_exclusion_rate,_2013_and_2014.png 
4 The lower the figure the higher the ranking. Being ranked 75 means that Romania was on the 75 th place 
among 168 countries. E.g. Denmark the least corrupted in the world, according with TI, is ranked nr.1. 
Source: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/romania/corruption-rank 
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While the efficiency of these policies is not obvious, the democratic system (albeit 
flawed) in these countries was negatively impacted by the EU anti-corruption campaign.  
 
Perhaps the most spectacular result of these policies was their repressive and coercive 
character when directed against high level politicians (MPS and members of the 
Executive) (Commission 1998a; 2006; 2014). The result was particularly catastrophic for 
the political class of Romania, and especially for members of the left-wing Social 
Democratic Party (SDP), until recently the country’s largest and most important political 
party.  After Romania’s accession in 2007, the Commission recorded that five hundred 
politicians had been sent to jail, of which almost half had held ministerial positions or had 
been members of Parliament.  More than 60% of these were members of the SDP or, more 
recently, from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), both of them belonging to the 
opposition since 2004 until (Commission 2014; Directorate National for Anti-corruption 
2015). In Bulgaria, high levels of corruption were the main argument for freezing over 
200 million euro of PHARE funds (Commission 2008a). In 2013 accusations of 
corruption were one of the main reasons triggering massive popular protests, which 
finally led to the resignation of Borisov’s government (2009-2013) (Commission 2013a).    
The genuinely worrying aspect of this phenomenon is that it has elements that suggest 
that accusations of corruption have been used as pretexts for purging the opposition. This 
seems to be particularly the case of Romania, where accusations of corruption hit mostly 
one side of the political spectrum – the centre-left one (see below).  A growing number 
of critics have expressed the opinion that the anti-corruption policies are becoming a 
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means of   repression. Such voices can be heard  from the international media (New York 
Times 2015), from within the European Parliament (Weber 2013) and from Romania, 
itself5. For example, the EMP, Renate Weber, sent a letter to the Vice-President of the 
Commission, Viviane Reding, questioning the Commission’s silence on important abuses 
generated by the activity of the anti-corruption agency (the DNA) in Romania. The 
relevance of this complaint is that the EC regards the DNA as a model to be replicated at 
the level of the whole EU (Commission 2014:19). 
 Awareness campaigns have been at the centre of the EU anti-corruption policies in 
Eastern Europe and it occupies a central place in its new strategy devised for the whole 
EU (Commission 2014).  The scope of such campaigns has been to sharpen the public 
sensitivity to corruption. It also meant that the media bombarded intensely the same 
public with cases of corruption at high level.  The direct result of this strategy was that 
public confidence in their democratically elected politicians decreased drastically in 
Bulgaria and Romania as mentioned above.  The main problem with the intense exposure 
of the public to such awareness campaigns has been that the public disrust for individual 
politicians was re-focused on the institutions that accommodated such politicians: the 
political parties, the executive and the legislative.  In other words, the most dangerous 
result of these awareness campaigns has been the growing popular distrust in the very 
fabric of democracy and the institutions that support it  and  which are publicly elected 
and publicly accountable (Toneva –Metodieva 2014; Dimitriev , Halampiev, et.comp 
2014; Grigorescu 2006; Krastev 2002; Mungiu –Pippidi 2003)). Grigorescu (2006) came 
                                                          
5 See the massive number of instances when such accusations were used selectively against the Social 
Democratic party when it was in the opposition  
http://www.luju.ro/magistrati/dna/dna-musamalizeaza-marile-jafuri-senatorul-serban-nicolae-acuza-
politia-politica-actiunile-dna-nu-dau-impresia-unei-reale-lupte-anticoruptie-pare-o-continuare-a-luptei-
basiste-cu-adversarii-politici-dna-aloca-doi-procurori-si-un-instigator-ca-s-o-incatusez 
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up with concrete evidence showing that there is no connection between the real levels of 
corruption and public perceptions and that such perceptions are mostly shaped by 
awareness campaigns, such as those supported by the EU.  
 
Summing up, the EU anti-corruption policies tested for Bulgaria and Romania display a 
significant lack of efficiency in rooting out corruption on one hand, while   it generated a 
veritable crisis of the democratic system of these countries due to the numerous corruption 
scandals and convictions that targeted members of the Parliament and the Government, a 
situation that also decreased the public confidence in their democratically elected 
institutions.  
 
Such questionable policies with little evidence of their efficiency for their avowed scope 
(rooting out corruption) but with significant impact on the political power balance in 
Bulgaria and Romania, are promoted as a model of action for tackling corruption in all 
27 EU member states.   This contradiction between the EU discourse of efficiency and 
what has been happening in practice is a reason for questioning the intentionality of the 
whole process, the EU rationale behind its anti-corruption strategy.  
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1.2 Thesis objective and structure 
The central hypothesis of this research is that the EU anti-corruption policies are designed 
to enhance EU interests and influence on the new and old Member States, by considerably 
reducing the role and influence of the democratically elected political elite and 
institutions. Ultimately, rooting out corruption is only a pretext for diminishing the 
powers of the national state and for redesigning its functions so that it can suit the EC. 
 
The central objective of this research is to explore how the anti-corruption policies 
devised by the EC manage to reshape and redesign the power balance in Member States. 
 
In order to test/explore this hypothesis, the analysis involves three main steps. Each one 
needs to answer to three main questions. 
 
 
Step 1: Was rooting out corruption the genuine purpose of the EU anti-corruption 
policies in the Romanian/Bulgarian case? 
The working hypothesis that needs to be fully tested is the existence of systematic double 
standards in the way the European Commission managed the anti-corruption 
conditionality in these two cases. This is an essential step in the logic of this research.  
 
Why does this issue need to be cleared up? The central hypothesis tested here assumes 
that the EU designed the anti-corruption policies with the scope of promoting its own 
agenda of power and interests.  However, such an analysis cannot be performed without 
first debunking the official argument that the EU’s primary purpose and scope was to help 
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countries like Bulgaria and Romania to solve their systemic problem of corruption. This 
is essential for three reasons. 
 
First, as long as the official discourse about rooting out corruption is considered valid, 
then this automatically roots out assumptions about the interplay of power and interests 
on the part of the EU. As long as it is widely accepted that the EU’s main role is to help 
these countries to solve a structural problem that affects negatively their general welfare, 
then all the other aspects or outcomes of the anti-corruption policies are subordinated in 
importance to this main purpose. For example, in such a case, the logic goes along the 
following line: if rooting out corruption can be solved by decreasing the powers of the 
elected officials, then this should not be a matter of concern. In short, as long as the EU 
discourse is not proved wrong, the analysis of anti-corruption policies in terms of who 
wins and who loses as a result of their implementation loses its relevance. 
 
 
Second, the inconsistencies and contradictions already signalled in the case of Bulgaria 
and Romania indicate the likely possibility that the Commission’s approach was 
systematically marred by double standards. The existing evidences are sufficient to 
trigger the working hypothesis of the systematic existence of double standards in the 
Commission’s approach of anti-corruption effort but they are not sufficient to fully 
confirm it, alone. The existence of systematic double standards is always a clear indicator 
of a hidden agenda behind the official discourse, as already discussed. 
 
 
Third, the working hypothesis of double standards needs to be irrefutably confirmed 
because there has been made no attempt to actually question or challenge the EU official 
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rationale, until now. Therefore, this analysis has no already existing empirical basis on 
which it can built in this sense, since no one has even considered the possibility or noticed 
the inconsistencies in the EU anti-corruption discourse. 
 
Step  2:  Who  was empowered and who was disempowered as result of the  
 
introduction of anti-corruption policies in Romania and Bulgaria? 
 
 
Once the official claim that the scope of the anti-corruption policies was not to root out 
corruption is contradicted, the next step is to understand the real reason behind it. The 
existence of double standards always indicates an attempt to promote a hidden agenda of 
power and interests. Therefore, the next logical step is to explore how the anti-corruption 
policies were used to advance interests and whose they were more exactly. 
 
Step 3. From exception to norm. Explaining the significance of the new anti- 
 
corruption framework in the light of the specific Bulgarian/Romanian case. 
 
 
At this stage, the central hypothesis needs to be explored and tested. As mentioned earlier, 
the Commission has decided to apply the anti-corruption mechanisms and policies 
developed for the particular case of Bulgaria and Romania across all twenty-seven EU 
member states. The findings triggered from the analysis of this case study can be used to 
interpret such a new anti-corruption framework from a power perspective: who is 
empowered and who is disempowered by the new strategy devised in Brussels? 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
 Literature Review, Theoretical Framework 
and Methodology 
 
 
Literature review 
Introduction 
This chapter critically explores the existing literature and theories with which the thesis 
engages. The purpose is to situate this research work within current scholarship that 
discusses corruption by pinpointing and mapping which empirical findings and 
theoretical approaches are most relevant, which ones are less useful and what gaps exist, 
some of which this thesis may contribute to filling in. 
 
Three main strands of studies are discussed here.  The streams represent different – even 
opposing – empirical and theoretical approaches to the way corruption has been framed. 
The first is the mainstream scholarship that addresses corruption within the framework of 
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the EU, a literature that accepts the EU discourse on corruption without problematizing 
it. The second part will engage with a number of studies which, in contrast with the 
mainstream, critically question the way corruption has been framed by IOs. Such studies 
usually discuss corruption outside the EU framework. Critical Political Economy is the 
third strand to be examined.  EU anti-corruption policies have not yet been addressed by 
the CPE. However, it offers a theoretical alternative to the mainstream: CPE introduces a 
critical/revisionist approach to what the EU is and does, which offers some conceptual 
back-up for the approach taken by this research. In each case, both the theoretical 
assumptions on which each body of literature is based, as well as any empirical findings, 
will be discussed. 
 
The next section explains what kind of methodology has been used to address the research 
question and why.   
 
Mainstream literature addressing corruption in the EU framework.  
The conventional view of studies addressing the European Union and the way it has 
tackled corruption share a series of fundamental assumptions about the EU and what it 
represents. The first, and perhaps the most important assumption is that its policies are 
designed to work for the welfare of the general public. This assumption is shared across 
EU mainstream studies, irrespective of their theoretical variations.  The European 
Commission, in particular, is expected to promote a ‘technocratic’ mode of governance – 
coming up with technical, apolitical solutions to various political problems (Radaelli 
1999; Majone1996, Cini 1999, 2002).  This is not to say that the EC’s activity is 
considered completely de-politicized or devoid of an interests (Page 1996; Radaelli 2002, 
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Epstein and Sedelmeir  2008, Cini 2002, Egeberg 2004). However, the conventional 
understanding is that the EC is an efficiency-driven actor who, in simple terms, is less 
characterized by vested interests and agendas of power than its political counterparts (e.g. 
the EU Member States).   
 
The second basic assumption of the mainstream EU literature is that the neo-liberal 
ideology that informs EU policies is the best approach to ensure economic welfare and a 
well- functioning democratic system, a formula that works in the best interests of the 
general public. Alongside this view, the process of EU’s Enlargement towards the East 
looked like a winning game for the former communist countries, who benefited from the 
transfer of (neo) liberal norms and values promoted by the EU  (Vachudova 2004; 
Spendzarova 2008;  Papadimitriou and Phinnemore 2008; Phinnemore 2010; Pridham 
2007a,b, Grabbe1998, 2001, 2003, 2006; Sedelmeier 2005, 2008, 2011, 2012; Pridham 
2002, 2007a,b; Raik 2004; Lippert et. All 2001; Noutcheva and Bechev 2008, Hughes 
Sasse and Gordon 2004; Jacoby 2004; Kochenov 2004).   The principal channel of these 
norms was the conditionality that the EU enforced on the candidate countries, including 
measures to address corruption. Since 1998, fighting corruption has been a key feature of 
the political conditionality of the Copenhagen criteria that the Eastern candidate countries 
have been required fulfil (Commission 1998a). It was associated with the notion of “good 
governance”: minimizing corruption was seen as a condition for the good functioning of 
democratic institutions and the existence of the rule of law.     
 As Grabbe aptly put it:  
“The assumption that accession and development goals are synonymous has 
generally gone unquestioned because the overall neo-liberal orientation of the 
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EU’s agenda gained the general consensus among Western governments and 
advisers” (Grabbe 1998:5).   
The research studies discussing EU anti-corruption efforts focus their empirical analysis 
on the two countries where these policies were created and subsequently fully 
implemented:    Bulgaria and Romania (Vachudova 2009, Vachudova and Spendzarova 
2012a, b; Krastev 2002. Grigorescu 2006; Ristei 2010; Mungiu-Pippidi 2002, 2007, 
Toneva –Metodieva 2007, Stoyan 2013;Dimitrov, Kaloyan et al. 2014).  The case of 
corruption for Bulgaria and Romania is frequently used to illustrate different approaches 
regarding the impact of the EU’s policies, norms and values on Eastern Europe.  Thus, 
conventional studies on corruption in the EU framework start from a series of 
unquestioned premises regarding the ideological framework of the anti-corruption 
policies and the role of the actors in managing it.   
 
First, the EU’s claim that ‘the only purpose of the anti-corruption strategy is to… root out 
corruption’ has been consistently taken at face value (Vachudova 2005, 2009; Pridham 
2002; 2007 a,b,c; Phinnemore 2007, 2010; Phinnemore and Papadimitriou 2008; Kornai 
and Rose Ackerman, 2004; Spendzharova 2008; Gallagher 2005; Pop Eleches, 2008).   
Another generally accepted view is that fighting corruption is associated with neo-liberal 
norms, which promoting the values of liberal democracy and the market economy: 
“fighting corruption is essential for consolidating the liberal democracy”, a view 
borrowed from IOs such as World Bank, who was among the first to set up the framework 
by which corruption had to be tackled (Spendzarova and Vachudova 2012: 46; World 
Bank 1997, 2003).  The consequence of this approach is that crucial aspects of the EU 
anti-corruption policies have remained largely unquestioned.  Almost all the mechanisms 
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developed by Brussels exclusively target the elected political class and the public sector, 
while there is very little recognition that the private sector and international investors, in 
managing these mechanisms, are also parties with a vested interest and could even be 
regarded as bribe payers (Commission 1998a, 2003 a, 2007 a,b; Gupta 2005; Galtung, 
Frederik and Pope: 1999).  The same positive expectation of neo-liberal norms also tends 
to colour the representations of roles played by such actors in the process. 
 
The story of the fight against corruption emerges from various studies discussing Bulgaria 
and Romania,  as a battle maintained on one side by a dubious and corrupt domestic 
political class, fighting to maintain its privileges, while maintaining a façade of 
commitment to EU liberal values and norms. (Vachudova 2005, 2009; Pridham 2002; 
2007 a,b,c; Phinnemore 2007, 2010; Phinnemore and Papadimitriou 2008;   
Spendzharova 2008; Gallagher 2005; Pop Eleches, 2008).  In the opposite camp sits a 
technocratic European Commission, whose main role is to discipline a corrupt domestic 
political class, and occasionally, to play down the exaggerated demands of some of its 
member states towards the candidates (Gallagher 2009; Phinnemore 2000, 2010; 
Phinnemore and Papadimitriou 2008; Vachudova 2005, 2009; Pridham 2007a, 2007b) 
(Vachudova 2009; 2012; Carp 2014; Ristei 2008; Spendzaharova and Vachudova 2012).  
In short, the EC’s technocratic discourse, which claims to put efficiency and objectivity 
in first place, has also been accepted at face value without testing its consistency in 
practice.   Consequently, the EC’s Reports on progress against corruption are regarded by 
the majority of studies as “a full and accurate picture of where a country stands” 
(Vachudova 2004:129).   The scholarship has regarded these reports as a ‘hard source’ of 
information and has used them as guidelines or starting points for analysis on the impact 
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of EU conditionality on these countries, integrating the views of the EC into their own 
research (Phinnemore and Papadimitriou 2008; Phinnemore 2007, 2010; Pridham 2002, 
2007a,b,c; Vachudova 2004, 2009; Spendzarova and Vachudova 2012; Ristei 2010). 
 
The third cluster of actors that participated in the management of anti-corruption policies 
and which backed the European Commission’s work is represented by the IOs and 
domestic NGOs acting as watchdogs of corruption, such as World Bank, IMF, USAID, 
Freedom House and Transparency International. The consistency between their goal of 
rooting out corruption and the efficacy of their actions also goes unquestioned and 
untested. They are viewed with the same de-politicized technocratic lens through which 
the activity of the Commission is regarded: their main scope is to solve a societal problem 
(Vachudova 2005, 2009; Pridham 2002; 2007 a,b,c; Phinnemore 2007, 2010; Phinnemore 
and Papadimitriou 2008;   Spendzharova 2008; Gallagher 2005; Noucheva and Bechev 
2008; Mungiu –Pippidi 2002; Stoyanov 2008; Kainberger 2003; Grabbe 2004). 
 
In conclusion, in terms of actors, the interplay of interests is reduced to the domestic 
decision makers of the countries targeted by the anti-corruption policies.  
  
The central research theme of such studies is mainly twofold: to understand what can 
boost EU leverage in the new member states, in order to accomplish the transfer of EU 
norms and rules; and record the impact of these reforms, mainly in institutional terms.  
Different studies have investigated themes such as: which are the most important 
determinants of domestic institutional change in combating corruption and reforming the 
judiciary systems in Bulgaria and Romania? (Spendzharova, Vachudova 2012a); how 
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efficient is the reward and sanctions policy of the EU and which domestic factors most 
hinder or enhance it (Spendzharova, Vachudova 2012 b), with particular reference to the 
Cooperation and Verification Mechanisms’ efficiency? (Toneva-Metodieva, 2014).  
 
Conclusions 
The main research questions addressed within the mainstream literature have focused on 
how the policy transfer was conducted and how faithfully the candidates fulfilled the EU’s 
requirements, but without asking why the conditionality was shaped in the way it was, or 
applying any critical questions about its enforcement or evaluation.  This has tended to 
reinforce the prevalent assumption that the interplay of power and interests lies only on 
the side of domestic political actors within countries such as Bulgaria and Romania, while 
freeing external actors, including the managers of the process, from any suspicion of 
carrying any ulterior agenda.  Thus, any failures in the policies themselves are attributed 
to the failures of actors within the countries on whom they are imposed, rather than 
questioning the efficiency of the policies themselves or, indeed, their managers’ 
intentions to promote efficiency.  The only explanation offered by the mainstream 
literature for the policies’ poor results in Bulgaria and Romania is the resistance of their 
domestic political class to the EU’s policies.  However, this argument cannot explain the 
negative impact these policies have had on the good functioning of the main democratic 
institutions, accountable to the Bulgarian and Romanian public, unless the very content 
of these policies is questioned.  
 
In short, although the mainstream literature on corruption in the EU has produced 
valuable contributions regarding the impact of these policies on the domestic policy of its 
target countries, it is not sufficiently conceptually comprehensive to explain the inefficacy 
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of the EU’s anti-corruption efforts implemented broadly. Rather, the mainstream 
literature has failed to notice that the EU’s anti-corruption policies seem to have 
exacerbated existing problems within the democratic political systems of the affected 
countries, nor offer any explanation for this. 
  
Studies on corruption outside the EU framework. 
Other studies, outside the EU framework, offer a different perspective. One stream of 
study is informed by a combination of neo-Marxist theory, to which is added a 
constructivist approach.   
An increasing number of studies critically assess the way corruption is framed by 
International Organizations, when targeting developing countries in South America, 
Africa and South Asia.  These studies come with a very different take on the issue of 
corruption, of a neo-Marxist inspiration built on Foucault stance on power and 
discourse(Foucault 1978). They reject the assumption that corruption is an objective 
phenomenon which needs some technical solutions. Instead it has been assumed that 
corruption, its definition, its solutions and their implementation are only a construct which 
cannot be de-linked from the interests of those who framed it and administered it and 
from the ideological context which generated them, which in this case is represented by 
neo-liberalism, the mainstream ideology (Polzer 2001; Moultrie 1998; Bernstein 1990; 
Bukovansky 2006; Bediharnoglu 2016; Brown and Cloke 2004; Hindess 2005; Harrison 
2006; Roden 2010; Bratis 2014).  
The main findings of this strand can be summed up  as it follows. Corruption has been 
framed in such a way as to promote neo-liberalism in the countries targeted by the anti-
corruption international campaigns. Its definition and the solutions devised by influential 
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IOs such as World Bank resulted in further shrinking the interventionist powers of the 
state in the internal market as well as the public sector, two of the core objectives on the 
neo-liberal agenda (Polzer 2001; Bratis 2014; Bediharnoglu 2016).  Moreover, the 
discourse of corruption has morally undermined the credibility of the state institutions, 
and in particular of the elected political class. Therefore,  instead of promoting “good 
governance” it only exacerbated the already existent problems in the struggling 
democracies from the developing world (Bukovansky 2006; Harrison 2006).  
Few studies have revealed that the sudden surge of interest in corruption recorded in the 
90s was only an artificially created issue in order to legitimize the intervention of 
international actors carrying a neo-liberal agenda of power and interests (Polzer 2001; 
Bedirhanoglu 2016;Bernstein 1990; Escobar 1995, Ferguson 1990, Ranis 1997) . It has 
been remarked that in this context that it is very common for development policy texts to 
construct a set of problems ideally a state of crisis, in order to justify intervention 
(Bernstein 1990, Polzer 2001; Gillies 1992). Case-studies on African and South American 
countries revealed that corruption was used as a very credible pretext to promote policies 
and measures which were opening the decisional structures to the influence of 
international actors such as the WB or IMF and which were creating favourable market 
conditions for the transnational capital (Heimann 1997; Marquette 2004; Jones 1996; 
Bediharnoglu 2007). 
 
Conclusion 
The striking aspect about this take on corruption is that it signals exactly the same problem 
that  the present research have noticed it in the EU case: inefficiency of addressing the 
very scope for which these policies were officially destined to and efficiency in promoting 
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the neo-liberal agenda of minimizing the state powers, undermining the credibility of the 
elected political class and promoting the influence of non-domestic, international actors.  
This literature offers both empirical evidences which legitimize the research bid proposed 
here. It is true that these studies address the issue of corruption outside the framework of 
the EU, however, the anti-corruption discourse is very similar because its has been 
promoted by the same international actors who were also invited to join the European 
Commission in the implementation of these policies in the Eastern Europe and in 
particular in Bulgaria and Romania.  
 
 
Critical Political Economy 
A critique of the mainstream literature and its conceptual premises can be reduced to a 
different set of ontological and epistemological premises. Critical Political Economy is 
an umbrella term for a relatively new branch of studies, mainly inspired by a neo-
Gramscian framework of analysis. 
 
 
The CPE strand is a newer approach in EU studies, which has arisen to answer the 
unresolved issued left by the mainstream pluralist approach. It was inspired by Gramsci’s 
idea of hegemony, and was repackaged first by Robert Cox (1998), and later on by 
Cafruny and Ryner (2002) and it was then applied to EU studies. 
 
 
Unlike the mainstream literature, the CPE strand is critically aware of the neo-liberal bias 
which permeates the EU policies. Following a Marxist logic of class struggle, the core 
neo-Gramscian ideas are that: the dominant contemporary elite is the transnational 
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capitalist class, and that its interests are promoted by neo-liberalism, with the support of 
the European Commission, as well as national and transitional epistemic communities.  
The European Union is the main instrument within Europe which promotes these interests 
and ideology (Apeldoorn et al. 2008; Apeldoorn 2002; Bailey 2006, 2010, 2011; Bieler 
and Morton 2001, 2004; Bieler 2002, 2005; Bohle 2006, 2005, 2008; Horn 2008; 
Ivanonva 2007; Holman 2001; Holman and Pijl 2003).  This vein of literature has 
produced evidence that the main rationale behind the EU Enlargements has generally 
promoted the hegemony of the transnational capitalist class, by restructuring the 
economies of those countries joining the EU, according to a neo-liberal regime.  As a 
consequence, the labour force, its main opponent, has been disempowered. (Bieler and 
Morton 2001, 2004; Bieler 2000, 2005). 
 
 
Research conducted specifically on Eastern Enlargement has come up with the view that 
the Eastern Enlargement has provided a market place in which to sell a radical recipe of 
neo-liberalism to former communist countries. From this viewpoint, the vagueness of  the 
Copenhagen economic conditionality has been used by the European Commission in 
order to promote an aggressive type of neo-liberalism, under a brand of shock therapy 
and privatization; a formula of neo-liberalism which the old member states themselves 
did not accept at home (Ivanova 2007; Horn 2008; Holman 2001, 2003; Bohle 2007, 
2008; Shields 2011, 2012, 2007). 
 
 
Those who supported such hegemonic interests formed a so-called “historical bloc”, 
which was an alliance between the transnational capitalists, the political class from the 
older, Western members of the EU, the European Commission and a network of national 
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and international epistemic communities (Holman 2003; Bohle 2006, 2005, 2008). In this 
alliance, the European Commission has been the main supporter of transnational capital 
interests in two respects: it used the powerful leverage of conditionality in its hands, in 
order to impose a radical version of neo-liberalism on the Eastern candidates during the 
accession process; and it was the main catalyst for creating a network of domestic 
“organic intellectuals”, think tanks and NGOs whose main role was to amplify its neo-
liberal agenda and to pressurize the domestic elites to accept it (Holman 2001, 2003; 
Bohle 2005; Horn 2005). 
 
The theory refers to hegemony as a phenomenon that is manifest not only at the economic 
level, but also runs through the social and political patterns of a society (Cox 1993; 
Gramsci 1971; Gill 2003).  Studies on Enlargement and the EU mainly cover economic 
aspects or economic-related aspects, such as the issue of the struggle of the labour force 
with transnational capitalism.  Bailey, who noticed this empirical gap, argued that this is 
a result of drawing predominantly upon Marxist approaches (Bailey 2010). In so doing, 
the critical accounts of the EU and Enlargement are largely based on economic 
determinism. 
 
 
This is a major empirical gap, as conditionality has not only an economic dimension, but 
also a political/social one, which has been equally important. The case study of the 2007 
Enlargement shows that the double standards and patterns of inequality existed not only 
in the economic sector of conditionality but also on the political side. The very fact that 
the European Commission placed the issue of corruption in the political conditionality 
forces such an approach. 
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Explaining use of the inductive approach  
 
Whether anti-corruption policies are used to root out corruption, or to contribute to the 
establishment of a new European order and undermine the nation states, in favour of 
supranational actors, is a topic of discussion of major salience.  Here, the research starts 
with an empirical discussion about the contradictions displayed by the EC in the particular 
case of Bulgaria and Romania. It continues with a very detailed analysis of the EC 
discourse on corruption and confirms the working hypothesis that, at least in the specific 
case of these two actors, rooting out corruption was not the real concern of the EC. 
Instead, it reveals that such policies were used primarily to promote the interests of the 
EU and its supporters within domestic civil society, at the expense of the elected political 
power. 
  
 
The general lack of critique in the literature on the subject has forced an inductive 
approach, not commonly used in the scholarship of political sciences. Indeed, this is 
particularly rare in the sector of EU studies, where deductive methodology is dominant. 
In practice, of course, there is no such thing as a purely inductive or deductive method. 
 
In embarking on a discussion of the various theoretical stances, it is important to note the 
limited range of objective literature. There is not even a single work which has a 
revisionist, critical view of the EU discourse on corruption. All EU scholarship has 
internalized the EU official rationale, with all its consequences: corruption is understood 
as an objective structural problem, which its anti-corruption policies are designed to 
solve.  The role of the Commission is to help the targeted countries to solve this problem. 
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The whole process of evaluation and monitoring is a technocratic one, based on 
meritocratic and fair criteria.  The Commission is a neutral actor, with no vested interests 
at stake, its Progress Reports are accurate representations of the anti-corruption efforts of 
the candidates and therefore they can be used as a hard source of information. This view 
has been so successfully promoted by the EU that suspicions of power interplay have 
been overlooked and there has been little or no sensitivity to the contradictions displayed 
in the way anti-corruption policies have been implemented by the EC. 
 
Going back to the main research questions of how efficient the EC’s policies are and 
which domestic factors prevent their implementation, there has actually been no attempt 
to question the way in which the EU formulated and implemented its conditionality in 
this sector. Above all, no one has questioned the intentions behind the policies or the 
power implications. The mainstream literature does not question the EU agenda, so all 
theories on Enlargement and conditionality stem from the fundamental assumption that 
they are in the general interest of member states, excluding any suspicions about 
alternative agendas. 
 
 
By contrast, Critical Political Economy comes up with a view, strongly inspired by the 
neo-Gramscian tradition, that: the EU carries out a hegemonic agenda, designed to 
promote a neo-liberal ideology, to minimize the role of the national state, to undermine 
the welfare system and the power of the working class and to promote the interests of 
transnational corporations, at the expense of domestic rooted business. Despite its more 
promising theoretical toolkit, most of the research generated by it focuses on the way the 
neo-liberal agenda is carried out at the economic level, the focus being on the way the 
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interests of transnational capital have been boosted by EU economic policy. Even the 
research on the role of civil society and experts (“organic intellectuals”) – a subject 
important to the topic addressed here – is discussed in connection with the power of 
transnational capital. 
 
 
The problem with the EU narrative on corruption is not only that it has gone unchallenged. 
The way it was framed, first and foremost it targeted the structures of political power. It 
is not random that corruption, as a phenomenon with consequences in the economic 
realm, was placed among political criteria. Consequently, the empirical contradictions 
that triggered the hypothesis of this research were discovered in the area of political power 
and institutions (e.g.  reform of the judicial sector, and legislation addressing political 
corruption and organized crime). It was political power and state institutions that were 
first and most visibly affected by the introduction of anti-corruption policies. With the 
exception of public procurement, the regulation of economic activity occupies a 
significantly smaller place in the anti-corruption strategy. Critical political economy 
literature has been almost exclusively preoccupied with the economic and class-struggle 
implications of the EU neo-liberal agenda, being faithful from this perspective to the 
traditional Marxist approach. 
 
 
Consequently, on the one hand, there is a massively developed literature, which does not 
question the EU dominant discourse on corruption, and on the other, the critical camp 
does not appear to have even noticed this issue. Outside of EU studies, there have been 
few voices challenging the mainstream framework to any extent. Some observers have 
noticed the neo-liberal bias in the way corruption was framed (Holmes 2006; Hodgson 
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and Jiang 2007; Chang 2002), or they have come up with evidence for the artificial way 
in which the old phenomenon of corruption was inflated by international actors and 
transformed into a major issue of global governance (Georgescu 2006). There have also 
been voices that remarked on the fact that anti-corruption measures did not seem to apply 
to major cases of corruption that involved transnational capital. Nevertheless, the 
literature has remained narrow in scope, with little depth of analysis, limited empirical 
case studies and, above all, it has been developed in total isolation from the EU itself. 
 
 
It has been difficult, therefore, for this research to start by asking the direct question of 
who won and who lost in terms of power, before demonstrating that this was what 
deserved to be the central research question. This is because the mainstream literature 
completely assumes that rooting out corruption has been the genuine purpose of the 
 
EU’s policies. If so, the question of who won and who lost as a result of this effort is 
relatively unimportant. If, for example, the national state is depleted of some of its powers 
as a result of anti-corruption policies, this is not a relevant issue as long as, in doing so, it 
solved or diminished a problem that affected the welfare of the general public. From this 
perspective, the question of power and interests is not meaningful. Nor is the neo-
Gramsci-inspired critical literature helpful in this area, for reasons already mentioned. 
 
Consequently, the present research had to start by demonstrating in the first instance why 
there are reasons to believe that the EU’s narrative on corruption was not informed by the 
genuine intention of solving a systemic problem but, rather, was a smoke screen for 
promoting a new European order which essentially minimizes the powers of the national 
state. This can only be done by exposing the empirical contradictions and inconsistencies 
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in the EU’s behaviour. The Bulgarian/Romanian case displayed obvious tensions between 
the official technocratic discourse of the EC and the way it was applied. 
 
 
Methodology 
Explaining the predominantly inductive approach   
Whether anti-corruption policies are used to root out corruption, or to contribute to the 
establishment of a new European order and undermine the nation states in favour of 
supranational actors, is a topic of discussion of major salience.  In other circumstances, 
this issue should have been the opening hypothesis followed by a testing theoretical 
framework.  Instead, the research has a predominant inductive approach. It starts with an 
empirical discussion about the contradictions displayed by the EC in the particular case 
of Bulgaria and Romania, in order to test the working hypothesis that, at least in the 
specific case of these two actors, rooting out corruption was not the primary concern of 
the EC.    
 
Indeed, this inductive approach is particularly rare in the sector of EU studies, where the 
deductive methodology is dominant. In practice, of course, there is no such thing as a 
purely inductive or deductive method. The main reason for this rather unusual 
methodology has been triggered by the gap in the literature on corruption in the EU. 
 
There is not one single work which has a revisionist, critical view of the EU discourse on 
corruption. All EU scholarship has internalized the logic of the evaluation/enforcement 
process. This also explains why it is necessary to explore which were the general 
36 
 
 
criteria/standards used by the Commission in the anti-corruption area of conditionality. It 
is important to note that the present research does not intend to come up with an analysis 
of the conditionality. The discussion here will focus on the meaning conferred by the EC 
itself to its standard EU official rationale.   
  
The mainstream literature, as already discussed, does not question the EU agenda, so all 
theories on Enlargement and conditionality stem from the fundamental assumption that 
they are in the general interest of member states, excluding any suspicions about 
alternative agendas.  It has been difficult, therefore, for this research to start by asking the 
direct question of who won and who lost in terms of power, before demonstrating that 
this was what deserved to be the central research question. This is because the mainstream 
literature completely assumes that rooting out corruption has been the genuine purpose 
of the EU’s policies.  
 
Consequently, the present research had to start by demonstrating in the first instance why 
there are reasons to believe that EU’s narrative on corruption was not informed by the 
genuine intention of solving a systemic problem but, rather, was a smoke screen for 
promoting a new European order, which essentially minimizes the powers of the national 
state. This can only be done by exposing the empirical contradictions and inconsistencies 
in the EU’s behaviour. The Bulgarian/Romanian case displayed obvious tensions between 
the official technocratic discourse of the EC and the way it was applied. 
 
This brings us to the second aspect of methodology, which in itself is a novelty in the 
literature on EU: the Content Analysis performed on Progress Reports for Bulgaria and 
37 
 
 
Romania between 2000 and 2004, before the negotiations for accession.  The scope of 
this analysis is to confirm the working hypothesis that this process was marred by 
systematic double standards.  The existence of double standards is always an indicator of 
power asymmetry and most importantly, of the existence of a hidden agenda behind the 
official rationale. In this case their systematic existence would confirm that fighting 
corruption was not the main purpose of the policies advanced by the EU. It would, 
therefore, legitimize, a research approach which was not interested in the efficiency of 
the anti-corruption effort and which does not regard them from a moral point  perspective 
(rooting out corruption is in the public interest), but instead it will look at these policies 
exclusively from the perspective of who won and who lost in terms of power.  Confirming 
the existence of systematic double standards is therefore essential to the research logic of 
this paper. 
 
How do we test the existence of systematic double standards? 
a)  Deciding where to look  
In this case, the whole issue of testing the existence of double standards relates to the 
way the European Commission built up the more approved or less favourable 
evaluations of the two countries. 
 
The first place to look for double standards is the Progress Reports. They are the main 
official texts which communicate EC opinion. Their importance is also crucial in the logic 
of enlargement: if the Commission considered that the candidates had not sufficiently 
progressed in implementing the agreed conditions, they were not allowed to conclude the 
negotiations.  Also, the contradictions which triggered the main hypothesis of this 
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research have been based on information provided by these Reports.  Consequently, in 
order to understand how the Commission built up a favourable (or less favourable) image 
of a candidate, it is important to examine the linguistic content of the Progress Reports.  
 
b)  What to look for 
Linguistically the Commission’s opinion is expressed through a number of positive or 
negative statements. In general, such statements are of two types. They can refer to 
various anti-corruption measures that the countries are required to implement (the anti-
corruption criteria): e.g. “No progress has been made…concerning MP’s immunity” 
(Progress Report for Bulgaria 2002). Or they are general assessments of corruption: 
“Surveys indicate that corruption remains a serious problem”.  Consequently, if Bulgaria 
scores more positive statements than Romania, then it is important to know what triggered 
them, how they were created, which were aspects of their anti-corruption activity and 
which assessments monopolized the negative or positive opinion of the Commission. The 
main point is to test whether the Commission picked and chose among its various criteria, 
by focusing on what was positive, while neglecting what was negative, and vice-versa. 
 
This involves two stages of analysis:  the first one is to quantify the number of 
positive/negative statements issued and to correlate them with the criteria on which the 
countries’ progress was judged. The second is to compare and contrast the results between 
the two countries (Bulgaria and Romania) and determine whether the Commission’s 
judgement respected the technocratic criteria of evaluation: meritocracy, fairness and 
efficiency. Identifying double standards within a text, in a systematic manner requires a 
precise methodology. Content Analysis is the method used for text quantitative analysis  
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Content Analysis of the EC’s Progress Reports for Bulgaria and Romania for 2000-
2004 (period of accession) 
The widely recognized role of CA is to formulate and substantiate a precise empirical 
hypothesis. According to the programmatic document “On content Analysis” by Leites 
and Sola Pool, there are three widely accepted main general functions of CA, which apply 
here. The first is the ability of CA to test/confirm a working hypothesis already presumed 
as valid. In this case, the CA is used to confirm the working hypothesis that the 
Commission’s evaluation process, as evidenced by its annual Progress Reports, was 
marred by systematic double standards and contradictions.  
 
Second, the CA is generally used to correct “optical illusions” which might be shared by 
the majority of specialists. In this case, the “optical illusion” is the general assumption 
that the Commission’s evaluation work was conducted in a technocratic manner, on fair 
and meritocratic principles, and that the sole purpose of the process was to root out 
corruption.  
 
The third function is to allow the formulation of a new hypothesis – in this case, 
establishing that the process was not technocratic – which leads on to the second part of 
the research.  This examines whether a power restructuring agenda was being established 
and carried out, using the discourse on (or against) anti-corruption as a vehicle. 
 
At its most basic, Content Analysis has been described as a word-frequency count, with 
the assumption that this generates inferences about matters of importance.  CA is a 
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method that attempts to characterize the meaning in a given body of discourse in a 
systematic and quantitative fashion. Content analysis is the statistical semantics of 
political discourse (Franzosi 2007:21).  This is the case here.  
 
CA has been around for long time and there is a massive literature accumulated along this 
line.  Although, initially it was applied to political sciences (Laswell, 1942; Kaplan 1941), 
later on, it was borrowed by a wide range of disciplines, from gender to mental health 
studies.  
 
The first consideration in choosing a tool kit (or, in this case, a coding system) is that it 
is both suitable and reliable.  Proven reliability means that it has previously been 
successfully tested in similar instances. This presents some challenges, since there is a 
vast selection of available texts to which the CA can be applied and an equally vast 
number of research questions that can be raised and shape the objective of the CA. What 
increases the difficulty in this particular case is that a CA has not been used before on EU 
documents in general and in the case of Progress Reports in particular.  Fortunately, this 
type of analysis, involving a correlation between evaluative statements and various text 
categories in order to extract patterns of biases and double standards, has been used quite 
extensively in other areas, from gender studies to education (Holsti 1969; Lands and Koch 
1977, Mosteller and Wallace 1964, Roberts 1997; Shapiro and Markoff 1977; Stemler 
and Bebell 1998; Weber 1990).  
 
The analysis of language rests at the core of the CA, using word quantification and 
correlations between quantified data.  This is generally known as a coding system, which 
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involves creating a system by which information is put into quantifiable form – for 
example, using characters, words or groups of words for defining notions that need to be 
analysed (Holsti 1969; Lands and Koch 1977, Mosteller and Wallace 1964).   
Interviews 
The study follows a qualitative approach, being the most appropriate for the theoretical 
and empirical questions raised here, which address the meaning, process and context in 
which the issue of corruption emerged.   
 
The interviews took place between 2009 and 2011 and they covered most of the actors 
and institutions involved in the process: The European Commission, relevant NGOs, and 
relevant officials of the two countries. 
 
The interviews were used both as a source of information, as well as for cross-checking 
them with the results of the Content Analysis. An overview of the interviewees and their 
affiliation are discussed in detail in Appendix 1.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
 Content Analysis 
 
 
Introduction 
As highlighted in the introductory chapter, the working hypothesis suggests a series of 
important inconsistencies and contradictions in the way the EC issued its judgment 
regarding the Bulgarian/Romanian fight against corruption.  The purpose of this chapter, 
therefore, is to test the working hypothesis that the European Commission’s management 
of anti-corruption conditionality in Bulgaria and Romania employs double standards. If 
this proves to be the case, the implication would be that their true purpose was something 
other than their declared intentions of rooting out corruption and achieving targets to 
reduce or eliminate it. This thesis will be tested by performing a content (quantitative) 
linguistic analysis (CA) on the Commission Progress Reports for Bulgaria and Romania 
between 2000 and 2004. 
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This chapter will start by discussing the method used to test the working hypothesis 
guiding this thesis [Part I], Followed by the coding results of the European commission 
progress reports for Romania and Bulgaria [Part II].  
 
 
Part I:  Content Analysis 
As referred to in the introduction, the general steps that are followed in any CA are the 
following (Holsti 1969; Lands and Koch 1977, Mosteller and Wallace 1964, Fairclough 
1989): 
 
1. Categories and sub-categories. Identifying the type of standards (the categories) 
and sub-categories that need to be quantified.   
2. Coding units. Breaking the text into those components (sentences, clauses, 
paragraphs) that allow us to identify the evaluative negative or positive statements 
made in regard to the categories (the standards) used by the Commission. 
3. Quantification. Transforming the information into a quantifiable form. The coding 
per se.  
4. Conclusions. Compare and contrast the quantitative results between the two 
countries (Bulgaria and Romania) and in time from one Progress Report to 
another. 
 
1 (A) Categories 
To put it simply, a category is “a group of words with similar meaning or connotations” 
(Weber 1990).    
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The main starting point, before devising the coding system, is to clarify which data are 
being analysed and how we define them. This is usually known as categorizing the data 
or, in other words, defining the categories that need to be quantified. The most important 
problem with defining categories is the level of reliability. In other words, it is crucial to 
eliminate as far as possible any subjectivity in the way such categories are defined. This 
is because “categories themselves exercise the most fundamental influence on results” 
(Laswell, 1942: 19).  Here, this problem has been solved because such categories and 
sub-categories were created by the author of the texts, the European Commission itself. 
The researcher only needed to map them and present them in a more systematic manner 
(see previous chapter). 
  
In this case, by ‘categories’ are meant the anti-corruption policies that the EC devised for 
the candidate countries. The adoption and implementation of these policies generated the 
standards/criteria used by the Commission to measure progress in the anti-corruption 
area.    
 
According to the Commission, there are three stages of anti-corruption strategy and each 
one of them bears a different importance in the general logic of evaluation of a candidate’s 
progress. 
 
1. Planning. The National Anti-Corruption Plan 
2. Adoption. Adoption of legislation and performing institutional change, according 
to Brussels’ requirements 
3. Results/implementation. Results of the above 
4. General assessments of corruption 
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The next step in the CA is to come up with the list of words or group of words that allows 
the reader to identify the above-mentioned categories in the text. That is because, most of 
the time, each category can be expressed through a variety of synonyms or groups of 
words. In this case, our categories refer to general stages of implementing various anti-
corruption policies. Therefore, it is important to identify which actions/policies belong to 
which category.  This is made possible by cross-checking the Commission’s main 
documents from 1997 and 2003, where it lays down the general strategy on corruption 
with the progress reports for Bulgaria and Romania and with the benchmarks of the 
Cooperation and Verification Mechanism. The latter indicates which aspects of the anti-
corruption policies were most important for the Commission. 
 
1) Planning 
In the first paragraph of its “Ten principles for improving the fight against corruption in 
acceding candidate and other third countries”, the Commission stated: “…. National anti-
corruption strategies or programmes, covering both preventive and repressive measures 
should be drawn up and implemented. These strategies should be subject to broad 
consultation at all levels” (Commission 2003 a:25).  Concretely, the Commission starts 
many of its Progress Reports for all ten Eastern candidates with evaluative statements 
regarding their National Anti-Corruption Plan (Commission 2002 Czech:26).  At the 
beginning of each year (in Spring), the Government of each country has to forward to the 
EC a report as to what has been realized and what needs to be realized according to the 
above Plan (Commission 2001 Czech:25;  2002:24). 
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In the Progress Reports, texts and references to the Planning stage can be identified with 
the following groups of words, which are synonyms for this category. Figure (3.1) shows 
a list of groups of words which can be identified as references to the Planning stage.  
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Figure 3.1: Linguistic references to planning stage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These have been compiled from the Progress Reports for Bulgaria and Romania covering 
the accession for negotiations during the period 2000-2004. 
 
2) Adoption of legislation and institutional change 
This is a considerably more complex category, which is represented by the next stage of 
the anti-corruption policy.  Again, in the “Ten principles for improving the fight against 
corruption”, paragraph 2, the EC mentions that “Future EU members shall fully align with 
the EU acquis and ratify and implement all main international anti-corruption instruments 
they are party to…” (Commission 2003:25). This is also a natural step in the logic of anti-
corruption policy: inserting the anti-corruption measures in the national legislation. 
 
In its 1997 and 2003 documents, the Commission detailed what the anti-corruption 
legislation and institutional change meant more exactly.  The Commission makes clear 
Linguistic reference to Planning stage/category 
-  National Strategy against corruption 
-  Action Plan 
-  Strategy 
-  Strategy for the fight against corruption 
-  National Anti-Corruption Plan 
-  National Strategy for Combating corruption  
-  National Plan for the Prevention of Corruption 
-  Programme for the Prevention of Corruption 
-  Agenda 
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from the very beginning that the anti-corruption strategy has two legs: prevention and 
criminalization. In 1997, the Commission stated that:  
“A distinction should be made between corruption in the narrower criminal law 
sense and corruption in a broader socio-economic sense. This distinction is 
necessary because, in accordance with the rule of law principles, criminal law 
provisions require unambiguous, precise language, while the concept of 
corruption can be more general, while responding to the purpose of crime 
prevention. In this context, the definition of corruption could embrace concepts 
such as integrity, transparency, accountability and good governance” 
(Commission 2003:14). 
 
In the same document, the Commission fleshed out more exactly what is comprised in 
the two dimensions.  Prevention includes: transparency – laws on transparency and access 
to data; integrity – laws regarding conflict of interests; assets declaration; political 
accountability – which concerns the immunity of decision makers: MPs and members of 
the government – ministries; party financing (Commission 2003:20, 25-26).    
 
The Annexes of the same document further include in the same category regulations to 
be taken in the public administration: Code of Ethics, Civil Service laws (employability, 
training, staffing, recruitment, salaries and social rights) (Commission 2003: 25). The 
administrative reform requires: “the establishment of a single anti-corruption unit or a 
single coordinating body” which would help in “improving the co-ordination between 
different state institutions” responsible for fighting corruption (Commission 2003: 20). 
Another criterion (No. 8 of the ‘Ten commandments’) states that, as part of the 
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prevention, an awareness-raising campaign should be established to help decrease 
people’s tolerance to corruption. Civil societies (NGOs) and international watchdogs (e.g. 
Transparency International) “have an important role to play in preventing and fighting 
the problem” (Commission 2003:26). 
 
In the same category of adopting anti-corruption legislation, measures are also entered to 
target economics and, in particular, law on public procurement, which ensures that the 
privatization of public assets honours the rule of free competition, thus avoiding 
favouritism towards businesses which have an illicit connection with political decision 
makers. 
 
The second leg is the criminalization of corruption and it consists of two types of actions 
that need to be taken by the candidate. The first is to change the legislation, more exactly 
the Penal Code, so that corruption can become a criminal offence. This makes prosecution 
and sentencing easier.  Also belonging to this category is the international legislation on 
corruption, to which the candidate countries must align their national legislation by 
ratifying and implementing such international agreements (Commission 2003:25). 
 
The creation of judicial bodies specialized in prosecuting corruption cases and, in 
particular corruption at the highest level of policy-making (elected politicians) represents 
the second dimension of criminalizing corruption, according to the EU view:  
“anti-corruption laws are important but more important is their implementation 
by competent and visible anti-corruption bodies – well trained and specialized 
services such as anti-corruption prosecutors” (Commission 2003: 25).   
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The role of the prosecutor is accordingly strengthened in the system. The Commission is 
particularly insistent on reforming this sector of justice, by granting the prosecutor a 
special position inside it, enhanced independence from political interference (including 
the Ministry of Justice), increased powers to start investigations into high-level cases of 
corruption and better payment. Figure 3.2 summarises the key aspects found in adoption 
stage.  
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Figure 3.2: Adoption stage summary 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Two legged strategy: Legislative framework – State institutions/public sector 
 
The five-legged legislation 
of: Transparency, decision-
makers immunity, party 
financing, asset declaration, 
conflict of interests 
Public administration  
Code of Ethics in Public Administration 
Civil Service laws 
employability/training/recruitment/  
staffing/salary 
Institutional 
Setting 
Judiciary –  
Specialized anti-
corruption 
judicial body 
Important role for 
the Prosecutor  
Preventive -structural reform of 
power/ state institutions 
Criminalization  of 
corruption 
Economics 
Law for Public procurement: making 
more difficult for political decision-
makers to privatize public assets 
without a fair bid. 
Civil Society  
Involvement of civil society 
in fighting corruption by 
awareness raising campaigns 
Legislation  
Laws criminalizing 
corruption: Making it 
easier to prosecute 
cases of corruption. 
Alignment to 
International 
Agreements on 
corruption of: OECD 
(GRECO), United 
Nations, Council of 
Europe.  
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Based on the Commission’s general guidelines from its documents (Commission 1997; 
2003) correlated with the text of the Progress Reports for Bulgaria and Romania between 
2000-2004, the following list of groups of words was compiled, with which the second 
category of CA can be identified:  Adoption of anti-corruption legislation and institutional 
change.  
 
Such groups of words define the above-mentioned policies that a candidate needs to 
adopt, according to the EC’s requirements. These policies are a part of the second stage. 
Figure 3.3, summarises the group of words used in identifying the second category.  
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Figure 3.3: Words used to identify second category   
Groups of words for identifying the second category: 
the Adoption of the anti-corruption legislative/institutional framework 
- Law 
- Legislation   
- Legal framework 
- Prevention of corruption 
- Public register law   
- Penal code   
- The civil service law   
- Code of Ethics for Public servants 
- Code of ethical behaviour 
- Licensing and registration regimes 
- Tax procedure code  
- Public procurement law 
- Privatization law 
- NGOs (civil society) 
- Public acceptance 
- Public awareness 
- Ratification of Council of Europe Civil Law Convention, GRECO of Council of 
Europe, OECD convention 
- Aligning with the acquis 
- Law enforcement bodies   
- Financing the political parties 
- Making more transparent the financing of political parties 
- Immunity 
- Asset declaration 
- Property disclosure 
- Conflict of interest law 
- Law on access to Public Information 
- Administration, Administrative    
- Administrative bodies  
- Local administration 
- Institutional structure 
- General prosecutor office 
- Penal code 
- National Anti-corruption Office 
- Ministry of Interior 
- Police 
- Judiciary, the judiciary system 
- The justice 
- The prosecutor 
- Anti-corruption Units inside government, ministries, police, justice… 
- Organized crime 
- National service for combating organized crime 
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3) Implementation 
The results are, after all, what makes the above-mentioned policies and measures 
efficient. Without concrete results, the whole process can be considered useless and it 
would not then fit into a technocratic logic of “solving the problem”. Consequently, in its 
“10 principles for improving the fight against corruption”, the Commission makes clear 
that this is the most important stage: “Anti-Corruption laws are important, but more 
important is their implementation by competent and visible anti-corruption bodies (i.e. 
well trained and specialized services such as anti-corruption prosecutors) (Commission 
2003:25) or “....the true problem of the fight against corruption seems to lie rather in the 
field of implementing these laws" (Commission 2003: 11).  
    
Concretely, in its Progress Reports for all candidate countries, the Commission expresses 
the same idea, that the implementation of anti-corruption policies is the most important 
stage in the anti-corruption process and, therefore, more important than the previous two 
stages: planning and adoption. Indeed, it is the most important one in the logical 
evaluation of candidate countries’ progress: e.g. “Despite a legal framework that is 
reasonably comprehensive...law enforcement remains weak.” (Commission Progress 
Report for Romania 2002) or “GRECO has noted that Bulgaria has made more progress 
in the adoption of legislation than in its implementation and enforcement” (Commission 
PR for Bulgaria 2003); or “The legal framework for fighting corruption is relatively well-
developed. Therefore, the Romanian government should focus attention on enforcing 
existing legislation” (Commission PR Romania 2003). 
 
 
55 
 
 
By “implementation” or “enforcement” the Commission understands bringing to justice 
and convicting corrupt decision makers: "The true problem of the fight against corruption 
seems to lie rather in the field of implementation of these laws: ...preventing, 
investigating, prosecuting and adjudicating corruption cases" (Commission 2003: 11).   
The EC explicitly links the perceived levels of corruption (a Transparency International 
ranking) with the number of prosecutions: “There has been a reduction in perceived levels 
of corruption and the number of successful prosecutions remains low, particularly for 
high-level corruption” (Romania Report 2004) or:  
“The priority for the Romanian government must be to ensure the enforcement of 
existing legislation. Despite the suspensions from party studies of a number of 
high-profile regional and local politicians, none of these cases has yet led to 
criminal sanctions during the reporting period” (Romania Report 2004); 
“The GRECO report noted that Bulgaria has made more progress in the adoption 
of the legislation, rather than in its implementation and enforcement…It noted that 
criminal procedure was slow and that relatively few cases of corruption have 
resulted in judicial sanctions in comparison with the estimated level of corruption” 
(Bulgaria Report 2002). 
  
Besides, in the fifty Progress Reports for the ten candidates during 2000-2004, the number 
of entries for the words "judiciary" and "prosecution" is the highest if compared with all 
the other institutions and measures that need to be taken, as shown in Table 3.1.  
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Table 3.1: number of words for Judiciary and Prosecution 
 
Judiciary  
(related terms: 
prosecution. 
convictions, 
cases brought  
to justice )  
Public 
procurement 
Police/ 
Customs 
Health  Education Justice  Taxation 
218 112 103 72 48 45 43 
 
*Source: European Commission Progress Reports, Anti-corruption section, 1998-2004 for all Eastern candidate 
countries – Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia.  
 
 
Whenever the Commission discussed the results of implementing the legislation, these 
were measured by the number of prosecutions and convictions brought to justice.  This 
was the case for the Czech Republic (e.g. Commission 2001, 2002, 03), as well as for 
Hungary (Commission 01; 03), Poland (Commission 2001; 2002, 2003), Slovakia (2001, 
2002), Lithuania (2001,2002) and Latvia (2001,2002,2003). From the first wave of 
Enlargement, the only exceptions made were Estonia and Slovenia, who were considered 
as having a lesser problem with corruption.  
 
In the Bulgarian and Romanian case, the number of successful prosecutions – particularly 
for high-level corruption (elected politicians) and mafia mobs – became a matter of top 
priority, that necessitated the extension of the EU’s surveillance mechanisms (the 
Cooperation and Verification Mechanism – CVM) after these countries became members 
of the EU: a first in the history of EU Enlargements.  The request for prosecuting high-
level corrupt politicians became Benchmark 4 of CVM for Bulgaria: “Conduct and report 
on professional, non-partisan investigations into allegations of high-level corruption. 
Report on internal inspections of public institutions and on the publication of assets of 
high-level officials” (Commission 2006a). Also, for Benchmark 3, it is stated that 
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Romania:  “…building on progress already made, continues to conduct professional, non-
partisan investigations into allegations of high-level corruption” (Commission 2006 b). 
 
After 2005, organized crime became a matter of sudden concern and therefore a part of 
the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism. Bringing to justice mafia mobs is 
Benchmark 6 in the CVM, aiming to:  
“Implement a strategy to fight organized crime, focusing on serious crime, as well 
as on the systematic confiscation of assets of criminals. Report on new and 
ongoing investigations, indictments and convictions in these areas” (Commission 
2006 a:25).   
Moreover, Bulgaria’s lack of achievements in the area of prosecuting and convicting 
mafia mobs and high-flying politicians was one of the two reasons invoked by the EC to 
freeze around 200 million PHARE funding in 2008 (another first in the history of EU 
Enlargements).  Consequently, based on the Commission’s documented general 
guidelines (Commission 1997; 2003), correlated with the text of the Progress Reports for 
Bulgaria and Romania between 2000-2004, as shown in Figure 3.4, the following list of 
groups of words has been compiled, with which the third category of CA can be 
identified:  Implementation of anti-corruption policies. 
 
The use of these groups of words indicates the existence of aspects that, in the EC’s view, 
show practical results of the anti-corruption policies: prosecution and conviction of cases 
of corruption. 
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Figure 3.4: Group of words used in identifying the third stage: 
 
Groups of words with which the third category of the CA can be 
identified: implementation of anti-corruption policies 
-  Law enforcement 
-  Implementation 
-  Criminal sanctions 
-  National Anti-Corruption Office activity 
-  Investigations 
-  Convictions 
-  Prosecutions 
-  Prison sentences 
-  Investigation of cases of corruption 
-  Cases brought to court 
-  Prosecutors 
-  Pre-trial procedures 
 
 
4) General assessments 
 
The language of the Progress Reports is not always standardized. Although most of its 
evaluative statements refer specifically to anti-corruption policies, there are others which 
cannot be placed in the above categories (planning, adoption, implementation). Broader 
statements can, however, be taken as comments on how serious the phenomenon of 
corruption is considered for society in general:  “Corruption continues to be a very serious 
problem in Bulgaria” (Bulgaria 2001); “Corruption continues to be considered as one of 
the main problems facing Bulgarian society” (Bulgaria 2001); “Last year regular reports 
noted that corruption was a widespread and systemic problem” (Romania 2000); 
“Corruption affects the society and has detrimental effects on the economy and has led to 
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a loss of confidence in the public authorities” (Romania 2000).   They can also quote the 
international and domestic NGOs’ surveys on levels of corruption, international rankings, 
public perception index (e.g. Transparency International):  “Surveys and assessments 
conducted by both national and international organizations confirm that corruption 
continues to be perceived as a serious problem” (Bulgaria 2004), “There has been no 
reduction in the perceived levels of corruption” (Romania 2004) or “International reports 
and surveys indicate that corruption in Romania continues to be widespread and affects 
all of society.” (Romania 2004); “Bulgaria’s ranking in indexes of international 
perceptions has improved” (Bulgaria 2002); “Independent observers have concluded that 
there has been no noticeable reduction in the levels of corruption” (Romania 2002).  There 
are also statements which have the value of a conclusion, as they have remarked on 
whether the country made satisfactory progress from one year to the other: “Measures to 
tackle corruption have been limited” (Romania 2001) and “There has been no substantial 
progress in the fight against corruption since the last Progress Report”; “Significant 
efforts were made during the reporting period to intensify the fight against corruption” 
(Romania 2004). 
 
Sometimes the Commission becomes slightly more specific when discussing the 
phenomenon of corruption by making reference to levels of corruption in decision 
making, public administration or economy: “Corruption remains important in the 
business sector” (Bulgaria 2004), “Some reports mention first signs of decline of petty 
corruption in the custom authorities, in the police and in the judicial system.” (Bulgaria 
2004), “Customs authorities linked to the judicial system, police and health sector are 
considered to be among the most corrupt groups”. Again, such statements do not refer to 
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any specific policy and stage of the anti-corruption strategy. Mostly, their role is to 
indicate which areas of society are particularly affected by corruption. So their role is 
more of a passive description of levels of corruption. In short, they do not give us 
information as to how conditionality is applied. 
 
It is important to pinpoint the difference between the previous three categories and the 
last one, that of “general assessments”. 
  
Based on the above information, the following list of groups of words has been compiled, 
which have now become full clauses, as shown in Figure 3.5. They enable the 
identification of “the general assessments category”.  
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Figure 3.5: Groups of words used to identify the third category 
Groups of words with which the third category of the CA can be identified: 
Implementation of anti-corruption policies 
-  Corruption is a wide and systemic problem 
-  Corruption is a very serious problem facing …society   
-  Corruption affects the society   
-  Has detrimental effects on the economy 
-  Has led to a loss of confidence in the public authorities 
-  No substantial progress in the fight against corruption   
-  Significant efforts were made to intensify the fight against corruption 
-  Measures have been taken to address corruption  
-  National and international surveys have been conducted 
-  Ranking in international surveys  
 
 
Conclusion 
Four categories have been identified. Three of them represent the stages of introducing 
anti-corruption, as well as specific policies and areas that need to be addressed.  The 
fourth is derived from the non-standardized character of the texts and is requested by the 
Content Analysis linguistic logic. The fourth category is particularly important because, 
when present, it epitomizes the general opinion of the Commission on how corruption is 
to be addressed by the candidate.  
 
The way in which these categories are interpreted in the evaluation is essential for tracing 
the existence of systematic double standards. 
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The Commission makes clear from the beginning a basic principle of a technocratic 
evaluation: results are the most important part of the whole anti-corruption strategy 
(Commission 1997; 2003).  This means that the stage of implementation of anti-
corruption is the most important, while the first stage, the planning of the strategy, comes 
last in importance: 
 
Planning < Adoption < Implementation 
A meritocratic evaluation of a country that has no significant results in the implementation 
stage cannot therefore gain a more favourable assessment than another one in the same 
situation.  Thus, the country’s image cannot be made any more or less favourable, except 
by selectively focusing on what is positive, while minimizing or ignoring the negative 
aspects.  This applies particularly to the most difficult and most important stage of 
conditionality – implementation. 
 
The last category of “general assessments” plays an important role in assessing the 
existence of double standards. It does not give information as to how the conditionality is 
applied by the candidate. However, the role of the assessments is to carry the general 
opinion of the evaluators, the Commission and the watchdogs of corruption that the 
Commission quotes. Therefore, if both countries display the same under-achievement at 
the implementation stage but, for one of them, the general assessments are more 
favourable or less critical than for its neighbour, then this is a good marker of double 
standards. 
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2. Sub-categories 
A relevant content analysis is a detailed one, which manages to ‘squeeze’ all the meaning  
from the text.  In order to do this, most CAs refine their tool by identifying further 
divisions within the text, according to the research needs (Holsti 1969; Lands and Koch 
1977, Mosteller and Wallace 1964). These are the so-called sub-categories.  In this case, 
the sub-categories are derived by the way the Commission itself has divided the anti-
corruption policies.  The types of decision-making (high-level, low-level or non-
governmental) and the area (political or economic) appear to be the main sub-divisions 
with which the Commission is concerned. 
 
 
 
a) Decision-making: High-level corruption – elected politicians 
The Commission makes a distinction between two levels of power. One is the high-level 
decision making which concerns “corruption cases of high-level authorities (Members of 
Parliament, Ministers, elected local government” (Commission 2002:26 - Progress 
Report for Hungary).  
 
The second is at a lower level of power, that is non-elected decision makers from the 
public administration, in particular, as they are defined by the EC in its ten principles for 
fighting corruption:  
“Integrity, accountability and transparency in public administration (judiciary, 
police, tax administration, health sector, public procurement) should be raised 
64 
 
 
through employing quality management tools and auditing and monitoring 
standards….” (Commission 2003:25). 
 
This distinction between the two levels of power is embedded in the way the anti-
corruption policies were devised by Brussels. Some of these polices exclusively target 
elected politicians.  This is the case for the five-legged legislation that all candidates are 
required to adopt: laws covering restriction of immunity for MPs and members of 
government; transparency of party financing; conflict of interest; asset declaration and 
transparency of information, Figure 3.6 portrays the detailed scheme.   
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Figure 3.6: 
 
Anti-corruption legislation targeting political corruption (elected decision-makers) 
 
 
Categories: Planning and Adoption 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
*Source:   Commission's Progress Reports for all candidate countries6 
                                                          
6 Hungary – 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003; Poland – 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002; Czech Republic – 2001, 2002; Slovakia – 2001, 2002; Slovenia – 2001, 2002;  
Latvia – 2000, 2001; Lithuania – 2001, 2002; Estonia – 1999, 2002, 2003; Bulgaria – 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004; Romania – 1999, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004. 
Asset declaration -
Control of personal 
wealth of decision 
makers.  
Allows 
identification of 
illegal benefits. 
 
                       Sub-category: 
          Political Corruption - High-Level  
- MPs and ex-MPs: members and ex-members of  
the government  
- Members of Justice/judicial system: high levels 
 
Conflict of 
interests - 
Allows early 
identification of  
opportunities for 
corruption. 
 
Party financing - 
Law that allows 
identification of 
clientelism, mainly 
between members 
of the party and 
businessmen. 
Immunity – 
Law that allows 
easier removal of 
decision makers’ 
immunity and 
subjection of 
decision makers to 
prosecution. 
 
Transparency of 
information – 
Fundamental in allowing 
corruption watchdogs 
(NGOs) to check up on 
asset declaration and 
conflicts of interest in party 
financing.  
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The five-legged legislation is necessary not only for prevention but also for facilitating 
the detection and prosecution of political corruption. Criminalization of high-level 
corruption is presented in the Progress Reports [PR] through the following main requests 
made by the Commission: the setting up of a judicial body specialized in prosecution of 
high-level cases of corruption; and legislative and administrative measures to ensure that 
such a body is independent of political interference (e.g. immune from interference by 
Parliament or the Ministry of Justice). Such special institutions or special procedures for 
tackling high-level corruption are mentioned in the case of most candidate countries.  For 
Romania, their special judicial body is “the National Anti-Corruption Office (NAPO), 
which is responsible for conducting investigation into high-level corruption or corruption 
involving state officials (Commission 2004b:21). In the Bulgarian case, this is mentioned 
later on in the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism, Benchmark 4. 
 
All these measures for prevention and criminalization of high-level corruption are part of 
the first two stages of anti-corruption policies: they have to be present in the National 
Anti-Corruption Plan requested by the Commission from each candidate; they have to be 
adopted in the national legislation and institutional setting of the country, and therefore, 
they are also part of the second stage and second category of the Content Analysis, as 
well as the Adoption of anti-corruption legislation and an appropriate institutional setting. 
    
The last and most important stage of implementation regards bringing to justice and 
conviction of corrupt individuals, as already discussed. High-level cases of corruption 
have a separate place within the Implementation stage. The Commission makes a 
qualitative distinction between bringing to justice high-level politicians and the lower 
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ranks of “decision making by complaining”, which the judicial bodies, specialized in 
corruption at high-level, are not involved with: “Romania should ensure that the national 
anti-corruption office remains focused on …investigating high-level corruption instead 
of processing a large number of petty corruption cases” (Commission 2004 b: 21) and  
“Overall the approach taken… in the fight against corruption has left aside the need to 
take specific measures in the fight against high-level corruption in the political and 
business circles” (Commission 2004a:24)”.  Between 2000 and 2004, this aspect was so 
important in the evaluation for Romania that the statement that “There has been no 
reduction in perceived levels of corruption” was automatically connected with the fact 
that “There have been very few prosecutions of high-level corruption, despite this having 
been identified as a priority” (Commission 2003b:21). In short, the general negative 
evaluation was presented as having one main source: lack of a sufficient number of 
convicted and prosecuted politicians on charges of corruption. Also, the high importance 
of convicting high-flying politicians was established after the accession, when this issue 
became Benchmark 4 and respectively Benchmark 3 in the Cooperation and Verification 
Mechanism (CVM) for Bulgaria and Romania7. Moreover, in 2008 Bulgaria would be 
penalized by approximately 200 million of PHARE funds for failing to show any progress 
in bringing to justice corrupted politicians or mafia mobs (Commission 2008). 
 
Based on the above-mentioned information, a further two lists of word groups have been 
compiled within each main category (Planning, Adoption and Implementation), which 
refer to aspects belonging to the sub-category of high-level corruption.  They are two and 
                                                          
7 CVM for Bulgaria Benchmark 4: Conduct and report on professional, non-partisan investigations into allegations of 
high-level corruption. Report on internal inspections of public institutions and on the publication of assets of high-level 
officials.”; For Romania Benchmark 3: “3. Building on progress already made, continue to conduct professional, non-
partisan investigations into allegations of high-level corruption”. 
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not three, because Planning and Adoption come under the same policies for adoption: 
legislative and institutional measures for fighting political corruption. However, the 
implementation stage refers to the results of these legislative and institutional changes, 
which are interpreted by the Commission in only one way: bringing to justice as many 
politicians as possible.  Therefore, the group of words that refers to high-level corruption 
in the implementation stage is different from the other two stages/categories, as shown in 
Figure 3.7. The compiled list was based on the Progress Reports for Bulgaria and 
Romania for 2000-2004. 
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Figure 3.7: 
 
Groups of words referring to high level corruption in the implementation stage 
 
 
 
List of groups of words 
 
 
    
 
 
 
  
 
 
 + 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 + 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sub-category:  
High-level corruption  
-  Political corruption 
-  High level corruption  
-  Elected officials/politicians 
-  High-ranking government officials 
-  The Parliament 
-  The Government 
-  Ministries 
-  Political parties 
-  Financing of political parties 
-  Party funding 
-  Assets declaration 
-  Immunity (for MPs and Members of     
Government) 
-  Conflict of interest of politicians 
-  Administrative measures for National 
Anti-corruption Prosecution Office  
 
 
 
  
  
 
  CATEGORY: 
  Planning +  
  Adoption 
 
 
 
CATEGORY: 
Implementation 
 
 
Sub-category:  
High-level corruption  
-  Prosecution of high-level corruption 
-  Conviction of high-level corruption 
-  National Anti-corruption Office 
-  Investigations of National Anti-
corruption Prosecution Office (NAPO) 
-  Prosecutors of NAPO 
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The following examples show how the categories and sub-category can be identified 
using the lists of groups of words mentioned for each of them. 
 
1. The national strategy aims to… creating more transparency in financing political 
parties 
 
 
     Category: Planning                                                                          Subcategory: 
high-level corr. 
 
 
2.  Adopted legislation for making more transparent the funding of political parties 
 
        
    Category: Adoption of legislation        *Sub-category: 
high-level corr. 
  
 
 
3. The number of convictions from National Anti-corruption Office remains modest. 
 
  
     Category: Implementation  Sub-category: high-level corruption         
 
 
      *Corruption. 
 
 
b) Decision making:  Lower levels of decision making – non-elected officials 
Lower-ranking officials from public administration, in particular, represent the second 
level of power targeted by the anti-corruption policies, according to the Commission’s 
“Ten principles of corruption”. Under this heading, the Commission includes: “judiciary, 
police, tax administration, health sector, education, public procurement ….” 
(Commission 2003:25). Measures addressing law enforcement bodies and public 
administration are elements that are not missing from any report of all candidate 
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countries8. The Commission makes clear why: “The capacity of public administration 
structures and the judiciary ... is an overarching concern of the Commission.”  
(Commission 2003: 20): The Commission also explains why this is necessary: because 
these bodies implement the anti-corruption legislation which otherwise would be 
rendered ineffective (Commission 2003:20). 
 
As in the case of high-level decision making, the strategy has two pillars.  Under the 
prevention umbrella, the same principles are present: transparency of information, asset 
disclosure and conflict of interest which are requested for decision makers. The only 
logical exceptions are immunity and party financing (Commission 1997; 2003).  In its 
“Ten Principles for improving the fight against corruption in acceding, candidate and 
other third countries”, the Commission comes up with details about the content of the 
above-mentioned principles applied to the public sector: Employment rules should be 
subjected to the principle of meritocracy and transparency; salaries and social rights must 
be appropriate; assets must be disclosed and there should be codes of conduct in the public 
sector (Commission 2003:25-26). 
 
Criminalization of corruption is, according to the Commission, the final stage of the anti-
corruption policy and it has two components: creating a legislation that criminalizes 
corruption (e.g. making a distinction between active and passive bribery) and creating 
specialized bodies to ensure that accusations of corruption will be appropriately applied 
(Commission 1997; 2003).   
                                                          
8 Without exception, all 10 Progress Reports mention the same measures that need to be taken in order to 
address corruption among lower ranks of public officials: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
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Bringing a public official to justice is, as in the case of high-level corruption, the most 
important proof that the legislative and institutional structures that have been set up 
function well (Commission 2003). As in the case of high-level corruption, the 
Commission insists on a judicial aspect and on the role of prosecution. The difference is 
that no specialized judicial bodies are required to tackle such cases. Figure 3.8 depicts 
anticorruption policies for public administration: 
 
     Figure 3.8: Anticorruption policies for public administration 
 
 
 
 
 
      
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Education  Banking   
Prevention:  
Three of the five 
laws addressing 
high-level corruption 
are also present here:  
- asset declaration 
- transparency 
-  conflict of 
interest  
See Commission 
2003: Annex: point 5  
Prevention: 
Code of Ethics 
in Public 
administration 
Commission 
2003. Annex: 
point 6 
Prevention:  
Civil Service 
laws 
Employability/ 
training/staffing/
recruitment  
Commission 
2003. Annex: 
point 6,        
points 4, 5.  
Criminal law 
regulating instances of 
corruption: distinction 
between passive and 
active; bribery. Money 
laundering, etc. 
-   prosecution and 
conviction of public 
officials  
Commission 2003.  
Lower-levels of power:  
Public administration (non-elected officials) 
 Police  Judiciary   Customs   Health  
Mentioned in Progress Reports for ALL 10 Eastern candidate 
countries without exception 
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Based on the above information, two further lists of word groups have been compiled 
within each main category (Planning, Adoption and Implementation), which refer to 
aspects belonging to the sub-category of corruption at lower ranks of public officials, non-
elected.  They are two and not three, because the Planning and the Adoption refer to the 
same policies that need to be adopted: legislative and institutional measures for fighting 
political corruption. However, the implementation stage refers to the results of these 
legislative and institutional changes, results which, according to the Commission’s 
interpretation mean one thing: the prosecution and conviction of corrupted public 
officials.  The group of words that refers to low-level corruption in the implementation 
stage is therefore different from the other two stages/categories. These are presented in 
Figure 3.9. The list was compiled based on the Progress Reports for Bulgaria and 
Romania for 2000-2004. 
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Figure 3.9 
 
List of words used to identify 
 low-level corruption in the implementation stage 
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Sub-category:  
Lower-level corruption  
-  Public administration 
-  Public officials 
-  Administrative capacity 
-  Clerks 
-  Civil servants 
-  Police 
-  Customs administration/officers 
-  Judiciary 
-  Magistrates 
-  Health 
-  Education 
-  Local administration/authorities 
-  Local offices 
-  Petty corruption 
-  Bribery 
-  Intra-departmental anti-corruption  
units 
-  Law on civil service 
-  Code of ethics 
 
 
  
  
 
   CATEGORY: 
   Planning + 
   Adoption 
 
 
 
CATEGORY: 
Implementation 
 
 
- Cases examined by courts 
- Convictions for bribery 
- Persons convicted 
- Corruption charges for public 
officials 
- Prosecutions for members of 
public administration 
- Public officials sentenced for 
corruption 
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The following examples show how the categories and the sub-categories can be identified 
using the lists of word groups mentioned for each of them. 
 
 1. The overall strategy aims at….improving the functioning of authorities at the 
local level  
 
 Category: Planning     Sub-category: Lower-level 
corr. 
 
 
2.  The Ministry of the Interior has prepared a draft code of ethical behaviour for 
the police 
 
     Category: Adoption          Sub-category: Lower-
level 
 
 
3.  In 1999, a total of 381 public officials were sentenced for corruption…. 
 
 
    Sub-category: lower level of corr.  Category: Implementation 
 
 
 
c) Policy making: NGO’s and IO’s: Domestic and international non-governmental 
watchdogs 
 
A third sub-category regards actions that do not directly concern the classic echelon of 
power (elected politicians and public administration).  Such actions had to be carried out 
by a new type of actor, whose importance is exalted in the EU’s strategy: non-
governmental organizations (civil societies). In its 10 principles on corruption, the 
Commission states (point no.8) that: “civil society has an important role to play in 
preventing and fighting the problem” (Commission 2003:25).  
 
The role of the non-governmental watchdogs of corruption is multifold, as acknowledged 
by the Commission itself, and it covers the following areas: planning – policy-making  
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(consultancy); implementation – surveillance and reporting on the way the five-legged 
legislation on corruption has been implemented; general assessments – acting as a source 
of information and evaluator for the general state of corruption in the country; prevention 
– activism, raising public awareness, acting as mouthpiece for EU’s anti-corruption 
strategy) (Commission 2000;  2003; Freedom House: 2005; World Bank 2005). 
 
In the planning stage: Policy making – consultancy. Civil Society should be involved in 
devising the National Anti-Corruption Plan in collaboration with the government. This is 
the first of the 10 principles on corruption: the government “has to initiate a wide 
consultation process with a range of relevant NGOs and international donors.”     
(Commission 2003: 25). In practice this became an important request formulated by the 
EC for almost all candidate countries from Eastern Europe, particularly highlighted for 
Slovakia (Commission 2001 i:18), Estonia (Commission 2003 c:22) Hungary (2002:23) 
and Poland (Commission 2001:19). In Bulgaria, the first draft was entrusted to a coalition 
of domestic NGOs and international donors who worked together with the government 
(Commission 2002e; 2001a; World Bank 2000). Romania is an extreme example in this 
sense.  Conducting an audit performed by an international organization (Freedom House) 
was one of the conditions inserted into Annex IX of the Accession Treaty that Romania 
had to fulfil in order to be accepted in the EU without activating the postponement clause9.   
Also, the Romanian Anti-Corruption Plan issued in 2001 was built on a diagnostic of the 
                                                          
9 According to the Agreement, Romania had to: “conduct an independent audit of the results and the impact the current 
National Anti‑Corruption Strategy has generated; to reflect the conclusions and recommendations of this audit in the 
new multi-annual anti-corruption strategy which must be one comprehensive document…”    Moreover, the choice for 
Freedom House was actually made at the direct suggestion of members of the EC, according to interviewees from the 
EC delegation in Bucharest.    
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World Bank (World Bank 2000), which was again commissioned by the government, at 
the suggestion of the Commission.  
 
NGOs/IOs in the Second stage: Adoption and institutional change 
According to the EC’s ten commandments on corruption, raising awareness about 
corruption among the population plays an important part in the area of prevention and it 
is also one of the most important tasks of non-governmental watchdogs: 
“Public intolerance of corruption should be increased, through awareness-raising 
campaigns in the media and training. The central message must be that corruption 
is not a tolerable phenomenon but a criminal offence. Civil society has an 
important role to play in preventing it...” (Commission 2003:26).   
NGOs’ role, envisaged by the EC, is to increase public awareness of corruption through 
such campaigns. Raising awareness belongs to the second stage of the anti-corruption 
policies because the Commission considers it an important part of the prevention pillar. 
Prevention belongs to the second stage/ category, as described above.  
 
A special category here is represented by IOs which developed legislative mechanisms 
against corruption. In its 10 principles on corruption, the Commission states at point 2 
that it expects that: “Current and future EU members shall fully align with the EU acquis 
and ratify and implement all main international anti-corruption instruments they are party 
to (UN, Council of Europe and OECD Conventions)” (Commission 2003: 25). This 
represents an important part of the legislation stage in adopting anti-corruption principles. 
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Implementation 
 This stage is not directly concerned with NGO activity. This is because the 
implementation stage in the Commission’s view refers almost exclusively to bringing to 
justice and convicting public officials and mafia mobs (see above). On the other hand, the 
NGO’s role is almost entirely focused on the prevention sector of the anti-corruption 
strategy (see above).  However, the role of civil society in preventing corruption was 
meant to have a practical impact on levels of corruption, either by preventing potential 
corrupt behavior from taking place or by preventing potentially corrupt individuals from 
having access to decision making.  Also, due to their access to sensitive information 
regarding party financing and individuals’ assets they could, potentially, inform the 
judicial system to start procedures against those public officials found at fault. 
Nevertheless, due to the co-lateral impact of their activity at this stage, as well as for the 
uneven results, the NGOs’ role at this stage goes unrecorded in the Progress Reports. 
Consequently, there is no need to count the NGOs’ activity as one of the sub-criteria 
belonging to the main category, the Implementation. 
 
General assessments 
As mentioned above, “general statements” refer to those evaluative comments made by 
the Commission, which do not refer to any of the anti-corruption measures that the 
country had to apply. Such comments are only general assessments of the state of 
corruption in the country, international rankings and criticism regarding certain sectors 
of activity or decision making but without making any specific reference to how concrete 
measures are to be adopted and applied. In short, the purpose of the general statements is 
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to capture the bigger picture, either of the general anti-corruption effort or of the 
phenomenon of corruption. 
 
The NGOs’/IOs’ activity has an important role in generating such statements.  Producing 
ranking of corruption based on public perceptions and generating surveys was the 
particular product of their activity, especially from the well-known international 
watchdogs of corruption such as Transparency International10. The Commission shows 
the importance it places on this aspect of NGO activity by opening its Report with quotes 
from surveys of IOs or opinions of “independent observers”, which in this case is another 
name for non-governmental actors: “Surveys indicate that corruption remains a 
widespread and systemic problem….”11  or “Independent observers notice that corruption 
is a general spread phenomenon …” .   The Commission uses these reports with the aim 
of giving a general impression as to the state of corruption and, sometimes, of the general 
effort made to fight it.  
 
Based on this information, two lists of word groups have been compiled, which identify 
the sub-category regarding NGOs/IOs activity, as shown in Figure 3.10. 
 
 
 
                                                          
10 According to interviewers from DG Enlargement, the rankings and studies produced by the local chapters of 
Transparency International were constantly used in the reports for giving a general picture of the state of corruption. 
Their name was not mentioned in the reports because the Commission wanted to emphasise that it retained sole 
responsibility for the content.  
11 The opening sentence from the Anti-corruption sector from 2003 Progress Report for Romania. 
80 
 
 
Figure 3.10: 
List of words used to identify the sub-category regarding NGOs/IOs activity 
 
 
   CATEGORY            Sub-category:  
           NGOs/IOs 
  
 
              + 
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      + 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-  Projects are underway through 
NGOs 
-  Civil society put corruption high on 
the public agenda  
-  Campaigns of raising awareness 
-  NGOs’ activity in public/ private 
councils     
-  Ratification of the Council of 
Europe Civil Law 
Convention/OECD/ 
GRECO/Stability Pact  
 
  
  
 
Planning 
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governmental actors 
-  Consultation with NGOs and 
donors 
 
  
  
- International reports and surveys 
indicate… 
- Rankings in international 
perceptions… 
- Independent observers have 
concluded 
- Public opinion perceives 
- Perceived levels of corruption  
- Public ranks corruption 
 
 
 
  
  
Adoption of 
legislation and 
institutional 
change 
 
 
 
General 
assessment 
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The following examples show how the categories and the sub-category can be identified 
using the lists of word groups mentioned for each of them. 
 
 
1. Whilst the Government and civil society have succeeded in putting the need to… 
 
 
Sub-category: NGOs  
 
 
    tackle corruption high on the public agenda… 
 
 
Category: Planning 
 
2.a. Public- private Councils have been set up with local municipalities and NGOs. 
 
 
Category: Adoption leg/instit. change     Sub-category: 
NGOs 
 
… in a number of cities to develop local anti-corruption activities.  
 
 
2.b. Bulgaria is a party to the Council of European Convention for Laundering  
 
 
Category: Adoption and Sub-category: IOs. 
  
 (Note: in this case, the ratification of International Agreements is exclusively a part of 
the second stage of anti-corruption) 
 
 
3. Surveys indicate that corruption remains a widespread and systemic problem. 
 
 
Sub-category: NGOs                                       Category: General assess. 
 
 
    
d) Organized crime occupies a prominent place in the issue of implementation. The 
Commission allotted it a special section in the chapter on Justice and Home Affairs, but 
it is also mentioned in the anti-corruption section of the Progress Reports, whenever the 
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Commission thought this was applicable (Commission 2000a,b; 2001a,b; 2002a,b; 
2003a,b; 2004a,b). The existence of a significant amount of organized crime indicates 
more than any other aspect that corruption is systematically embedded at the highest 
levels of decision making: crime cannot be organized if there is no symbiotic relationship 
between political power and mafia (Europol 2012). In short, its very existence is a sure 
signal that the phenomenon of corruption enters into the most severe category of 
corruption: state capture. Apart from this, organized crime plays an important role in this 
particular instance. Tackling organized crime became benchmark 6 in the Cooperation 
and Verification Mechanism for Bulgaria (Commission 2006a). Also, the lack of 
consistency with which the Commission treated this issue was one of the empirical 
arguments that triggered the present working hypothesis. Therefore, mapping the way the 
EC evaluated this problem becomes very important in determining the existence of double 
standards in the Progress Reports. 
 
Linguistically, identifying a statement that refers to organized crime is more 
straightforward than for other sub-categories. The group of words for identifying this sub-
category remains the same for each category. Consequently, organized crime would be 
included as a distinct sub-category belonging to the four main stages or categories of the 
anti-corruption strategy: planning, adoption of legislation and institutional change, 
implementation plus the fourth linguistic category identified here as ‘general statements’.  
 
Even if organized crime might be completely missing from some categories, such absence 
is as relevant as its presence. Therefore, a section on organized crime would need to be 
inserted for all the categories. 
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Based on this information, a list of word groups has been compiled, which identifies 
measures against organized crime; 
 
- Organized crime 
- Mafia mobs 
- Money laundering 
 
 
Examples:  
 
1. …. this is an element of the National Strategy on Combating Organized Crime 
 
   
    Category: Planning Sub-category: Organized crime 
 
 
2. The specialised anti-corruption unit …for Combating Organized Crime has… 
 
 
Category: Adoption  Sub-category:      organized 
crime 
 
    …been reinforced with a doubling of its staff 
 
 
   Category: Adoption 
 
 
e) Economics.  At first sight, it might look quite perplexing that anti-corruption is placed 
among political criteria, as a part of good governance, rather than among the economic 
requirements. That is because the consequences of corruption are mostly visible in the 
economic area and the Commission itself admits this: “corruption… undermines the 
economy” and “economic development” (Commission 2000; 2003 Romania), 
“corruption is a serious obstacle to the business environment” (Commission 2001, 
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Bulgaria), in that “it affects the capacity of the state to guarantee a predictable and lawful 
environment for its …economic …actors” (Commission 2000, Bulgaria). 
 
On the other hand, it is true that legislative and institutional mechanisms were developed 
to target corrupt behaviour, which was to a great extent related to activities in the 
economic sector and, in particular, with public procurement and privatization. In fact, 
the legislation regulating public procurement and public bids seems to score high in 
importance in the Progress Reports: “In conclusion, with the important exception of 
public procurement, there has been no substantial progress in the fight against 
corruption” (Romania 2000) or “a positive development in the fight against corruption 
was the adoption of an ordinance introducing public procurement procedures” (Romania 
2000).  So, although public procurement legislation is only one aspect among many of 
the anti-corruption strategy, its adoption is considered essential for the progress of the 
anti-corruption fight in general. In former Socialist countries, most of the economic 
sector belonged to the state. Consequently, the state was still the biggest owner in the 
economy. Under EU pressure for a market economy, the former Socialist countries had 
to relinquish state control over a considerable amount of such property under the form of 
privatization. Also much of the public work had to be entrusted to private companies, 
following the same market logic. Therefore, public procurement and privatization 
legislation was essential to ensure that such a procedure was not undermined by corrupt 
practices or lacking in transparency.    
 
The economic criterion is present only in the first and second stage of anti-corruption 
strategy: planning and adoption of legislation.  The third stage, implementation, refers to 
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the judicial /coercive side of the process, where those who encroached the law (such as 
a public procurement law, or any other) had to be put on trial.  However, the economic 
aspect is largely present in the category identified as “general assessments”. The 
Commission makes numerous general evaluative statements regarding the relationship 
between corruption and the economic sector.  Such statements do not involve any 
particular aspects of the anti-corruption strategy, as would usually be the case for such 
statements. Some of them have been exemplified above already.   
 
Based on the information provided by the Commission’s Progress Reports, the following 
two lists of word groups have been compiled as necessary for identifying the sub-
category of economics, as shown in Figure 3.11: 
 
Figure 3.11: List of words used to identify subcategory of economics 
 
 
Categories                             Sub-category: Economics 
 
  
 
          + 
 
 
              + 
 
 
 
f) General assessments of each stage of corruption 
In the section that identifies the categories for the content analysis, there is a special place 
for statements which are labelled as “general assessments”.  This is because it is difficult 
Planning and 
Adoption 
leg/institutional 
-  Public procurement 
-  Registration and licensing regimes 
-  Financial fiscal control 
-  Privatization law 
   General 
   Assessments  
-  Business environment 
-  Business and investment climate 
-  Economy 
-  Commercial operations 
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to place them in one of the categories that refer to the anti-corruption policies and their 
stages (planning, adoption and implementation).    
 
A similar situation occurs in the case of sub-categories for content analysis. In each report 
the Commission comes up with a general evaluation of the candidate’s progress in the 
three stages of the anti-corruption policy: planning, adoption of legislation and 
institutional change (anti-corruption framework) and implementation.  However, such 
statements do not refer to specific measures or policies that could be integrated into one 
of the sub-categories already identified (high-level and low-level decision making, 
economics, organized crime, civil society). Similarly, with the case of the “general 
assessments” category, the Commission comes up with a general opinion as to where the 
candidate country stays in terms of progress, or lack of it, in one or other of the stages of 
anti-corruption conditionality.  In each report, the Commission inserts sentences such as:  
 
1. Further good progress has been made with the adoption of an Action Plan 
 
 
Evaluative statement    Category: Planning 
 
Source: Progress Report for Bulgaria 2002 
 
2. Whilst progress has been made in setting the legislative framework for tackling 
corruption… 
 
      Evaluative statement    Category: Adoption leg./instit. 
 
Source: Progress Report for Bulgaria 2002  
 
3. “There has been no substantial progress in implementing the anti-corruption law”  
 
  
Evaluative statement Category: Implementation 
 
 Source: Progress Report for Romania 2000 
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The above examples show how the general statements are constructed. The sentence 
contains a linguistic reference to one category or another and, importantly, it is always 
accompanied by an evaluative statement that the Commission makes in relation to the 
candidate’s progress in that area (e.g. “progress has been made”). However, overall there 
is no reference to specific aspects or measures that belong to these stages.   
 
For example:  
1. Last year’s Regular Report noted that corruption was a widespread and systemic 
problem 
    Category: General assessment + evaluative statement. 
 
Source: Progress report for Romania 2000 
 
2. Measures to tackle corruption have been limited 
 
Category: General assessment       Evaluative statement 
Source: Progress Report for Romania 2000 
 3. There has been no substantial progress in the fight against corruption since the 
last Progress Report.  
Evaluative statement  Category: General assessment 
Source: Progress report for Romania 2000 
 
The above statements do not refer to any of the stages of corruption, nor to the existence 
of corruption within political decision-making and economics. However, they can have a 
very powerful evaluative value, exactly because they are general. In the first example, the 
Commission states that corruption remains a major and massive problem for the 
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candidate.  This is very important because it legitimizes the Commission’s requests and 
evaluation contained by the Progress Reports: since corruption remains such a massive 
problem, then the Commission is entitled to continue both its work of monitoring and of 
further enforcing its policies. 
 
Example no. 3 shows what the Commission believes about the candidate’s general 
progress.  It represents the final grade that the Commission grants to the candidate for 
that year. So, its importance exceeds all the other statements made in the text – with one 
exception: the sub-category of those general evaluations generated by the NGOs and IO, 
as exemplified above12. They retain the same value – that of conclusion – and, therefore, 
they are very important to the logic of the evaluation. What differs is the source: they 
belong either to the Commission or they are generated by the NGOs/IOs. 
The following list of word groups was compiled to identify the sub-category of general 
statements, as shown in Figure 3.12. 
 
Figure 3.12: Words used to identify subcategory of general statements. 
 
 
                                                          
12 As a reminder, such examples are: "surveys and assessments conducted by both national and international 
organizations continue to perceive corruption as a threat...." (e.g. Commission 2001, 02 a,b,c,d,e; 2003 a,b,; 2004 a,b) 
or “international reports indicate that corruption ...."(Commission 2003 b). Also, the rankings of TI chapters in these 
countries were much quoted by the Commission in its reports: The ranking in the indexes of corruption has improved 
…”, “There has been no reduction in perceived levels of corruption”. 
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Conclusion  
The categories and sub-categories identified represent the main stages of anti-corruption 
policies and the main areas where these policies had to be applied (the sub-categories) in 
accordance with the Commission’s guiding documents and its Progress Reports. What 
had to be evaluated has therefore been identified, as well as how it had to be evaluated 
for the official purpose of rooting out corruption.  The importance of each stage can now 
be understood.  
 
This information is necessary for testing the working hypothesis that:  the Commission’s 
monitoring was marred by systematic double standards, as the initial empirical evidences 
suggest. The existence of double standards contradicts the EU official discourse, which 
states that the rationale of the anti-corruption conditionality was to solve the big problem 
of corruption and therefore to help countries to improve their economic and political 
environment.  Solving the problem and introducing policies which are all for the benefit 
of the general public of these countries are the main features of the technocratic discourse, 
which has been much used by the Commission in order to legitimize its work in general. 
A purely technocratic discourse is essentially de-politicized. It excludes the existence of 
power intention or of vested interests. However, the existence of systematic double 
standards contradicts this, demonstrating that technocratic principles were not genuinely 
applied. Consequently, the meaning of the whole process changes.  If rooting out 
corruption and, therefore, solving a problem for the benefit of the larger public does not 
seem to be the main scope of the process, then the only relevant questions that need to be 
addressed are: in whose interests are the anti-corruption policies working and who has 
been empowered or disempowered, and how?  In other words, the content analysis scope 
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here safely allows us to remove a widely accepted assumption: that the main rationale 
behind the EU anti-corruption policies was to solve the problem of corruption for the 
general benefit of the people of these countries.   
 
The next stage of this research is therefore now legitimized.  This focuses on the anti-
corruption narrative as a means to push forward different interests and change the power 
balance in the country. That being said, the detailed information about the anti-corruption 
conditionality is also essential in order to understand how the new legislative and 
institutional structures introduced by the candidate countries also changed the internal 
power balance.  
  
Stage/category I: Planning 
The National Anti-Corruption Plan - The European Commission required national 
governments to propose a coherent plan to fight against corruption with deadlines 
benchmarks, guaranteed budgetary and clear institutional responsibilities. The NACP 
could be amended each year or once per couple of years.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION PLAN 
Planning the legislation framework, institutional reform  
and the implementation stages. 
- General evaluation (gen.) 
- High levels of power – elected politicians MPs, Government (hl) 
- Lower levels of power – non-elected officials, public administration (ll) 
- NGOs and IOs  (NGOs/IO) 
- Organized crime (org.cr) 
- Economy (ec) 
 
Note: the NACP was not necessarily adopted or renewed each year.  
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Stage/category II: Adoption of legislation and institutional reform 
This category covers all the anti-corruption legislation and institutional changes requested 
by the EU: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stage/category III: Implementation 
In the Commission’s plain words, implementation is equivalent to the prosecution and 
conviction of an increasing number of officials, elected and non-elected, including mafia 
mobs of organized crime, where appropriate (see Bulgaria). 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
1. HIGH–LEVEL ELECTED DECISION MAKERS   
 -  Prevention: five legged legislation: immunity, assets control, conflict of 
interest, party financing, transparency of information.  
-  Criminalization – special judicial bodies and prosecutors for high-level cases of 
corruption. 
-  Organized crime – Note:  whenever this is the case 
2. NON-ELECTED OFFICIALS, LAW ENFORCMENT BODIES (police, 
justice, public procurement, tax, education, health) 
-  Prevention – five legged legislation +Code of Ethics +Civil Service law+ anti-
corruption institutional settings  
-  Criminalization – legislation for bringing to justice prosecution/conviction) 
officials ;  
Criminalization - ratification of international agreements on anti-corruption 
(OSCE- GRECO, Council of Europe). 
3. CIVIL SOCIETY – NGOs – Prevention – policy making, surveillance, 
activism. 
4. Organized crime –judicial reform for allowing easier prosecution of judges  
IMPLEMENTATION - prosecution/conviction 
 
   1.  General evaluation  
    2.  HIGH LEVEL ELECTED DECISION MAKERS` 
   3.  LOWER LEVELS: NON-ELECTED OFFICIALS FROM LAW 
ENFORCEMENT BODIES  
   4.  Organized crime (mafia mobs).  
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Content Analysis, Evaluative statements and coding 
A. Intensity of evaluative statements 
In the previous section, the categories and sub-categories on which the coding would be 
applied were identified. 
  
Identifying the categories and sub-categories is essential but not sufficient. They become 
meaningful only when they are accompanied by an evaluation statement, which reveals 
the Commission’s qualitative opinion. For example, the phrase: “National Anti-
corruption plan was adopted” only conveys that the country did adopt the first stage of 
anti-corruption policies, which, in itself, should be a positive statement. However, the 
statement does not clarify the quality of the step taken, as in the second example. “An 
important step forward was the adoption of the National Anti-Corruption Plan”. The 
Commission clearly attaches a great importance to this step. Therefore, although in both 
cases the sentences transmit the same information – “the national anti-corruption plan 
was adopted” – the value attached to it is different.   
 
The above example reveals that such evaluative statements come with a degree of 
intensity. The first statement about the National Anti-corruption plan transmits a weaker 
positive value than the second one. This is due to the use of so-called “intensifiers”. 
Intensifier is a linguistic term (but not a proper lexical category) for a modifier that makes 
no contribution to the propositional meaning of a clause but serves to enhance and give 
additional emotional context to the word it modifies (Katz et al., 1969; Markoff et al., 
1975). The most well-known intensifier is “very”, but there is a whole range of 
intensifiers   (Katz et al., 1969; Markoff et al., 1975).  Here, are such intensifiers are used 
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by the Commission:  very serious, step forward, significant progress, etc. What makes the 
difference between evaluative statements is the intensity attached to them. Therefore, it 
is essential to examine the intensity of evaluation in the present coding.  
 
The degree of intensity can be generated in two ways: syntactically and contextually. 
Syntactically the intensity is created by the usual linguistic modifiers (adjectives, adverbs) 
or by a more complex combination of nouns/verbs/adverbs/adjectives, as in the following 
example: “an important step forward” (Katz et al., 1969; Markoff et al., 1975). The EC 
realizes one type of evaluative statement by using the usual adjectives/adverbs + 
noun/verb formula: e.g. little progress, few concrete results, no progress, it is worrying, 
etc. (Fairclough 2003: 172)  
 
Employing evaluative verbs is the other option for creating evaluative statements used by 
the EC in its Reports: e.g. to be improved, should be upgraded; it fails to address; it 
undermines (Fairclough 2003: 172). Such verbs have negative or positive meanings in 
themselves, without being accompanied by any other modifiers (e.g. adverbs/adjectives).  
 
The third option is represented by evaluative nouns, which, like verbs, introduce a 
negative or positive meaning in the statement without being accompanied by the usual 
modifiers (adjectives or adverbial intensifiers): progress, achievements, problem, 
obstacle (Fairclough 2003: 172). When such modifiers are present, they enhance the 
positive/negative value. 
94 
 
 
The context refers to the meaning attached by the author to the text and it always has 
priority over the syntax (Roberts 1997). For example, in one sentence, the Commission 
states: “There has been no substantial progress in the fight against corruption since the 
last report”; and “No progress has been made in making the funding of political parties 
more transparent” (Romania 2002). In both cases, the evaluative statement is the same: 
no progress. However, in the first case its value is considerable stronger than in the 
second.  The first sentence is the negative, final mark for the anti-corruption effort as a 
whole, in general.  The second refers only to one aspect of it.  The Progress Report’s final 
destination is to release the EC general opinion on the progress or lack of it that a 
candidate makes in applying the conditionality.  In such cases, the value given by the 
context always has priority over the syntax (Shapiro and Markoff 1997; Roberts 1997, 
Erlandson 1993, Denzin and Lincoln 1994).   Such statements are created on three 
syntactic levels or coding units: at the level of a clause, at the level of sentence and at the 
level of a paragraph. However, the basic coding unit or building brick of such evaluative 
statements can be identified as the close. (Roberts 1997; Krippendorff 1980; Shapiro and 
Markoff 1997; Stemler and Bebell 1998; Weber 1990). 
 
It is possible to map the circumstances in which a (positive or negative) evaluative 
statement receives a certain value on an arbitrarily chosen scale (Roberts 1997). By 
examining syntax and context markers, the scale of intensity employed for evaluative 
statements can be mapped.  The following section shows such an analysis of some of the 
evaluative statements employed by the Commission in its Progress Reports. 
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Intensity of evaluation generated by syntax 
Linguistically, the EC uses a range of evaluative statements which covers the types 
distinguished in the specialized literature on this subject, which are (arguably) three 
(Fairclough 2003; White 2001; Katz et al., 1969; Markoff et al., 1975; Franzosi 1989; 
Abell 1987, Heise 1989, Corsaro and Heise 1990). Here, the usual three degrees of 
intensity for negative/positive statements have been employed, plus one further degree, 
as used by the Commission. They follow the usual pattern of a modifier (an adverb or an 
adjective): good (positive); better (strong positive) the best (superlative). However, the 
degrees of intensity found in the Commission’s Progress Reports are as follows:  
 
Very serious problem >  serious problem  >  problem  >  some (a few) problems 
  
 
very strong Negative       strong Negative  Negative     mild Negative  
(statement) (vsN)  (sN)      (N)   (mN) 
 
 
Or: 
 
Good progress   >   progress   >   some progress 
 
 
strong positive        positive         mild Positive  
          (sP)  (P)              (mP) 
 
Here, superlative statements are not present, due to the nature of the text analysed. The 
Progress Reports are official texts and therefore their language is to a certain degree 
standardized, precise and, therefore, cautious. As one of the interviews stated:  
“There was a blueprint of phrasing and wording: the rule forbade strong words. 
For example, we were not allowed statements that were referring to the state of 
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corruption in Romania as being ‘a disaster’ or statements where Bulgaria’s 
progress was described as ‘wonderful’.”   
 
To these categories, an extra category has been added.  This is demanded by the logic of 
the text:  mild statements (negative or positive). In the case of those with negative 
meaning, their role is that of desirability (Fairclough 2003:173). Their main purpose is 
not to emphasize the failure, or to criticize but they urge towards further action. In the 
Progress reports such combinations can be: 
-  it needs to be improved 
-  it should be upgraded 
-  there is room for improvement 
The use of the adverb “some”, which can be replaced with “few”, also falls under this 
category. According to the Oxford Content Analysis Handbook (2008), wherever the 
word can be used interchangeably with “few”, its meaning is: a limited number or a small 
quantity. Therefore, in this context, when it accompanies nouns that indicate a negative 
meaning, such as “problem” or “obstacles”, its value is to reduce their negative value – 
and vice-versa in the case of mild positive statements.  
 
It is not only the syntax that determines the intensity, however. The importance of the 
topic of such an evaluative statement also depends on the context. As mentioned before, 
the context always has priority over syntax and together they give the degree of intensity. 
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Very strong negative statements 
Before everything else, the fundamental logic behind the Progress Reports is enshrined 
in their very title: they measure the progress of candidate countries from one year to 
another.  Consequently, all the other negative or positive evaluations referring to various 
specific aspects that are only a part of the anti-corruption puzzle are not as important as a 
general evaluation of progress in the area.  This is achieved by statements such as:” There 
has been no substantial progress in the fight against corruption since the last report”. By 
contrast, there are also statements such as the following: “No progress has been made in 
making the funding of political parties more transparent” (Romania 2002). The statement 
that carries the biggest weight is, of course, the former. The latter is subsidiary in terms 
of value because it refers to only one aspect of anti-corruption conditionality.  What 
makes the difference here is the general versus the particular, and the general has priority, 
due to the logic of these reports: measure progress and then decide whether the country 
is sufficiently prepared in general terms to conclude a chapter of the conditionality. 
 
Accordingly, general statements about the state of corruption, such as: “surveys indicate 
that corruption remains a widespread and systemic problem that is largely unresolved” 
(Romania 2002) also come under the same category. Similarly, so do statements that 
assess the general state of corruption in the country, such as this: “corruption remains a 
serious and widespread problem” (Bulgaria 2000). Statements that belong to the category 
of “General assessments” therefore take the strongest negative.   
Figure 3.13, compiles the word combinations that receive the value of very strong 
negative.  
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Figure 3.13: list of word combinations with the very strong negative values 
 
 
 
Although there are very few positive statements (two that can be labelled as ‘very strong 
positive’), they do exist and need to be mentioned, as shown in Figure 3.14. 
 
 
Figure 3.14: Positive statements 
 
   Very strong positive 
-     Further good progress has been made with the adoption of Action Plan 
-   A considerable step forward has been taken through the National Anti-
Corruption Plan 
-    Bulgaria’s rankings in indexes of international perceptions has improved 
 
The last statement, regarding Bulgaria’s ranking, does not qualify syntactically in the 
category of very strong statements. However, this evaluation states something important 
    Very strong negative statements 
-  Corruption is a widespread and systemic problem 
-  Corruption continues to be widespread and affects all aspects of society 
-  Corrupt practices affect/contribute to tainting the political, economic and social 
environment 
-  Corrupt practices affect the capacity of the state… 
-  It undermines the effectiveness and legitimacy of state institutions 
-  Corruption is a very serious problem 
-  Corruption is one of the main problems 
-  Corruption is one of the most serious problems 
-  Corruption is largely unresolved 
-  No reductions in the levels of corruption 
-  No reduction in perceived levels of corruption  
-  No reduction of corruption (during the reporting period) 
-  Measures to tackle corruption have been limited 
-  No substantial progress in the fight against corruption (since the last Progress 
Report) 
-  Such high levels of corruption undermine…. 
-  Levels of corruption remain high 
-  Corruption is all the more worrying 
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and quite rare in this particular case: the improvement in the international indexes. This 
is equivalent to saying that Bulgaria has actually managed to reduce levels of corruption 
and, therefore, its progress in fighting corruption was real and noticeable.  
 
Strong negative/positive statements 
Negative 
Statements carrying the greatest weight in terms of importance are the ones that assess 
the progress in fighting corruption and the state of corruption (or general levels of 
corruption). That is because they assess the final results of the anti-corruption effort made 
by the candidate.   
 
Second in importance come those statements that label progress made in one of the three 
main stages of tackling corruption: planning, adoption, and implementation. Such 
statements are more important than those which refer to specific aspects of the anti-
corruption strategy. For example: “…there has been no substantial progress in 
implementing anti-corruption policies” (Romania 2001) and “although the principle of 
access to information is enshrined in the Constitution, there is no effective 
implementation of the legislation” (Romania 2001). In the first sentence, the Commission 
labels the whole implementation effort of Romania as being unsatisfactory.  In the second, 
it refers to just one aspect of the implementation stage: enforcing the law on transparency 
of information.  
 
Under the same category of strong statements come the Commission’s assessments of 
corruption as a phenomenon that affects certain sectors of society and decision making: 
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democratic institutions, public administration and the economy. Typical statements in this 
case include: “corruption undermined the legal system”; “corruption undermined the 
economy”; “corruption is seen as having a negative effect on business”.  Apart from 
making such general statements, the Commission sometimes deliberately emphasizes the 
importance of one particular policy, in contrast with the others, such as: There have been 
very few prosecutions of high level corruption, despite this having been identified as a 
priority.” (Romania 2003). “On some important aspects of the strategy there is no detail 
as yet on concrete measures and deadlines, such as…” (Bulgaria 2002).  
 
The importance of seemingly specific aspects of the anti-corruption policy are elevated 
when the Commission states that they are a condition for judging the whole anti-
corruption effort of the candidate, as in the following examples: “Last year Regular 
Report noted that filling NAPO’s (National Anti-corruption Office)’s posts would be a 
test for the government’s commitment to the fight against corruption. One year later, 
NAPO still remains seriously understaffed” (Romania 2003); “The priority …. must be 
to ensure the rigorous enforcement of existing legislation. Measures contained in the 
National Corruption Strategy …had a limited impact” (Romania 2003).  “Overall, the 
approach taken by the Bulgarian authorities in the fight against corruption has left aside 
the need to take specific measures in the fight against high-level corruption” (Bulgaria 
2004). 
 
Strong Positive statements 
The same principles apply to the positive statements.  These include statements that 
address the general progress in one of the three main stages of the anti-corruption 
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programme, such as: “Bulgaria had made more progress in the adoption of the 
legislation...” (Bulgaria 2003).  
 
The Commission also makes statements that address general levels of corruption in 
certain areas of public administration and society such as: “Reports mention first signs of 
a decline of petty corruption in the custom authorities, in the police and judicial system” 
(Bulgaria 2004).  Syntactically this is not a strong positive statement but, rather, a cautious 
one (“first signs”). However, it addresses a topic which has been regarded as very 
important by the Commission itself: it refers to the institutions considered as essential in 
the fight against corruption – police and the judicial system; secondly, it also concerns 
levels of corruption, which is equivalent here to concrete results in decreasing the 
phenomenon, which should be the most important outcome.  
 
As in the previous case, there are several instances when the Commission emphasizes the 
importance of a certain particular aspect of conditionality, which, under normal 
conditions, would only count as part of one of the three main stages of anti-corruption 
policies. “The major institutional development over the period was the setting up of the 
National Anti-Corruption Prosecution Office” (Romania 2002); “The two instruments 
target dates for the ratification of the international legal instruments related to fighting 
corruption…. These are important developments” (Romania 2002); “In conclusion, with 
the important exception of public procurement….” (Romania 2001). 
 
The following lists of evaluation statements have therefore been compiled to indicate 
strong negative/positive statements; these are presented in Figure 3.15: 
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Figure 3.15: List of evaluation statements 
 
    Strong negative statements 
 - No progress in implementing… 
 - Less progress in implementation and enforcement (of legislation) 
 - Measures contained in the National Strategy …have a limited impact. 
 - Undermines the legal system 
 - Undermines the economy 
 - Loss of confidence in the public authorities 
 - Customs, police, university teachers, public sector officials are… among the 
most corrupt professions 
 - Corruption is a serious obstacle to business environment/investment climate 
 - Corruption is widely reported within public bodies/at political level 
 - On important aspects…no progress 
 - Corruption remains a common aspect of commercial operations 
 - It is widely reported with public bodies/political level 
 - Institutional arrangements a serious problem   
 - National strategy fails to substantially address… 
 - Strategy is weak 
 - A test (failed) for the government commitment to the fight against corruption 
    Strong positive statements 
-   Further good progress   
-   Further development …the adoption of the National Anti-Corruption Plan 
-  Important developments (referring to punctual aspects of anti-corruption 
strategy) 
-   Major institutional development 
-   Important (positive) exception 
-   More progress in the adoption of legislation 
-   Anti-corruption legislation is well-developed 
-   Decline of petty corruption  
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Negative/Positive statements 
 
Syntactically, the word groups above do not contain the usual intensifiers we met for the 
‘very strong’ and ‘strong’ evaluations, such as: good progress, major development, 
serious obstacle, very serious problem, etc.  Also, their topic overlaps with the content of 
the sub-categories determined in the previous section. This includes all policies and 
measures that belong to the sub-categories identified as: high-level corruption, low-level 
(public administration), economics, organized crime and NGOs (see lists of words that 
identify these measures nos. 1, 2, 3).  
 
Sometimes the Commission only notices that certain policies have been adopted, without 
comment. In such cases, the candidate countries need to receive a positive value, even if 
this is not accompanied by any other evaluative comments – first, because it 
acknowledges that the country did comply with requested measures; second, for the sake 
of consistency. For example, we have statements such as: “No progress has been made 
on the draft …concerning MP’s immunity” (Bulgaria 2002). This statement must receive 
a negative value for the obvious reason that it signals that the country failed to comply.  
The statement: “The concept of conflict of interests has been introduced into Romanian 
law” (Romania 2003) does not contain any other assessment (e.g. “progress was made).  
However, it states that the country has complied with one of the compulsory requests 
inserted in the anti-corruption strategy (Commission 1997; 2003). Therefore, its value is 
positive.  
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Usually, however, the Commission clearly indicates its opinion as favourable or 
unfavourable on a particular item by using the modifiers already discussed above: “Co-
ordination between the various other bodies charged with tackling organized crime 
remains a problem” (Romania 2001); “No progress has been made on the draft Act…. 
concerning MP’s immunity” (Bulgaria 2002). Or, for the positive side: “The changes 
made to the privatization law… have started to have an effect” (Bulgaria 2002); “The 
number of outside interests considered incompatible with being a public official has been 
significantly expanded.” (Romania 2003).  
 
At other times, the positive meaning of a certain statement is indicated by an adversative 
coordinative or subordinate conjunction. Adversative conjunctions introduce two 
contrasting clauses, such as these: Despite suspensions from party duties of a number of 
high-profile… politicians, none of these cases has yet led to criminal sanctions during the 
reporting period.” (Romania 2002). In such cases, the Commission uses the following 
such adversative conjunctions: however, nevertheless, yet, but, whilst, despite, although, 
while.    
 
Table 3.2 below re-lists the combinations of words that identify the anti-corruption 
measures belonging to the sub-categories of: high-level corruption, low-level (public 
administration), organized crime, economic corruption, NGOs and IOs.   
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Table 3.2: Combinations of words used to identify anti-corruption measures for 
subcategories. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Sub-category:  
High-level corruption  
(planning + adoption stage) 
-  Political corruption 
-  High level corruption  
-  Elected officials/politicians 
-  High-ranking government officials 
-  Parliament 
-  The government 
-  Ministries 
-  Political parties 
-  Financing of political parties 
-  Party funding 
-  Assets declaration 
-  Immunity (for MPs and Members of 
Government) 
-  Conflict of interest of politicians 
-  Administrative measures for National 
Anti-Corruption Prosecution Office  
 
 
 
  
  
Sub-category:  
High-level corruption 
(implementation stage) 
-   Prosecution for high-level 
corruption 
-   Conviction for high-level 
corruption 
-   National Anti-Corruption 
Office 
-   Convictions by National 
Anti-Corruption 
Prosecution Office 
(NAPO)  
-   Prosecutions by NAPO 
 
 
  
  
Sub-category:  
Lower-level corruption  
(planning and adoption stage) 
-  Public administration 
-  Public officials 
-  Administrative capacity 
-  Clerks 
-  Civil servants 
-  Police 
-  Customs administration/officers 
-  Judiciary 
-  Magistrates 
-  Health 
-  Education 
-  Local administration/authorities 
-  Local offices 
-  Petty corruption 
-  Bribery 
-  Intra-departmental anti-corruption units 
-  Law on civil service 
-  Code of ethics 
 
 
  
  
Sub-category:  
lower level corruption 
(implementation stage) 
- Cases examined by 
courts 
- Convictions for bribery 
- Persons convicted 
- Corruption charges for 
public officials 
- Prosecutions for 
members of public 
administration 
- Public officials 
sentenced for corruption  
 
 
  
  
106 
 
 
Mild negative statements  
The text of the Progress Reports also contains statements whose value is rather 
ambiguous. For example: “There is still room for improvement… to monitor declarations 
on conflict of interest” (Romania 2004); “The legislative sector should be upgraded…” 
(Bulgaria 2000); “The government should further enhance its efforts to create an 
environment of zero tolerance to corruption” (Bulgaria 2000); “Further  steps are 
required to introduce the concept of criminal liability of legal persons” (Romania 2003). 
 
In CA literature, the meaning of such statements is identified as expressing an urge for 
further action, rather than to criticize. Nevertheless, its implied meaning remains negative 
because it signals that whatever effort has been made was insufficient and more needs to 
be done.  This category is available only for the negative statements. There is no such 
equivalent for the positive evaluations.  
 
Table 3.25:  Statements used by the Commission in the Progress Reports: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mild negative statements 
-  There is room for improvement 
-  Should further enhance 
-  Further steps are required 
-  Further efforts 
-  Needs to be upgraded 
-  Needs to continue its efforts 
-  Renewed efforts are needed 
-  Needs to be consolidated 
-  Would benefit from 
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Conclusion 
This section has identified the degrees of intensity the Commission uses in the text of its 
Progress Reports. This is necessary for creating the coding, and therefore for quantifying 
the positive/negative statements used in the Reports.  They are, therefore, essential in 
exploring the existence of systematic double standards in these texts.  
 
Four degrees of intensity have been identified for negative statements: very strong, strong, 
(simple) negative and mild negative. 
 
Three such degrees of intensity have been identified in the case of positive statements: 
very strong, strong and positive.  
 
 
Very strong negative/positive 
 
 
 
Category: general assessments - on overall progress made in fighting corruption and 
assessments of levels of corruption  
 
 
 
Strong negative/positive  
 
 
 
Sub-category: general statements of the three stages of the anti-corruption strategy: 
planning, adoption, implementation.  
+  general assessments of corruption levels in certain sectors of society and policy 
making 
 
+ specific anti-corruption measures pinned down as very important by the 
Commission 
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Negative/Positive statements 
 
 
 
All anti-corruption measures that belong to the sub-categories identified above as: 
high level corruption, low level corruption, organized crime, economic corruption 
and NGO/IO activity.  
 
 
Mild negative 
 
 
 
Statements that urge further action in various areas of conditionality where steps 
have been already taken 
 
 
 
Coding system at the level of a simple clause 
 
In the coding system, the degrees of intensity receive arbitrary values. The choice of 
values in itself is not important (they can start from 1 or from 100).  What is essential 
is the consistency with which they are applied (Roberts 1997a,b; Janis 1949; Lebart 
1993,1994; Neundorf and Kimberley 2002; Shapiro et al 1997; Weber 1990; Duzin 
and Lincoln 1994 ).  
 
 
 
Consequently, the following values were chosen:  
 
Statements value 
 
vsN  =  very strong Negative =   -3 
sN    =  strong Negative          =   -2 
N     =  Negative                      =   -1 
mN  =  mild Negative             =  -0.5 
 
vsP  =  very strong Positive   =   3 
sP    =  strong Positive            =   2 
P     =  Positive                        =   1 
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The abbreviations for the main categories, with their sub-categories, are: 
 
1. Planning (National Anti-Corruption Plan):  Pl  
a. General evaluation of the National Anti-Corruption Plan stage: Gen.  
b. High-level (measures addressing high-level corruption): hl 
      c. Low-level (measures for corruption at the level of non-elected decision-
makers): ll 
d. NGOs/IOs – anti-corruption activity carried out by NGOs and IOs 
e. Economy: Policies addressing corruption in the economy: ec 
f. Organized crime: org. cr. 
 
2.   Adoption (adoption of legislative and institutional measures): Adopt. 
      a. General evaluation of the Adoption of legislation and institutional change: 
Gen.  
      b. High Level: hl 
      c. Low –level: ll 
      d. NGOs/IOs 
      e. Economics  
      f. organized crime: org. cr. 
 
3.   Implementation: Impl. 
      a. General evaluation of the implementation: gen.      
      b. High Level: hl 
      c. Low –level: ll 
  
4.  General assessments/ranking of corruption: Gen. 
      a. General assessments of Commission on progress in fighting corruption: Gen 
      b. General rankings/assessments issued by NGOs/IOs: NGOs/IOs 
      c.  High-level of power:  hl 
      d. Lower levels: ll 
      e. Economics: ec. 
 
Examples of coding on simple clauses: 
 
Further good progress has been made with the adoption of the Action Plan 
  
  
Indicates the value: Indicates: category – Planning: Pl.  
very strong Positive = +3     sub-category: General evaluation: Gen. 
 
The formula of the coding is mentioned in parenthesis at the end of each simple 
clause.  The formula is: category: subcategory; value 
 
Therefore, the coding goes:  
Further good progress has been made with the adoption of the Action Plan (Pl: gen; 
vsP = +3).  
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Coding at the level of sentences (or combinations of clauses) 
 
Most information in the text is conveyed, not in simple clauses but, most of the time, 
through a combination of clauses. The literature on this topic indicates a multitude of 
relationships that exist between two or more clauses in complex sentences, relationships 
which change according to the type of linguistic marker or context in which they are 
introduced. Such relationships are created by the introduction of various (adverbial) 
conjunctions (Halliday and Hassan 1976; Quirk 1985; Celce-Murcia and Larsen-Freeman 
1999; William 1996)13. The only relationship of interest here, however, is when the 
importance or the value of a clause is taken separately, or changes in relationship to other 
statements.  
 
In the case of Progress Reports, this situation is generated by subordinating adversative 
(adverbial) conjunctions. The syntactic role of subordinate conjunctions is to introduce a 
clause which is dependent on the main one, which cannot stand by itself without the main 
clause (Foley and Valin 1984). Adversative conjunctions introduce a contrast between 
two clauses. The subordinate adversative conjunction therefore introduces a hierarchical 
value between the two statements. In other words, the subordinate conjunctions signal the 
introduction of a statement which is semantically weaker, or less important, than the main 
one. It is used to signal where the author’s emphasis falls (Halliday and Hassan 1976; 
Foley and Valin 1984; Cristofaro 2003; Kortann 1996; Mathiessen and Thompson 1988). 
 
 
                                                          
13 From a semantic perspective, coordinative (adverbial) conjunctions introduce different types of relationships between 
clauses such as:  enumerative, summative, appositional, resultative, inferential, contrastive, transitional, etc. (Quirck 
1985: 634). Although such categories differ from one author to another, such differences are mostly taxonomic. 
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For example: “Despite a legal framework that is reasonably comprehensive, law 
enforcement remains weak”. Here are two clauses linked by the subordinate adversative 
conjunction, “despite”. Its semantic importance is that it indicates which one of the 
statements is more important, from the author’s point of view. The message it sends is: 
“Yes, the legal framework is comprehensive but this is not as important as the fact that 
there are no results coming out of it”. The subordinate clause introduced by the 
adversative “despite” loses some of the positive value it would have held if it had been 
an independent clause: e.g. “The legal framework is reasonably comprehensive”. 
  
 Despite a legal framework that   is reasonably comprehensive 
 
Decreases statement value               sets up initial value = Positive = +1 
by 50%     
 
Therefore the final value it takes is: +0.5 
 
The main clause retains its initial value. 
 
Consequently, the coding goes as follows: 
 
Despite a legal framework  that is reasonably comprehensive  
   (Adopt:gen; P = +0.5) 
 
 Decreases  Category: Adopt.(Adoption legisl.) sets up initial value: Positive = +1 
Value 50% Sub-category: gen.(general evaluation) 
 
 
law enforcement           remains weak (Impl:gen; sN= -2) 
 
category:Impl. (Implementation)   value:strong negative sN= -2 
Sub-category: gen (general evaluation) 
 
 
The subordinate adversative conjunctions that the Commission uses in the Progress 
Reports are: 
 
- Whilst  
- Despite 
- Although 
- While 
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However, the conjunction “despite” does not always introduce a contrast, as in this case: 
“There have been very few prosecutions of high-level corruption despite this having been 
identified as a priority”.  In this case, “despite” plays the role of an intensifier: it stresses 
how important is the lack of achievement in this area and therefore it enhances the 
negative value of the statement.  Also, the dependent clause introduced by “despite” has 
no value in itself. Its only role is to intensify the negative statement (strong negative) from 
the main clause and therefore it does not receive any value.  In such cases, the coding 
goes: 
 
There have been very few prosecutions of high-level corruption (Impl:hl; sN= -2) despite 
this being identified as a priority. 
 
Selecting the relevant sentences in the Progress Reports 
The necessity of reducing text to its main components has emerged mainly due to the 
large amount of text/discourse that needed to be analysed and quantified (e.g. minutes 
from Parliament). Fortunately, this does not apply here. The Anti-Corruption sections 
from Progress Reports are short and well defined in terms of length. Therefore, their 
content needs to be quite precise. Precision in this case means that the texts have to 
communicate how the Commission values the candidate’s effort or progress in complying 
with the anti-corruption conditionality. Therefore, statements which have no evaluative 
role, that are purely descriptive and refer to details which have little relevance in the 
context of conditionality, are not very frequent. However, they do exist. For example:  
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“NAPO (Romania’s National Anti-Corruption office) replaces the existing anti-
corruption section of the General Prosecutor’s Office. The National Office only 
investigates corruption cases involving sums over 100,000 Euros and relating to high-
ranking officials. NAPO also has regional branches attached to each of the fifteen Courts 
of Appeal. These branches handle corruption cases that fall outside NAPO’s competence. 
Countrywide, and when fully staffed, NAPO will have 75 prosecutors, 150 judicial police 
officers, 35 financial experts, 50 auxiliaries and 10 administrative positions”. (Romania 
2002). The whole paragraph is only a description of an institution. The description carries 
no value because there is no evaluative statement attached to it. Therefore, from a 
quantitative point of view, this type of text does not count in the coding. 
 
Analysing the data 
The role of CA is to understand how a more favourable or less favourable evaluation is 
built and from which criteria or sub-criteria such views were generated. The next step in 
this study is to compare the evaluations made for Bulgaria and Romania. This is essential 
in order to understand whether the evaluations have been marred by double standards, or 
not. 
 
The analytical steps are: 
1. To quantify the negative and positive statements, in order to determine which side 
is dominant (positive or negative). 
2. To quantify which categories and sub-categories generate most negative or 
positive statements (and by what percentages these can be measured). 
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3. To compare and contrast the dominant score in both cases. For example, if the 
dominant score in the Bulgarian case is positive and in the Romanian case it is 
negative, then these results are compared first. The comparison is made between 
the categories and sub-categories which generated them.  
4. The next step is to pinpoint which aspects (categories/sub-categories) counted 
little in the dominant score, or were completely missing.  
5. Coming to a conclusion on the existence of double standards depends on 
analysing: whether the Commission focused selectively on positive aspects, while 
dismissing the negative ones, or vice versa, in both cases; or whether it focused 
on less important aspects of the anti-corruption stages (e.g. the initial ones), while 
consistently dismissing the most important aspects, or whether, in comparison, it 
focuses on the more important stages.  
 
The following section discusses the coding of EC anti-corruption reports for Bulgaria and 
Romania from 2000-2004: 
 
 
Part II: Coding of the European Commission Progress Reports 
 
Table 3.3 highlights the coding index used to code the EC reports for Bulgaria and  
 
Romania respectively.    
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Table 3.3: Coding index 
 
Coding index: 
 
  vsN = very strong Negative = -3 
  sN = strong Negative = -2 
  N = Negative = -1 
  mN = mild Negative = -0.5 
 
  vsP = very strong Positive = 3 
  sP = strong Positive = 2 
  P = Positive = 1 
Main categories - abbreviations: 
  1. Planning (National Anti-corruption Plan): Pl  
  2. Adoption (Adoption of legislative and institutional measures): Adopt. 
  3. Implementation: Impl 
  4. General assessments/ranking of corruption: Gen. 
 
Sub-categories:  
  a. General evaluation of the Planning/Adoption/Implementation:    Gen.  
  b. General assessments by the Commission on progress in fighting corruption:    Gen 
  c. General rankings/assessments issued by NGOs/IOs:    NGOs/IOs 
  d. High-level (measures addressing high-level corruption):    hl 
  e. Low-level (measures for corruption at the level of non-elected decision-makers):    ll 
  f. NGOs/IOs – anti-corruption activity carried out by NGOs and IOs:    NGOs/IOs 
  g. Economy: Policies addressing corruption in the economy:    ec 
  h. Organized crime:    org. cr. 
 
For each of the five years covered in this study, I started by coding the evaluation 
statement used in the Commission’s reports, followed by summarising overall scores of 
the identified categories and subcategories. In the following section, I discuss the 
summarising tables and their interpretations for Romania and Bulgaria from the years 
2000-2004.  For a detailed overview on how I coded each EC report, please refer to 
Appendix 2. 
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2.1 Summary of European Commission reports for Bulgaria and Romania, year 
2000 
 
Table 3.4 summarises the quantification of the number of the positive and negative 
statements made for each linguistic category and subcategory of the Commission’s 
reports that were used to identify each stage of corruption, as shown in section F of this 
chapter.  
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Table 3.4:  Bulgaria and Romania, year 2000, scores for categories, 
subcategories and overall scores   
 
1. PL: Planning 
Sub-criteria BULGARIA ROMANIA 
Positive Negative Positive Negative 
General evaluation     
High–level of power 
(elected politicians) 
  - 0.5   
Lower level      
Organized crime (where 
applicable) 
+0.5    
NGOs/IOs +1    
Economics     
2. Adopt: Adoption of legislation and institutional change 
General evaluation   +3  
High level  +1 -2 +1  
Low level +2 -1 +0.5 -2 
Organized crime      
NGOs/IOs +2   -2 
Economics +3 - 0.5 +1  
3. Impl: Implementation  
General evaluation  - 0.5   
High level     
Low level    +1 -1 
Organized crime     
4. Gen:General assessments 
General evaluation of 
corruption/progress(Gen.) 
+1 -10 
 
 -9 
NGOs/IOs 
assessments(ranking levels 
of corruption) 
    
High level (elected 
politicians) 
    
Lower Level (public 
admin.) 
 - 6   
Economics    -5 
Score: TOTAL Positive= 10.5 
Negative =  - 20.5 
 
NEGATIVE 67% 
POSITIVE 33% 
Positive = +6.5 
Negative = -19 
 
NEGATIVE 74% 
POSITIVE 26% 
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CATEGORIES 
Positive Negative 
Bulgaria Romania Bulgaria Romania 
1. Planning  +1.5 0 -0.5  0 
2.  Adoption +8 +5.5 -3.5 -4 
3. Implementation   0 +1 -0.5 -1 
4. General 
Assessment 
+1 0 -16 -14 
Score Total: +10.5 +6.5 -20.5 -19 
Dominant category 
Percentage of 
positive/negative 
score 
Adoption 
76% 
Adoption 
85% 
General 
assess 
80% 
Gen. Assess. 
70% 
 
Sub-categories 
Positive Negative 
Bulgaria Romania Bulgaria Romania 
a. General evaluation 
of the 3 main stages 
(Pl; Adopt; Impl.) 
0 +3 -0.5 0 
b. General evaluation 
of corruption/ 
progress (by 
Commission ) 
+1 0 -10 -9 
c. General assessment 
by NGOs/IOs 
0 0 0 0 
d. NGOs/IOs (role in 
the three stages) 
+3 0 0 -2 
d.  High-Level 
(elected politicians) 
+1 +1 -2.5 0 
e. Low- level (public 
administration) 
+2 +1.5 -7 -3 
f. organized crime +0.5 0 0 0 
g. economy +3 +1 -0.5 -5 
Score: Total +10.5 +6.5 -20.5  -19 
Dominant sub-
category 
Percentage of 
positive/negative 
score 
NGOs/IOs≈3
0 % 
Economy ≈ 
30% 
Gen.eval. 
stages ≈ 
50% 
Gen.eval. 
Com-
mission 
≈ 50% 
Low-level  
≈ 35% 
Gen.eval. 
Commission 
≈ 50% 
Economy  
≈ 26% 
*Note: some figures are approximations in order to give a clearer image. 
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For the year 2000, the scores are fairly balanced. Both countries have received a larger 
number of negative statements than positive ones.  However, Bulgaria scores slightly 
better. 
 
There is only a small difference between the negative scores for the two countries. The 
majority of the negative statements are triggered by the Commission’s general 
assessments, which do not highlight how specific policies are implemented. These 
statements only provide a vague illustration of the corruption phenomenon in general.   
This result is endorsed at both the category and sub-categories level. This means that they 
are not generated by comments made on concrete, specific anti-corruption actions.  
 
Looking at the positive scores, the difference between the two countries is more evident. 
Bulgaria has more overall positive scores (33%) than Romania (26%).  At the level of 
categories, for both countries, it is the adoption of legislation and institutional change (the 
second stage of the anti-corruption strategy) that gathers the great majority of positive 
comments. Bulgaria shows more positive scores regarding the planning and the 
commission’s general assessment of corruption categories, while Romania scores 
nothing. 
 
At the level of sub-categories, the positive scores are generated from different sources.  
For Bulgaria, it is the activity of the NGOs and, in particular, their collaboration with the 
Bulgarian government in putting together a plan for fighting corruption that attracts 
plaudits. The second source is represented by anti-corruption legislation, targeting the 
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economy.  For Romania, most of the positive points are accumulated by general 
assessments of each stage of their anti-corruption strategy.  
  
Noticeably, some crucial aspects were either not considered or even ignored.  For 
instance, comments focusing on the implementation stage are almost totally missing in 
the Bulgarian case. Moreover, the organised crime subcategory is almost ignored [with 
the exception of one mild positive comment; although Bulgaria has the highest rate of 
organized crime, moulded after the Russian model. 
 
2.2 Summary of European Commission reports for 
Bulgaria and Romania, year 2001 
 
Table 3.5 summarises the quantification of the number of the positive and negative 
statements made for each linguistic category and subcategory of the commission’s reports 
that were used to identify each stage of corruption, as shown in section F of this chapter.  
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Table 3.5:   Bulgaria and Romania year 2001 overall scores, categories and 
subcategories scores.   
 
 
 
1. PL: Planning 
Sub-criteria BULGARIA ROMANIA 
Positive Negative Positive Negative 
General Evaluation      
High–level of power 
(elected politicians) 
      
Lower level  +2    
Organized crime (where 
applicable) 
    
 NGOs/IOs +2    
 Economics +1    
2. Adopt: Adoption of legislation and institutional change 
General evaluation +2 -3  -2 
High level  +2   -1 
Low level +3 -1   
Organized crime    +1 -4 
NGOs/IOs +2  +2(IOs) -2 (IOs) 
Economics +3  +3  
3. Impl: Implementation  
General evaluation  -2  -4 
High level     
Low level      
Organized crime   +1 -1 
4. Gen: General assessments 
General evaluation of 
corruption/ 
progress(Gen.) 
 -3  -11 
NGOs/IOs 
assessments(ranking 
levels of corruption) 
+2   -3 
High level (elected 
politicians) 
+1   -4 
Lower Level (public 
admin.) 
 -2   
Economics  -2  -2 
Score Total: Positive  +20 
Negative = -13 
 
POSITIVE 60% 
NEGATIVE 40% 
Positive = +7 
Negative = -34 
 
POSITIVE 20% 
NEGATIVE 80% 
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CATEGORIES Positive Negative 
Bulgaria Romania Bulgaria Romania 
1.Planning  +5  0  0  0 
2. Adoption +12 +6 -5 -10 
3. Implementation 0 +1 -2 -4 
4. General Assessment +3 +1 -7 -20 
Score Total: +20 +8 -13 -34 
 
Dominant category 
Percentage of 
positive/negative score 
Adoption 
60% 
Planning 
25% 
Adoption 
75% 
Gen. Assess. 
45% 
Adoption 
40% 
Gen. Assess 
60% 
Adoption 
30% 
SUB-CATEGORIES 
Positive Negative 
Bulgaria Romania Bulgaria Romania 
a. General evaluation 
of the 3main stages 
(Pl; Adopt.; Impl.) 
+2 0 -5 -6 
b. Gen. evaluation of 
corruption/progress 
(by Commission ) 
0 0 -3 -11 
c. General assessment 
by NGOs/IOs 
+2 0 0 -3 
d. NGOs/IOs (role in 
the two stages) 
+4 +2 (IOs) 0 -2 
d.  High-Level (elected 
politicians) 
+3 0 0 -5 
e. Low- level (public 
administration) 
+5 0 -3 0 
f. organized crime 0 +2 0 -5 
g. economy +4 +3 -2 -2 
Score: Total +20 +7 -13  -34 
Dominant sub-
category 
Percentage of 
positive/negative score 
NGOs 
activity 
≈30% 
(sub-cats 
c+d)  
Low level 
≈25% 
Economy 
≈20% 
Economy 
≈40% 
 
Org. crime 
≈30% 
Gen eval. 
stages ≈40% 
 
Gen. eval. 
progress 
≈25% 
Gen. eval. 
Progress 
≈30%  
Gen eval. 
Stages ≈20% 
High-level 
15% 
Organized 
crime ≈15% 
 
*Political context: change of government in Bulgaria. Kostov government – United Democratic Forces 
Alliance (1997-2001) was replaced with the Simeon II government *New Movement Simeon II Party 
(2001-2005) 
*Romania – Nastase government Social Democratic Party (2000-2004). 
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Compared to the scores in 2000, when the situation depicted by the progress reports 
seemed to be moderately balanced between the two countries, the 2001 scores show a 
clear gap in the way in which the Commission issued its opinions. 
 
In 2001, Bulgaria received a positive score, compared to Romania. Also, the gap in favour 
of Bulgaria is significant. Compared with the previous year (2000), there is a radical 
change in the score for Bulgaria.  There is an increase in the overall scores (from 33% in 
2000 to 60%). On the other hand, Romania’s scores did not change significantly (from a 
negative 74% in 2000 to a negative 80% in 2001).   
 
So, the question arises: what led to this change in Bulgaria, apart from the change in 
government? The difference between the previous year’s negative score and the positive 
one for 2001 is not justified by Bulgaria’s progress.  The positive score is based on its 
achievements in the first and second stage of anti-corruption strategy, namely the 
planning and adoption stages. The implementation stage, the most important one, does 
not contribute at all to the positive score (which is zero). 
 
At the level of sub-categories, it is the activity of NGOs that triggers the majority of the 
positive statements. The Commission is particularly pleased with the collaboration 
between the new government, the NGOs and IOs in the National Anti-Corruption Plan. 
This is matched by the positive assessments of levels of corruption in general performed 
by the same non-governmental actors. 
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In the Romanian case, there is a large disproportion between the positive and negative 
statements. Positive statements are triggered, as with Bulgaria, by its achievements in the 
Adoption stage. Nevertheless, this is less intense than in the Bulgarian case (which scores 
double – 12 points, if compared with Romania). What significantly increases the gap is 
that the Commission does not comment at all on the initial stage of anti-corruption 
strategy, the Planning, as it does in the Bulgarian case. 
 
WHAT IS MISSING Categories(stages) Sub-categories 
Bulgaria   Organized crime 
Romania Planning  
 
 
The structure of the negative scores shows that, in both cases, the general assessment of 
the Commission and the watchdogs of corruption generated most such comments. This is 
followed by the Commission’s critics in the area of Adoption of anti-corruption 
legislation.  However, there is a massive disproportion between Bulgaria and Romania, 
when it comes to the general evaluation of progress issued by the Commission. To 
reiterate, such general comments do not refer to concrete anti-corruption steps. They 
transmit the evaluator’s general feeling about the progress in the area without backing it 
up with detailed arguments. These are the comments that strike the difference between 
the two countries for the negative score and the general score.  
 
The Commission is keen to tackle high-level corruption and organized crime in Romania. 
As previously mentioned, measures targeting political corruption are among the most 
sensitive and therefore the most difficult to implement.  
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Omissions can be as important as what is present. The Commission is completely silent 
about the organized crime of Bulgaria, as if the phenomenon does not exist. However, at 
this time, Bulgaria had a rampant problem of organized crime, with the uniquely 
aggravating feature that it was modelled on and connected to the Russian mafia (Europol, 
2012).  By contrast, the Commission is sensitive to organized crime in Romania. 
According to Europol, Romania’s organized crime is noticeable.  However, it never 
displayed the aggravating features of the Bulgarian situation.  Also, organized crime is 
not one of the benchmarks of the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism for Romania 
after Enlargement in 2007.  
 
The Commission makes no comments on the Planning stage in Romania. The National 
Anti-Corruption Plan is the first step in introducing anti-corruption measures and the 
easiest to follow. This comes in contrast with Bulgaria, who receives a good positive 
score on its account. 
 
To sum up, the significant quantitative gap (the score) between the two candidates cannot 
be explained by their achievements or lack of them in the way they adopted and applied 
concrete anti-corruption measures. At least, the reports do not give away much in this 
direction. 
 
The contrast between the two countries works best for Bulgaria. Most of its positive score 
is based on a selective focus on its achievements in the first and second stages of 
corruption, planning and adoption. Its obvious lack of achievements in the 
implementation stage (the most critical phase) does not seem to capture the Commission’s 
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attention. Its low negative score is due to a toning down of the Commission’s general 
critical comments on corruption in general. A potential source of negative comments was 
the big problem of organized crime. However, the topic is avoided. In contrast, the 
Commission is sensitive to the issue of organized crime in Romania, where it is not such 
a big issue. 
 
Where, indeed, Bulgaria seems to make a positive difference, if compared with Romania, 
is in the collaboration between the government and the NGOs laying down the National 
Anti-Corruption Plan and allowing these actors to conduct awareness campaigns. The 
role of NGOs is responsible for the positive assessments of the Commission during the 
Planning stage. For Romania, the Commission is completely silent on this issue, as there 
is no mention of NGO activity. 
 
Most of the negative score for Romania comes from the general assessments of the 
Commission on general progress, without concrete references to anti-corruption policies. 
With the exception of involving NGOs in the creation of a National Anti-Corruption Plan 
and the ratification of international agreements on corruption, Bulgaria does not display 
any significant achievements which could justify the large score gap. Nor is the leap 
between Bulgaria’s score in 2000 and the one in 2001 apparently justified. 
 
All in all, the Commission seems to focus selectively on Bulgaria’s achievements in 
incipient stages of anti-corruption, while avoiding focus on important negative aspects, 
such as rampant organized crime and lack of progress in the final implementation stage. 
The general negative evaluations made by the Commission are toned down. By contrast, 
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that which is ignored or played down in the case of Bulgaria is highlighted in the 
Romanian case: lack of achievements in the implementation stage, little progress in 
tackling high-level political corruption and problems with organized crime. Also, 
responsible for most of Romania’s negative score is the Commission’s general comments 
on corruption as “a widespread and systemic phenomenon”. 
 
2.3 Summary of European Commission reports for 
Bulgaria and Romania, year 2002 
 
Table 3.6 summarises the quantification of the number of the positive and negative 
statements made for each linguistic category and subcategory of the Commission’s 
reports that were used to identify each stage of corruption, as shown in section F of this 
chapter.  
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Table 3.6:   Bulgaria and Romania 2002: overall scores, categories/subcategories  
1. PL: Planning 
Sub-criteria 
BULGARIA ROMANIA 
Positive Negative Positive Negative 
General Evaluation  +9  0 +10 0 
High level of power 
(elected politicians) 
+2 -2  0 0 
Lower level  +4 -1  0 0 
Organized crime (where 
applicable) 
 0  0  0 0 
NGOs/IOs +4 (NGOs)  0 +4 (IOs) 0 
Economics +1  0  0 0 
Total: +20 -3 +14 0 
2. Adopt: Adoption of legislation and institutional change 
General evaluation +4 -1 +4 -2 
High level  +1 -1 +3 -1 
Low level +3  0  0 -1 
Organized crime  +1  0  0  0 
NGOs/IOs +3  0 +1 (IOs)  0 
Economics +3  0 +1 -1 
Total: +15 -2 +9 -5 
3. Impl: Implementation  
General evaluation  -6 0 -4 
High level   0 -8 
Low level  +1  0 -1 
Organized crime  0  0 0  0 
Total +1 -6 0 -13 
4. Gen: General assessments 
General evaluation of 
corruption/progress(Gen.) 
  -2  -3 
NGOs/IOs assessments 
(ranking levels of 
corruption) 
+2 -4  -9 
High level (elected 
politicians) 
  +2 -5 
Lower Level (public 
admin.) 
 -7  -2 
Economics  -2  -5 
Total: +2 -15 +2 -24 
Score Total: Positive = +38 
Negative = -26 
 
POSITIVE = 60% 
NEGATIVE = 40% 
Positive = +25 
Negative = -42 
 
NEGATIVE = 60% 
POSITIVE = 40% 
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CATEGORIES 
 
 
Negative 
Bulgaria Romania Bulgaria Romania 
1. Planning  +20 +14 -3 0 
2. Adoption +15 +9 -2 -5 
3. Implementation +1 0 -6 -13 
4. General 
Assessment 
+2 +2 -15 -24 
Score Total: +38 +25 -26 -42 
Dominant category 
Percentage of total 
score (positive plus 
negative) 
 Planning 
+30% 
Adoption 
+25% 
Total 
+55% (out 
of 64) 
Planning 
+20% 
Adoption 
+13% 
Total +33% 
(out of 67) 
Gen. Assess     
-24% 
Implement  
-10% 
 
Gen. assess 
-35% 
 Implement     
-20% 
Total of -
55% (of 67) 
SUB-CATEGORIES 
Positive Negative 
Bulgaria Romania Bulgaria Romania 
a. General evaluation 
of the three main 
stages (Pl; Adopt.; 
Impl.) 
+13 
(Planning+ 
Adoption) 
+14  -7  -6 
b. General evaluation 
of 
corruption/progress 
(by Commission ) 
0 0 -2 -3 
c. General assessment 
by NGOs/IOs 
+2 0 -4 -9 
d. NGOs/IOs (role in 
the two stages) 
+7  
(5 NGOs+2 
IOs) 
+5 (IOs) 0 0 
d.  High-Level 
(elected politicians) 
+3 +5 -3 -14 
e. Low- level(public 
administration) 
+8 0 -8  - 4 
f. organized crime +1 0 0 0 
g. economy +4 +1 -2 -6 
Score: Total +38 +25 -26 -42 
Dominant sub-categ. 
Percentage of total 
score(64) 
Gen. eval. of 
categories 
≈20% 
NGOs (c+d) 
cumulated  
≈15% 
Gen. eval. 
of categ. 
≈20% 
NGOs role 
cumulated 
≈7%High-
Low level 
≈10% 
Gen. eval. 
categ. ≈10% 
 
High-level 
≈20% 
 
 
 
 
130 
 
 
 
Bulgaria’s and Romania’s scores are mirror images. The positive score of Bulgaria 
matches that of Romania but in terms of negative comments. Such a stark contrast should 
communicate that Bulgaria’s progress is far more substantial than that of Romania’s.  
However, this is not the case, as shown in Table 3.7. 
 
Table 3.7: Bulgaria and Romania’s progress 
 
Categories Bulgaria  Romania  
Planning and Adoption 
 
Similar situation 
(according to the 
Commission) 
Progress:  
“…Bulgaria has made 
more progress in the 
adoption of the legislation” 
Progress: 
“…legal framework that 
is reasonably 
comprehensive and which 
has been extended over 
the last year” 
Score: + 55% (of the total score) + 33%  (of the total score) 
Implementation 
 
Similar situation 
(according to the 
Commission): 
Lack of progress 
“Bulgaria has made more 
progress in the adoption of 
the legislation rather than 
in its implementation and 
enforcement” 
Lack of progress 
 
“..enforcement and 
implementation  remains 
weak” 
Score(out of total points) - 10% - 20% 
 
 
Excluding general assessments, both countries display the same strengths – progress in 
the first two stages of anti-corruption (planning and implementation) – and both display 
weaknesses in the last stage – implementation. However, the Commission’s approach is 
different from country to country. For Bulgaria, the Commission focuses on the positive 
side. Planning and Adoption represent more than half of the positive score, while for 
Low-level 
corr ≈15% 
level corr. 
≈7% 
 
NGOs 
(cumulated 
c+d) ≈6% 
NGOs 
(cumulated 
c+d) ≈14% 
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Romania they are represent only a third. For Romania, the emphasis falls on its lack of 
progress at the most difficult stage, the implementation.  Although Bulgaria’s absence of 
concrete results is also admitted by its evaluators, Bulgaria’s negative score on 
implementation is half that of Romania’s.  
 
This score did not include the general assessments, which do not make direct reference 
to concrete anti-corruption policies. The general assessments category communicates the 
overall opinion of the evaluators: that of the Commission, as well as of the international 
watchdogs of corruption.  Such comments are general and quite vague about concrete 
anti-corruption policies. Such comments have a strong descriptive flavour, as they only 
convey their likes and dislikes without actual reasons. They are also descriptive because 
they make general references to corruption as a systemic phenomenon, reiterating its 
negative impact on society. 
 
However, these statements play a crucial role in building up negative scores or in striking 
the balance between negative and positive scores. The frequency with which such 
statements are used is also very important. So, although both countries display the same 
weaknesses and strengths, the Commission’s general discontent is expressed with much 
more insistence for Romania than for Bulgaria. Bulgaria gets a minus 15 from such 
comments, while Romania gets a minus 24, which makes 35% of the overall score.  
 
Sub-categories  
For both countries, most of the positive score (20%) is derived from the general evaluation 
of the two stages of corruption: planning and adoption. Here the score is almost equal, 
132 
 
 
which strengthens the idea that overall there was no significant gap between the 
achievements of the two countries.  What is interesting here is what made the difference.  
Romania’s score mainly appears to be negative due to the Commission’s perception of 
lack of progress in fighting corruption at the highest decisional levels. In contrast, for 
Bulgaria, this is issue is comparatively ignored.  Yet, looking at the information provided 
by the Commission itself, Bulgaria is even more backward than Romania: it did not 
develop any judicial mechanisms that could allow decision-makers to be brought to 
justice.  The double standards continue with organized crime, with Bulgaria having the 
biggest problem out of all the candidates who struggle to overcome organized crime. 
Here, they score a plus 1 and no negative comments are made on the issue. 
 
The NGO’s assessments also display a selective style of evaluation, the scores again being 
a mirror reflection. Romania also receives negative assessments or rankings of NGOs, 
quoted by the Commission, but such a selective approach is not backed by empirical 
evidence. Romania is indeed backward. Bulgaria however, displays worse features: no 
attempt to implement measures against high-level corruption and rampant levels of 
organized crime, which are not even mentioned. 
 
What is indeed different between Bulgaria and Romania, however, is the fact that the new 
Bulgarian government, Simeon II, collaborates with civil society in preparing the 
National Anti-Corruption Plan. This is a fact well-noticed and appreciated by the 
Commission, as all the positive points accumulated by the sub-category of NGOs activity 
come from this aspect.  The Commission insists on highlighting Bulgaria’s achievements. 
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Table 3.8: Bulgaria and Romania progress by subcategories 
 
SUB-CATEGORIES Bulgaria Romania 
1. High-level corruption  
Adoption 
(only those items that 
are mentioned by the 
Commission itself in 
this Progress Report)  
  
 
No progress: 
MPs immunity – no law 
Conflict of interest – no law 
Party financing transparency 
- Law existent since 2001 
asset declaration – law existent 
since 2000 
 
No progress: 
MPs immunity – Law 
existent since 2000 
Conflict of interest – no law 
Party financing 
transparency – no law  
asset declaration – 
existent14 
 Implementation No progress, no measures 
taken:  
 
Asset declarations -  
“No effective monitoring and 
sanctions”. 
 
Non-existent judicial 
mechanism which could allow 
the prosecution and conviction 
of elected decision makers. 
 
At the end of the accession for 
negotiation, the Commission 
informs that, with few 
exceptions, such measures had 
never been taken: 
“overall the approach taken by 
the Bulgarian authorities in the 
fight against corruption has left 
aside the need to take specific 
measures in the fight against 
high-level corruption in 
political and business circles”  
(Bulgaria 2004) 
 
Unsatisfactory progress 
but measures were taken: 
 
 
Existent judicial 
mechanism and institution 
specialized on the 
prosecution and conviction 
of elected decision-makers 
(National Anti-corruption 
Office – NAPO).   
                                                          
14 Although in the 2000-2002 Reports the Commission does not make any comments on whether this law was adopted 
or not. In the 2003 Report it is alluded that the law existed when it says that the requirements of such a law “were 
extended”. So such a law was already in place. Freedom House gives us more information on the matter and it specifies 
that asset declaration law had been already adopted in 2001.  
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Conclusions: Adoption stage:  
same weaknesses for both 
Implementation:  
Bulgaria does not have the judicial framework for tackling 
corruption, while Romania does.  
Romania is more advanced than Bulgaria in tackling high-
level corruption.  
  Score:  -3  points  = 4% (of total   
score 
-14 points = 20% 
2. NGOs assessments/activity  – despite no concrete differences between the two 
candidates, the international/domestic watchdogs’ approach is different 
Score: Negative:  Romania -14%;  
Positive:   Bulgaria +14% 
3. Organized crime – Bulgaria has a rampant organized crime, unique in the EU 
(Europol 2012); it is benchmark 5 of the Cooperation and Verification 
Mechanism (CVM)  
Score:         Bulgaria:  
Positive =+1  
Negative = 0 
 
 
2.4 Summary of European Commission reports for 
Bulgaria and Romania, year 2003 
 
Table 3.9 summarises the quantification of the number of the positive and negative 
statements made for each linguistic category and subcategory of the commission’s reports 
that were used to identify each stage of corruption, as shown in section F of this chapter.  
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Table 3.9:  Bulgaria and Romania 2003: overall scores, categories/subcategories   
 
  
1. PL: Planning 
Sub-criteria BULGARIA ROMANIA 
Positive Negative Positive Negative 
General Evaluation      -0.5 
High  level of power 
(elected politicians) 
     -1 
Lower level      +1  
Organized crime (where 
applicable) 
    -1 
NGOs/IOs      
Economics      
2. Adopt: Adoption of legislation and institutional change 
General evaluation  +4     +5  -4 
High level   +1   +3   -4 
Low level  +7       
Organized crime         
NGOs/IOs  +6    -2    +2    -1 
Economics     
3. Impl: Implementation  
General evaluation   -2   -4 
High level     -8 .5 
Low level      
Organized crime     
4. Gen: General assessments 
General evaluation of 
corruption/progress 
(Gen.) 
   +1.5  
NGOs/IOs 
assessments(ranking 
levels of corruption) 
  -2   -6 
High level (elected 
politicians) 
 +2    -3 
Lower Level (public 
admin.) 
  -2   
Economics     -3 
  
 Score Total: 
Positive                    +20 
Negative                   - 8 
 
POSITIVE                  70% 
NEGATIVE                30%  
Positive               +12.5 
Negative              -36 
 
POSITIVE              25% 
NEGATIVE            75% 
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CATEGORIES Positive Negative 
Bulgaria Romania Bulgaria Romania 
1.Planning    0  1   0  -2.5 
2. Adoption  18  10  -2  -9 
3. Implementation   0   0  -2  -12.5 
4. General 
Assessment 
  2  1.5  -4  -12 
Score Total: 20 12.5   -8   -36 
Dominant category 
Percentage of 
positive/negative 
score 
Adoption 
90% 
(Out of 20) 
Adoption 
80% 
(Out of 
12.5) 
Gen. assess 
 50% 
(Out of -8) 
Impl + 
Gen assess 
70%  
(Out of -
36) 
SUB-CATEGORIES Positive Negative 
Bulgaria Romania Bulgaria Romania 
a. General evaluation 
of the three main 
stages (Pl; Adopt.; 
Impl.) 
  
 +4 
 
 +5 
 
 -2 
 
 -8.5 
b. General evaluation 
of 
corruption/progress 
(by Commission ) 
 
 0 
 
 +1.5 
 
 0 
 
  0 
c. General assessment 
by NGOs/IOs 
 0   0  -2  -6 
d. NGOs/IOs (role in 
the two stages) 
 +6  +2  -2  -1 
 
d. High-Level (elected 
politicians) 
 +3  +3   0  -16.5 
e. Low- level(public 
administration) 
 +7  +1  -2   0 
f. Organized crime  0   0   0  -1 
g. Economy  0   0   0  -3  
Score: Total +20  +12.5  -8  -36 
Dominant sub-
category 
Percentage of 
positive/negative 
score 
Lo-level 
35% 
NGO’s 
30% 
Total: 
+65% 
General 
evaluation 
 +40% 
Gen.eval,NGOs 
IGOs,low-level 
  -25% 
Hi-level -
45%           
gen.eval.-
24% 
Total -
69% 
 
In the case of Bulgaria, a high positive score is reported in the adoption stage. 
Surprisingly, the implementation stage (the most crucial and important stage) is not 
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mentioned at all. By contrast, Romania’s negative scores are based on its limited focus 
and efforts regarding the implementation of anti-corruption policies.   
 
In terms of the sub-categories, Bulgaria gathers positive comments, thanks to its 
management of low-level corruption and the involvement of NGOs and IOs in the 
process. What is missing is more relevant. There is not even one mention of the most 
sensitive aspect of corruption: high level elected politicians.  On the other hand, in the 
Romanian case, the Commission focuses on its lack achievements in the sensitive area of 
high-level corruption.  If we are to compare both countries; Romania seems to have set 
up some institutional framework to tackle high-level corruption. Although it may not be 
going well, it is nevertheless present, while, in the Bulgarian case, the whole infrastructure 
for tackling high-level corruption is barely evident. Finally, organized crime is almost 
totally absent from the record in both cases. 
 
2.5 Summary of European Commission reports for Bulgaria and 
Romania, year 2004 
 
Table 3.10 summarises the quantification of the number of the positive and negative 
statements made for each linguistic category and subcategory of the Commission’s 
reports that were used to identify each stage of corruption, as shown in section F of this 
chapter.  
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Table 3.10:   Bulgaria and Romania 2004 overall scores, categories/subcategories  
 
2. PL: Planning 
Sub-criteria BULGARIA ROMANIA 
Positive Negative Positive Negative 
General Evaluation   +2    
High  level of power 
(elected politicians) 
   -1    
Lower level   +1     
Organized crime (where 
applicable) 
    
NGOs/IOs      
Economics      
5. Adopt: Adoption of legislation and institutional change 
General evaluation  +7    +5   
High level     -3   +1   -1 
Low level + 2.5    +2  
Organized crime         
NGOs/IOs  + 4.5       +2   
Economics  +1    
6. Impl: Implementation  
General evaluation   -1    -7 
High level    + 0.5   -9 
Low level   + 1.5    
Organized crime     
7. Gen: General assessments 
General evaluation of 
corruption/progress 
(Gen.) 
     
NGOs/IOs 
assessments(ranking 
levels of corruption) 
+ 0.5  -4   +1   -9 
High level (elected 
politicians) 
   -2    
Lower Level (public 
admin.) 
 +2     
Economics   -3    
Score Total: Positive               +22            
Negative             -14    
 
POSITIVE              60 % 
NEGATIVE            40 %    
Positive               +11.5      
Negative               -26 
 
POSITIVE              35  % 
NEGATIVE            65 % 
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CATEGORIES 
Positive Negative 
Bulgaria Romania Bulgaria Romania 
1.Planning     +3   0   -1   0 
2. Adoption   +15  +10   -3  -1 
3. Implementation   +1.5  +0.5   -1  -16 
4. General Assessment   +2.5   +1   -9  -9 
Score Total:   +22  +11.5   -14 -26 
Dominant category 
Percentage of 
positive/negative score 
Adoption  
    70%  
(Out of 22) 
Adoption 
    80% 
(Out of 11.5) 
Gen.Assess 
    -64% 
(Out of -14) 
Impl. 
    -61% 
(Out of -26) 
Sub-categories 
Positive Negative 
Bulgaria Romania Bulgaria Romania 
a. General evaluation 
of the three main 
stages (Pl; Adopt.; 
Impl.) 
 
 +9 
 
  +5 
 
 -1 
 
 -7 
b. General evaluation 
of 
corruption/progress 
(by Commission ) 
 
   0 
 
   0 
 
  0 
   
  0 
c. General assessment 
by NGOs/IOs 
 +0.5  +1  -4  -9 
d. NGOs/IOs (role in 
the two stages) 
 +4.5  +2   0   0 
d. High-Level (elected 
politicians) 
  0  +1.5  -6  -10 
e. Low- level(public 
administration) 
 +7  +2   0   0 
f. organized crime   0   0   0   0 
g. economy  +1   0  -3   0 
Score: Total +22 +11.5 -14 -26 
Dominant sub-
category 
Percentage of 
positive/negative score 
Gen eval 
40% 
Lo-level  
30% 
Total: 70% 
(Out of 22) 
Gen eval 
43% 
NGO/IOs -
28% 
Hi-level -
43% 
 
Hi-level -
38% 
Ng0/I0s -
35% 
Gen eval                
-27% 
 
 
In 2004, Bulgaria continued to report positive overall scores compared to Romania. 
Bulgaria received a larger number of positive statements (60%) compared to Romania. 
By contrast, Romania received more negative comments than Bulgaria (65%).  
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In the case of Bulgaria, the EC focused mainly on the adoption and planning stages and 
nearly ignored the implementation stage.  By contrast, in Romania’s case, the EC focused 
more on the third and most difficult stage, which is implementation.  This stage is highly 
politically sensitive and difficult to tackle. This resulted in Romania receiving more 
negative statements than Bulgaria. For example, 14 out of their 32 evaluation statements 
emphasised the need to convict and bring to justice high level officials. This clearly shows 
an imbalance between the ways the EC dealt with the two countries.  
 
In terms of the subcategories, Bulgaria received positive scores in the general evaluation 
of the three stages, followed by the degree to which NGOs and IOs were involved in the 
process of rooting out corruption. Almost nothing was said about its efforts to root out 
corruption at high level.  At the same time, Romania scored negatively in terms of its 
efforts in tackle high level corruption.  Both countries portray a significant difference in 
terms of their approach in tackling high level corruption. Romania on the one hand, has 
set up some institutional parameters to tackle the high-level corruption of its elected 
politicians while, in the Bulgarian case, there is practically no evidence of an 
infrastructure being in place. Finally, in neither country is there is anything to suggest 
they have made efforts to tackle organised crime. 
 
So far, I have shown that there is a clear difference between the positive aspects that the 
Commission highlighted when addressing Bulgaria’s and Romania’s progress. Table 3:11 
presents a summary of the overall positive and negative scores per year for both Romania 
and Bulgaria.  
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Table: 3:11 
Summary of overall scores 
 
 
 Bulgaria Romania 
Year 
Overall 
positive scores 
Overall negative 
scores 
Overall positive 
scores 
Overall 
negative scores 
2000 33% 67% 26% 74% 
2001 60% 40% 20% 80% 
2002 60% 40% 40% 60% 
2003 70% 30% 25% 75% 
2004 60% 40% 35% 65% 
 
 
Conclusions: 
 
The technocratic discourse of meritocracy and fairness has been consistently 
contradicted, in this case by the Commission’s selective focus on positive aspects when 
addressing Bulgaria’s progress and on the negative ones in the Romanian case.  This has 
happened at the expense of important points, which, according to the Commission’s own 
standards, were essential in the fight against corruption: implementation of anti-
corruption legislation and the prosecution and conviction of corrupted politicians and 
mafia mobs. Such requests were either played down (tackling high-level corruption) or 
completely ignored (organized crime) in the Bulgarian case. In return, the Commission 
highlighted positive aspects of Bulgarian’s anti-corruption effort, which according to its 
own hierarchy of standards, were less important: e.g. collaboration between the 
government and civil society in the planning stage of anti-corruption policy. 
 
In short, the CA confirms the systematic usage of double standards in the case of Bulgaria 
and Romania. It also confirms that the central question about the EU’s anti-corruption 
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policies is who won and who lost in terms of power, as a result of the fight against 
corruption under the EU’s terms. 
 
Double standards 
The quantitative analysis of the Commission’s Reports has revealed a series of interesting 
aspects. The most striking one (although not the most important one from the perspective 
of this research) confirms the opinion of a minority of scholars in this area that: “Progress 
Reports offer a distorted image of the accession process (Kochenov 2004: 17) and refutes 
the more largely shared idea in the literature, that they give “a full and accurate picture of 
where a candidate stands in the pre-accession process” (Vachudova2004:129). 
  
The existence of double standards always relates to situations involving vested interests, 
where, through a reinterpretation of the facts, power agendas are promoted in such a way 
as to override the standard objections. Actions, which would normally cause discontent 
are reframed and assigned a positive meaning, which appears morally and rationally 
acceptable, hiding the power games behind the scenes, and reorganising the balance of 
power, usually to the perpetrators’ advantage. 
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Table 3:12   Dominant Categories 
 
 
 
Bulgaria  Romania  
   
Year Positive  Negative  
2000 adoption General assessment 
2001 Adoption General assessment  
2002 Planning/adoption 
(nearly equal) 
General assessment 
2003 adoption Implementation and General 
assessment 
2004 Adoption  Implementation  
 
 
Table 3:13 
Dominant Subcategories 
 
 
Bulgaria  Romania  
Year Positive  Negative  
2000 NGOs and IOs and economy General evaluation commission 
2001 NGO activity General evaluation progress  
2002 General evaluation 
categories 
High level 
2003 Low level High level 
2004 General  High level  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 Governments and the role of NGOs 
 
Introduction 
This chapter discusses the relationship between domestic civil society and the 
governments and how this impacts on the way civil society reports on the progress against 
corruption. The chapter has two parts, which discuss separately the cases of Bulgaria and 
Romania. The existing evidence suggests that double standards, used by the Commission 
in reporting on progress, were mirrored by the watchdogs of corruption. It also suggests 
that rooting out corruption was not the main, genuine concerns of these actors either.  
However, this relationship (governmental versus non-governmental actors) needs to be 
unfolded and analysed, in order to understand how more exactly the non-governmental 
actors took advantage of the anti-corruption context. 
Bulgaria 
Non-governmental watchdogs of corruption and the Simeon II government  
(2001-2005) 
 
The relationship between the government and non-governmental watchdogs of corruption 
is indicated as key in explaining the Commission’s double standards. The results of the 
Content Analysis show the importance of civil society in country branding. It also shows 
the importance granted by the Commission to the voices of these actors in the process. 
The collaboration of the Bulgarian government with civil society was more important 
than the existence of an organized crime, unique among the Eastern candidate countries, 
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according to Europol (2012) and famous for its relationships with the Russian mafia 
(Centre for the Study of Democracy 2012; Kazuharov 2007, 2008; Volkov 2002; 
Trojanow 2006a, b). It was also more important than bringing to justice elected decision 
makers and mafia mobs, an issue which was rendered as crucial by the Commission.  
 
 The role of non-governmental organizations is described in the 10 principles for fighting 
corruption: “The civil society has an important role to play in preventing and fighting the 
problem” (Commission 2003).  It appears that the role of these actors and their access to 
decision-makers was promoted by the EU anti-corruption policies before accession. 
 
Nevertheless, the existence of double standards indicates a different rationale than that of 
rooting out corruption behind such policies. The consequences of double standards is 
always the empowerment of one side and the disempowerment of the other or, it may 
signal an already existent power polarization. The CA and the interviews indicated that 
the relationship between the government and non-governmental actors played an 
important role in the Commission’s evaluation and, therefore, in generating the distorted 
image of corruption.   
 
Most of the interviewees (from the DG Enlargement, Bulgarian and Romanian Unit) 
stressed that the evaluation of structural phenomena, such as corruption, was mostly based 
on the promises made by the candidates, that they would implement the necessary 
measures, because rooting out corruption takes time. The only provision was that such 
promises had to be credible. The Simeon Government gave signs that it was more 
committed towards reform than the Social Democratic Party in Romania.  
146 
 
 
 
The DA results showed that the main factor that bestowed credibility to Bulgaria’s bid 
was that the National Movement Simeon II Party decided to be flexible and to undertake 
a serious consultation exercise with NGOs and donors on the preparation of the Strategy 
and Action Plan (European Commission 2002a:16). Interviews conducted within the 
European Commission endorsed this result. According to members of the EC Delegation 
in Bulgaria, both the Kostov and Simeon governments were “very open minded” in 
accepting the European Commission’s suggestions for a collaboration with domestic 
think tanks. Michael Leigh (former EU chief negotiator for Bulgaria) stated that, 
involving IOs and NGOs in the reform of justice and in forging the Anti-Corruption 
Action Plan, was crucial for the positive image of Bulgaria in Brussels. This collaboration 
was undertaken under the umbrella of the 2000 Coalition.  This coalition played a crucial 
role in planning, monitoring and reporting to Brussels on the anti-corruption progress. It 
was a coalition between non-governmental organizations validated by the EU, 
international donors (IMF, WB, USAID, Freedom House, etc.) and members of the 
government. The initiative for such a coalition came from the EC Delegation in Sofia, 
according to the interviewees with former members of the delegation and with some 
members of the Centre for the Study of Democracy, a leading Think-Tank of Bulgaria.  
 
The coalition was the main access gate that allowed civil society and international donors 
access to policy making and decision in the area of corruption. However, members of the 
Romanian Unit and the EC Delegation in Bucharest expressed their annoyance about this 
aspect. According to the task manager of JHA and corruption: “In the beginning, 
Bulgarian NGOs were issuing quite critical reports on the state of corruption in Bulgaria, 
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but later on, they became more and more optimistic … and they started holding back 
negative aspects”. This situation was acknowledged by members of the EC delegation in 
Sophia, who admitted that the NGOs decided to use their reports about the state of 
corruption as ‘window dressing’ for the government.  
 
The most important confirmation came from the interviews with the members of 
Bulgarian civil society (such as the interviewees from the Centre for the study of 
Democracy and Transparency International, Bulgarian Chapter) who participated in the 
process of evaluation. They offered the following explanation: the ex-king Simeon 
demonstrated flexibility in co-opting the most important civil society organizations into 
policy making and in accepting their expertise. In return, the civil society decided that it 
would be more useful for Bulgaria to convince the EU members and the European 
Commission that, despite some important difficulties, Bulgaria was prepared to join the 
EU on time. The reason given by the interviewees was that, if Bulgaria’s membership 
were delayed, the momentum for rooting out corruption would be lost and the authorities 
might slide back into their usual complacency with the situation, owing to lack of 
encouragement on the EU side. 
   
Consequently, the main reason for the Simeon II government’s good image in Brussels 
seems to be located in its good relationship with Bulgarian civil society and its 
international donors. Discourse Analysis and the interviews in Brussels and inside 
Bulgarian civil society endorsed this aspect.   
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The 2000 Coalition granted the domestic watchdogs massive political influence in a very 
short time, as they practically mingled with the authorities at all levels of decision and 
policy making. Leading members of think tanks and NGOs, such as Boyko Borisov, 
Programme Director of the Centre for the Study of Democracy, Diana Kovacheva, the 
Executive Director of Transparency International, or Ognian Shentov (Centre for the 
Study of Democracy) functioned as direct advisers, at the highest level of the executive, 
in relation to the Anti-Corruption Plan. 
 
A second aspect is the financial one. From 2001, the burden of finance started being taken 
over by the government itself, as the numerous members of NGOs operating at the local 
and central levels of administration had to be paid for their work. Indeed, during this 
period, Bulgarian civil society started boasting about its increasing independence from 
international donors and its reliance on domestic sources of money (which were in fact, 
provided by the government). The international donors remained important, but the 
importance of governmental funding increased and was mostly welcomed as a vital 
diversification for the thinning stream of money coming from some Western donors 
(Freedom House 2004). Such a vital source of money is represented by the Corruption 
Monitoring System, in which 500 NGOs were involved, and which was an essential 
source of funding during this difficult period (Centre for the Study of Democracy 2003) 
 
 
 
 
Reporting on corruption 
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In these circumstances, Bulgarian civil society decided to shift its role from corruption 
watchdog to regime enhancer, in order to “support the government’s bid for the EU 
integration” (see interviews inside TI and the CSD).  Transparency International (TI) 
Chapter for Bulgaria  is a case in point.  Bulgaria experienced a change in the CPI ranking, 
which jumped from an index lower than three, in 1998, to above four, in 2004, placing 
Bulgaria above the majority of the new Eastern EU members, such as Slovakia and 
Poland. The evaluation of the 2000 Coalition (2004) based on the TI’s CPI, claimed that, 
“from a country with systemic corruption problems, Bulgaria is turning into a country 
with a moderate spread of corruption”. This statement was made precisely when contract 
killings were reaching a peak, under Simeon II government, as was organised crime. 
Figure 4.1 exactly describes this situation. 
 
The most important and influential reports, however, were those issued by the leading 
Think-Tank, the Centre for the Study of Democracy, the academic branch of the 2000 
Coalition. The high reputation gained by this organization has still been maintained until 
today. CSD is one of the 20 organizations that participate in the ANTICORP FP7 project, 
initiated by the European Commission, which investigates the efficiency of EC anti-
corruption policies. 
 
From the moment that the 2000 Coalition issued its influential report on Corruption 
(1998) until the end of the accession negotiations in 2004, there was not even one 
consistent paragraph dedicated to organized crime. The terms ‘contract killings’ and 
‘organized crime’ are never mentioned. In hundreds and hundreds of pages dedicated to 
the reform of the judiciary and of the Ministry of the Interior, there is not one reference 
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to these phenomena (CSD: 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004). The first reference to 
racketeering was made one year after European Commissioner, Olli Rehn, expressed 
concern about it, in 2006, and it was mentioned by the Centre for the Study of Democracy  
(CSD 2006: 22). From 2005 onwards, the 2000 Coalition was dissolved. The CSD was 
the left to issue the Anti- corruption Report.  
 
In 2005, the same Centre issued a special Report on “Crime Trends”. One would expect 
that organized crime would finally be discussed. However, the Centre announced from 
the very beginning that the report would not discuss “organized crime or ... financial 
crimes” (CSD 2005: 7). The conclusion of the Report was that between 2001 and 2004, 
the crime rate decreased (CSD 2005: 6). It is very important to note that, in this case, the 
Centre depicts a rosy version of reality, based on an essential omission: organized crime. 
The result is that, according to this report, Bulgaria is found to be safer than Poland or 
Australia (CSD 2005: 6).  
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Figure 4.1 
Killing Contracts in Bulgaria, 1997-2006 
 
 
Figure 4.1 shows that, during the government of the National Movement, Simeon II 
(2001–2005), killing contracts became especially common. Just between 2001 and 2004, 
the number of such contract killings soared to around 150 (Freedom House 2009), a figure 
that far surpassed all records, from previous governments or after, including the Socialist 
Coalition of Stanishev (2005-2009). According to the Bulgarian Prosecution Office, from 
1992 to 2005, there were 175 contract killings by non-identified perpetrators. Even now, 
almost none of these contract killings cases have been solved and brought to justice 
(Commission 2013). 
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Conclusion 
As shown in Figure 4.1 the Simeon II received positive assessment of fighting corruption, 
While Stanishev was highly criticized.  However, if looking closely on the graph, it is 
clear that organized crime proved to more active under Simeon II, who was praised than 
Stansihev. This suggests the possibility of double standards on part of the EC. 
Organized crime, killing contracts and high-level corruption are crucial issues for the fight 
against corruption. However, civil society has decided to ignore or downplay them. The 
main reason was the “open attitude” of the Simeon II government, who allowed access to 
policy-making and resources in an unprecedented way. It appears that, at least during this 
period (2001-2004), the watchdogs of corruption were not interested in the efficiency of 
anti-corruption activity. Using their imported position as rapporteurs and surveyors of 
corruption, granted to them by the EC, private gain seemed to be more important. 
 
Civil Society and the Socialist Coalition of Stanishev (2005-2009) 
The former king, Simeon Saxe-Cobourg, who was liberal and well-connected in Brussels, 
and his party (the National Movement for Stability and Progress) were defeated during 
the elections and the Socialist Party, led by Sergei Stanishev, came to power. Stanishev 
does not seem to have pursued a different policy from that of Simeon. He declared his 
pro-EU stance and received Barrroso’s praise for keeping Bulgaria on track with the 
accession (BBC 2006, 26 September).  
 
The mood in Brussels started to change, but in an unfavorable direction for the new 
government, from 2005. The European Commission started to become aware that 
organized crime in Bulgaria potentially represented a big problem. It also decided that 
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contract killings were a worrying phenomenon, that Bulgaria was not doing enough to 
create the necessary legislative and administrative framework for tackling high-level 
corruption, that the judicial system might have serious failings, since they had not 
managed to bring even one important mafia mob to justice or solve even one contract 
killing case. All these aspects emerged in their Progress reports from 2005 and 2006, and 
they would become benchmarks in the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism, as 
discussed already.  
 
The EC’s increased concern was  mirrored in the growing number of peer reviews. In one 
year - August 2005-June 2006 - Bulgaria would receive more peer reviews than it had 
previously received in four years, according to interviews in DG JHA (Justice and Home 
Affairs). The last peer review of February 2006, conducted by Susette Schuster and Klaus 
Jansen, was the most critical (see the Introduction). It was leaked to the Western press 
and produced an uproar. Now, Romania was regarded as the front runner, while Bulgaria 
was the target of criticism for something that had been praised only one year before. 
 
The critical stance against Stanishev peaked with the unprecedented freezing of PHARE 
funding worth 220 million Euro. There were two reasons for this: the lack of convictions 
of high-profile mafia mobs and corrupt politicians, and embezzlement of EU funding 
(European Commission 2008a).  
 
The new shift was also mirrored in the assessments of international and domestic 
corruption watchdogs.  
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In 2009, the most prestigious Bulgarian think-tank, the Centre for the Study of 
Democracy, issued its most critical assessment ever. According to this, Bulgaria 
witnessed a slowdown in its anti-corruption efforts after the accession. Moreover, for the 
first time since 1998, the Corruption Monitoring System, managed by a cluster of NGOs, 
registered a trend of rising corruption rates among the Bulgarian population for the 2007-
2008 period. The reason mentioned is a lack of political commitment to press forward 
with anti-corruption reforms (Centre for the Study of Democracy 2009: 5).  
 
Transparency International added itself to this negative choir by downgrading Bulgaria’s 
CPI so that in 2008, it reached its lowest level for four years: Bulgaria's score dropped to 
3.6 points on a scale of zero to 10, compared to 4.1 points a year earlier, replacing 
Romania as the country with the lowest CPI in the EU (Transparency International 2005). 
Before 2005, TI in Bulgaria was boasting a CPI higher than Slovakia and Poland, while 
now it had a score even lower than that of some non-EU countries, such as Croatia. 
 
The way in which the European Commission and civil society expressed their opinion 
indicates that something had deteriorated. Logically, the place to look for this was around 
Benchmark Four, regarding high-level corruption, organized crime and contract killings 
(CVM 2008a).  However, nothing had changed here: contract killings had soared during 
the previous government, when organized crime was also rampant, and the lack of high-
level convicted politicians or mafia mobs was equally evident during the time of the 
previous government (see the previous chapter and Figure 3.1, above). The only 
difference was that these were not previously made obvious, either by the European 
Commission or by its watchdogs.  Moreover, there was actually one positive 
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development. Figure 3.1 shows that the frequency of contract killings under the Socialists 
of Stanishev had, in fact, decreased.  
 
The second motive regarding the embezzlement of EU funding also raises some 
questions. Firstly, the accusations of embezzlement do not refer to structural, post-
accession funding but to PHARE, pre-accession funding. PHARE had been in place for 
ten years. It was after ten years that a detailed audit investigation was initiated in relation 
to these funds (interviews at Centre for the Study of Democracy and EC delegation in 
Sophia). This is remarkable, since the financial and administrative management of 
PHARE projects is managed by the national implementing structure of the candidate 
countries, but under the supervision of the European Commission and its Delegations. 
Why, in ten years, had there been no such concern previously for the management of 
PHARE funds?  
 
In its 2008, specially issued report on this problem, the European Commission identifies 
high level corruption and organized crime as a general reason for this situation, which 
enhanced the weakness in administrative and judicial capacity (European Commission 
2008c). But such high levels of corruption had been always there; the only difference was 
that they were deliberately ignored, as has already been demonstrated. The argument that 
the European Commission’s awareness increased because Bulgaria was about to have 
access to a much larger pot of money, the structural funds, is not an explanation, as it 
excludes the fact that, in ten years of PHARE, much larger amounts of money could have 
been embezzled.  
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Secondly, PHARE management differs from the management of structural funds. In the 
first instance, the European Commission’s Delegation is also responsible for its 
management. Yet, the role of the EC delegation is not mentioned in the EC Report 
(European Commission 2008c). The European Commission seemed to ignore the fact that 
in 2005, the Bulgarian chapter of Transparency International pressed charges against 
officials from the Delegation of the EC, who were accused, together with the Ministry of 
Finance, of manipulating the assessment of project proposals under the PHARE 
Democracy Programme (Centre for the Study of Democracy 2007:63-64). Again, timing 
is important, for these charges concerned the mismanagement of funds before the 
Stanishev government took charge.  
 
In conclusion, the arguments brought by the European Commission against Stanishev 
show inconsistencies, which force the question: what were the genuine reasons that 
prompted this negative attitude? What had changed now, as compared with the previous 
government? 
 
A strained relationship with Civil Society 
The analysis covering 2000-2004 showed that civil society’s access to policy making 
and public funding, granted under the Simeon II government, was rewarded with a 
positive assessment (compared to Romania), despite its poor achievements in other 
more important areas of the fight against corruption. The relationship with the pro-EU 
civil society elite seems again to be the factor that influenced the balance of the 
evaluation. 
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According to interviews with former members of the EC delegation in Sophia,  the  
members of Bulgarian civil society (the Centre For The Study Of Democracy and TI), 
and the Anti-Corruption Reports issued by the Centre For The Study of Democracy and 
some other documents issued by the IMF, WB and Freedom House, there  were two main 
lines of discontent regarding Stanishev’s actions. One related to his attempt to divert 
funding from the established NGOs, protected by the EU, to others created by various 
politicians. The second related to the economic policies adopted by the new government, 
which were moving away from the neo-liberal doctrine. 
 
In contrast with the former king Simeon, who agreed to collaborate with and, 
consequently, to finance, the pro-EU NGOs, the new government did something that 
enraged the mainstream NGOs: “it attempted to establish control over civil society by 
setting up quasi-NGOs and by co-opting old ones, in order to suppress criticism” (Centre 
for the Study of Democracy 2009:33). The quasi-NGOs were registered by high-level 
public officials who, while still in office, used their status to divert resources to the NGOs 
in question (Centre for the Study of Democracy 2009:41). This was particularly painful 
for the established NGOs, at a time when international donors started to shift their 
attention and resources towards the poorer Western Balkans and Kosovo. Consequently, 
the government came to play a crucial role in NGO funding. Public funds distributed by 
the government and intended for the NGOs in 2008 constituted almost 40% of the total 
amount (interviews at TI, CSD; Centre for the Study of Democracy 2009:39). The 
mechanism for financing the NGOs, established by the European Union in its European 
Citizen Action Service (European Commission 1993), stipulates that half of their income 
should be ensured from public funds, distributed by the government. By opening a large 
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number of NGOs, run by various Bulgarian politicians, much of the funding that was 
expected to go to the established pro-EU watchdogs started to be diverted.  
 
Secondly, with the disappearance of the 2000 Coalition, the old state/NGO partnership 
was not revitalized. So, although the old mechanism of the Corruption and Monitoring 
System was still in place, together with all of its local networks of surveillance, the access 
to policy making was restrained.  
 
Members of CSD, and in particular of Transparency International (TI), complained about 
the unwillingness of the Socialist government to accept their projects and expertise; their 
access to executive and parliamentary meetings and debates was restricted, as well as 
their access to the activity of the Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Justice 
(Interviews at CSD and TI). The established NGOs also pointed out the reason for 
this: ”organizations with little or no previous institutional experience, yet with high level 
public officials as members of their management boards, not only receive grants but take 
part in the elaboration of state policies under the guise of being independent associations” 
(Centre for the Study of Democracy 2009: 42).  
 
In short, Stanishev made the mistake of trying to phase out that “civil society” which had 
been responsible to a certain degree for the good (if not well-deserved) atmosphere that 
his predecessor, Simeon II, enjoyed in Brussels.  
 
For Brussels, these steps taken by the Socialist government were interpreted as an attempt 
to restrain the European Commission’s ability to keep a close eye on the political elite in 
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power. It was regarded as a “quiet revolution” on the part of a political class, which had 
proved cooperative until that moment, according to interviews in DG Enlargement.  
 
In conclusion, the Bulgarian civil society displayed a consistent pattern of behaviour, 
which confirms the fact that fighting corruption was not the genuine priority. These actors 
used their position in the anti-corruption strategy to gain access to policy-making and 
resources. The EC conditionality on corruption empowered pro-EU civil society by 
creating a window of opportunity both during the accession and after. The main losers in 
terms of power remained the domestic government which was forced to take into account 
the interests and agenda of these actors. 
 
Romania 
2000-2004: The Social Democratic government and civil society 
Alina Mungiu Pippidi, a veteran of Romanian civil society, stated in an interview that, 
“Smart ambassadors from the new EU members, know that in order for Europeanization 
to work, they need to identify and provide political support to people who want to change 
things. Give a sign to the right people ...” (Pippidi 2007). Both the Bulgarian and the 
Romanian cases show how right he was. 
 
The Kostov (1997-2001) and Simeon (2001-2005) governments in Bulgaria were shrewd 
enough to accept the EC Delegation suggestions and to strike a deal with civil society. In 
contrast, the Social Democratic Party in power in Romania did not grasp the importance 
of this aspect. However, the relationship between government and civil society had not 
been so strained from the very beginning.  This occurred largely due to the informal 
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pressures coming from the EU and international donors. The SDP, under Nastase, took 
several steps in the direction desired by civil society in the first years of its governance 
(2000-2002). 
 
In 2001, at the beginning of the accession process, the government passed a law 
(HG1065/2001), stating that collaboration with civil society and the media was an 
essential condition for putting together the successful Anti-Corruption Plan requested by 
the European Commission.  
 
A second step was to pass the law on Transparency of Information in 2001, which allowed 
public access to information considered in the public interest (Freedom House 2005:147). 
Law 544 allowed various NGOs to require access to information, which could indicate 
various sources of corruption and irregularities performed by the government (Freedom 
House 2005:47; SAR 2004:11-12; interview with Diana Crangasu, APADOR CH). It was 
therefore considered essential. For example, the Romanian Academic Society, a leading 
NGO, issued a Warning Report in 2004, which presented evidence about corrupt practices 
in the way state funding was being distributed to the counties. The result was that the 
Minister in charge of this was forced to resign. The transparency law made it possible for 
this NGO to have access to the necessary data.  
 
A third step made by the Social Democrats was that five prominent NGOs15 were actually 
invited by the government to have a say in the National Anti-Corruption Plan, requested 
                                                          
15 Romanian Academic Society (SAR), Helsinky chapter (APADOR-CH), Group for Social Dialogue (GDS), Centre 
for Independent Journalism (CJI) and Media Monitoring Agency (MMA). 
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by the European Commission, mirroring on a more modest scale the Bulgarian example 
with its 2000 Coalition. The Central Group for Analysis (GCA) was the governmental 
body responsible for editing the National Anti-Corruption Plan and its implementation. 
The NGOs were invited to be members of the GCA (Freedom House 2005: 157;16 
Interviews inside APADOR-CH and Centre for Independent Journalism). Their main 
roles were to participate in the making of this Plan, particularly in the legislative area, and 
to monitor its implementation. 
 
Very soon, it became clear that the government had little intention of allowing these actors 
to play a role in policy-making on corruption. Though invited to come up with their view 
on the Plan, they were reduced to the status of observers only, inside the Group for 
Analysis (GCA). Moreover, the GCA’s activity was a shadow of what it had been 
designed to be. Originally planned to meet once per month, the Group met only four to 
five times in two years (2001-2003), with no clear benchmarks for monitoring the 
implementation of the Plan. The presence of the five NGOs in this group was voluntarily 
terminated in 2003, when the vast majority of their proposals were not included in the 
final version of the plan (Interview; Freedom House 2005:158). “It was only a semblance 
of consultation with us, for the sole purpose of satisfying the European requirements for 
the involvement of civil society” 17. Particularly responsible for this situation was the 
Minister of Justice, Rodica Stanoiu. According to the interviewees it was she and Prime 
Minister Nastase who were responsible for preventing civil society from getting involved 
in the National Anti-Corruption Plan. So, in March 2003, the NGOs decided to withdraw 
                                                          
16 Interviews inside APADOR-CH and Centre for Independent Journalism in Bucharest, Romania 
17 Interview with a member of the  NGO Centre for Independent Journalism in Bucharest 
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from the monitoring group and, in September of the same year, the Ministry of Justice 
took over from the ineffective Group for Analysis.  
 
This moment represented the breaking point between the Socialists and civil society. 
Freedom House, in its Report on Corruption for 2000-2004 deplored the fact that the 
Government fenced them off from supervising the implementation of the transparency 
law and monitoring the activity of public servants (FH 2005:51). While Bulgarian NGOs 
took charge of the corruption awareness campaign, requested by the European 
Commission, with full government support and funding, the Romanian NGOs had to 
apply for PHARE funding with no support from their government (FH 2005:145). 
 
On top of everything else, in the same year, 2003, the government passed an emergency 
ordinance (37/2003) by which access to EU funding for NGOs was controlled by the 
government (APADOR CH 2003:3). This came at a particularly difficult moment for the 
Romanian NGOs, when international donors were gradually scaling down their financial 
support, as a result of the prospective accession, and relocating it towards other poorer 
countries with fewer chances for membership, such as the Western Balkans (e.g. Kosovo) 
(FH 2005:148)18. Bulgaria experienced a similar phenomenon, only, in its case, the 
international financial drought was compensated for by the governmental decision to 
collaborate with the NGOs in the framework of the 2000 Coalition, when around 250 
NGOs and their branches participated in the Monitoring System, at both central and local 
levels (Centre for the Study of Democracy 2002).  
 
                                                          
18Also according with the Interviewees from the following NGOs:  Romanian Academic Society, Transparency 
International . 
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The result was that the Socialist government received the most damning reports since 
2000, issued in particular by the domestic watchdogs (SAR 2003a, 2003b, 2003c; 
APADOR–CH 2003). This negative image was reflected in the European Commission 
Progress Report in the sudden rise in importance of a new issue: the conviction of high-
flying politicians. 
 
The 2003 Progress Report on Romania is the first in the history of both the 2004 and 2007 
Eastern Enlargements where the issue of high-level corruption cases that needed to be 
prosecuted was mentioned and, moreover, was mentioned with a sense of emergency: 
“There have been very few prosecution cases of high level corruption despite these being 
identified as a priority” (European Commission 2003:20). The European Commission 
does not say here when and how it mentioned this as a priority.  In its 2002 Report, the 
Commission had made only a vague and passing reference to political corruption: 
“Corruption remains a common aspect of commercial operations but it is also widely 
reported in dealing with public bodies, as well as at the political level” (European 
Commission 2002:20).   The previous reports for Romania, from 1997 to 2002, never 
mention it (European Commission 1997b, 1998b, 1999b, 2000b, 2001b, 2002b). One year 
later, in 2004, it comes up in the Progress Report for Bulgaria, but without the sense of 
urgency that we see in the Romanian case (European Commission 2004a:20).  
 
According to interviews conducted within the European Commission and with members 
of NGOs, the sudden emphasis on high-level corruption was due to these measures 
targeting the pro-EU civil society. Freedom House also openly admitted that there was a 
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direct connection between access to public funding of NGOs and the critical tone of its 
report (FH 2005: 148).  
 
During 2003 and 2004, the pressure from the European Commission, supported by other 
corruption watchdogs, both domestic and international, reached its climax and was 
coming from all sides: the European Commission, the European Parliament and various 
Member States, plus the western media (EC 2002; 2003; EP 2004a, 2004b, 2004c; 
Reuters 28 October 2004). As one member of the EC delegation admitted, 
 “In 2003-2004, everything had to be connected with corruption. The term was 
used and abused. Whenever you wanted to destroy the image of someone or 
something, you could label it as corrupted. Corruption became overnight the 
public enemy”19. 
 
Yet, much legislative and judicial reform happened under the Socialist government. 
During 2000-2004, under the Nastase government, a series of reforms of justice took 
place. In 2002, the National Anti-Corruption Office (European Commission 2002b) was 
set up and five laws were adopted to enable the detection and prevention of high-level 
corruption: the immunity of policy-makers, access to information, asset declaration, 
conflicts of interest and party financing.    This was a major step in judicial reform.  In 
2004, the same government also re-organized the judicial system, along the lines wanted 
by the European Commission.  This took place under the new Minister of Justice, Cristian 
Diaconescu, who replaced the much criticized Rodica Stanoiu (Gallagher 2009:124; 
Phinnemore and Papadimitriou 2009:55). By several accounts from inside the European 
                                                          
19 Interview with a member of the EC Delegation in Bucharest 
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Commission, this reform was considered the first great breakthrough, without which, 
Romania would not have been allowed to close the chapter on JHA.20 
 
It did not satisfy the watchdogs of corruption, however. Reports issued by influential 
think-tanks, such as SAR, Open Society, Transparency International and Chapter 
Romania, were highly critical to the Socialist Democratic Party, accusing it of being the 
most powerful and corrupt of all the parties; its reforms were considered insufficient and 
inconclusive, although the 2004 judicial reforms had followed the requests of the 
European Commission (SAR 2004, Open Society 2005, Transparency International 
2005). 
 
Finally, the Romanian Academic Society created the Coalition for a Clean Parliament in 
view of the 2004 elections, which opposed the Socialist Party, and a new Liberal Coalition 
was led by Basescu.  The Coalition for a Clean Parliament started an aggressive 
campaign, based on accusations of corruption, which almost exclusively targeted 
members of the old Socialist government. The CCP established the criteria that would 
make a candidate unfit for a clean parliament. The result was that the almost a hundred 
members of the SDP running for elections were declared unfit and the SDP was forced to 
retract half of them from the election lists (Romanian Coalition for a Clean Parliament 
2005). 
In December 2004, the Social Democratic Party lost the election, in favor of a political 
entity called the Truth and Justice Alliance (TJA), which was an alliance between the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), headed by Traian Basescu, who would afterwards 
                                                          
20 Please refer to appendix 1 for the Interviews in the DG Enlargement. 
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become the President of Romania, and the National Liberal Party (NLP), headed by Prime 
Minister Tariceanu. It is widely thought that TJA won the elections exclusively due to the 
campaign organized by the Coalition for a Clean Parliament and the accusations of 
corruption, targeting the Socialists of Nastase. 
 
Ultimately, between 2000 and 2004, the Socialist government tried to block the leading 
domestic NGOs from having any access to policymaking or resources. The failed 
collaboration affected the way these actors reported on government achievements 
regarding the fight against corruption. The result was that the government lost face in 
Brussels and in front of its own public. The crux of this strained relationship was the 
support that these actors granted to the liberal opposition.  This was an important blow 
for the Socialists, who finally lost the elections, despite the fact that initially they had 
been considered the favourites to win (Freedom House 2004; Open Society 2004). 
 
NGOs and the Liberal Democratic Party (2004-2008) 
The 2004 elections and civil society: Corruption used to purge political opposition 
There is a general agreement that the Liberal Coalition, led by President Basescu, would 
not have won the elections, if not for the aggressive campaign mounted by the NGO 
Coalition for a Clean Parliament.  The CCP determined six criteria which could render a 
politician unfit to run for the elections:  
1. Having repeatedly shifted from one party to another, in search of personal profit  
2. Having been accused of corruption in the past, based on verifiable evidence 
3. Having been exposed as a member of Securitate (the Communist secret service under 
Ceausescu) 
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4. Being the owner of a private firm with important tax arrears to the state budget 
5. Being unable to account for discrepancies between asset declaration and real income 
6. Conflict of interests – turning a profit from one’s previous public position 
 
According to the Coalition, the main parties targeted for the elections were the Social 
Democratic Party, in power since 1992, and the newly formed Liberal Coalition, led by 
T. Basescu. There were 300 politicians that were checked against the aforementioned 
criteria. Only politicians from the Social Democratic Party that were actually checked 
and 100 were found unfit to run on election list. However, there were other politicians 
from the opposing party (Coalition for Truth and Justice) to whom this criterion could 
have been applied and they could have been banned from the election list.    This shows 
partisan use of accusations of corruption through which the interest of one party is 
promoted against another. There is a democratic purge of oppositions using corruption 
as a pretext.  
 
The Coalition alleged that the Socialist Party was the most corrupt, while the Liberal Party 
was considered the least corrupt.  
 
Controlling corruption or purging the opposition? 
Three aspects distinguished the new power from its predecessors. It was the first such 
political entity that received strong support from a coalition of NGOs, entitled the 
Coalition for a Clean Parliament. The coalition based its propaganda on accusations of 
corruption, targeting the Social Democratic Party, headed by Prime Minister Nastase.  
Secondly, it was the first party to place a senior member of civil society in a key position, 
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that is: Monica Macovei, as Minister of Justice.  Thirdly, it was the first political party to 
receive positive assessments from the EU, within only a few months after taking power, 
for its achievements in the areas of justice and the prosecution of high-level corruption 
cases. This immediate positive reaction by the European Commission to the “progress in 
the reform of justice” was unusual, because the new government could not have had time 
to deliver such results. The real recipient of this praise was, in fact, Monica Macovei, the 
first member of civil society to be put in a key position. (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore 
2009:60, 88; Gallagher 2009; Ciobanu and Schafir 2005; Pippidi 2007; Stan 2005; 
Pridham 2007). Her appointment was applauded in Brussels by the new European 
Commissioner of Enlargement, Olli Rehn, in the most emphatic way ever for Romania, 
or even Bulgaria:  
“Romania has made progress in the fight against corruption. Sound and solid 
structures have been set up for this purpose, and investigations into high-level 
corruption cases have been launched. This is immensely important. It gives a 
signal to society that for the first time in the history of the country, nobody is 
above the law” (Rehn 2005).  
Rehn’s statement seemed to convey the message that great things had already happened. 
However, this official speech was delivered on 3 April 2005, while the new government 
had entered into power only three months earlier. At the time of Rehn’s speech, the 
National Anti-Corruption Plan had not been released: this would happen some weeks 
afterwards. The Plan announced future measures that the government was prepared to 
take (Romanian Government 2005a). So, “the sound and solid structures that have been 
set up”, had not been set up at all at that time: the reform would happen around six to 
seven months after this speech (Romanian Government 2005b) and the three-package law 
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for reforming justice would only be adopted four months later (Romanian Government 
2005c). As for the “high level corruption cases launched”, during the whole of 2005 there 
was only one case that could be called high profile (see Footnote 12).   
 
In conclusion, the government did not have the physical time to prove itself – not, at least, 
in the way the European Commission wanted during the time of the previous Socialist 
government – to come up with high profile corruption cases.  Moreover, the person who 
made such unusual laudatory statements was the same one who, only a few months 
earlier, came up with the idea of creating the postponement clause, already inserted into 
the Accession Treaty; a credible threat, particularly for Romania (Interview with 
Dashwood, Ch, Hedberg, Per Ibold, van de Kasteele; Phinnemore and Papadimitriou 
2009: 57). Olli Rehn, as European Commissioner for Enterprise, in 2004 was a distinct 
voice inside the European Commission opposed to closing the chapter on Competition.  
 
As a result, two reforms of justice took place: one in 2004 under the Social Democrat 
Party, and the second, under the new government of the Justice and Truth Alliance in 
2005/6. Both reforms were undertaken at the request of the European Commission, 
respecting the guidelines coming from Brussels. In the case of Monica Macovei, these 
guidelines were taken directly from desk officers in charge of the Justice and Home 
Affairs chapters, for the minister was in daily telephone contact with them (Zwaenopol, 
Ruiter, Summa, Pasquarelli).  
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Bringing high-level decision makers to justice or witch-hunting?  Activity of the 
National Anti-Corruption Office (2005-2008) 
 
According to the European Commission, the ultimate ‘litmus test’ for Romania was to 
come up with as many cases as possible of important decision makers being prosecuted 
and eventually jailed for corruption. Consequently, this should be also the final test for 
the Justice and Truth Alliance’s (JTA) commitment to rooting out corruption, and in 
particular for its celebrated reformist, the Minister of Justice, Monica Macovei. Macovei 
was particularly praised for the fact that she made NAPO efficient. Efficiency meant, in 
this case, that NAPO started opening prosecution cases against the ‘big fish’, as requested 
by the European Commission.  
 
One problem with hunting down politicians under accusations of corruption is the risk of 
transforming the process into a ‘witch hunt’, where the party in power merely uses 
accusations of corruption to wipe out its opponents. This annihilates the benign role of 
the anti-corruption effort. In such cases, accusations of corruption undermine state 
democracy and the good functioning of its institutions, particularly the judiciary. Under 
Communism, for example, accusations of “treason against the state” were used to purge 
the opponents of the Party and of its leaders.  Therefore, when looking at the cases of 
high-flying decision makers who were prosecuted by NAPO during 2005-2008, it is 
imperative to map their political loyalty. If most or all such cases were located in the 
opposition parties, and none or very few were attached to the party in power, then this 
was a politicized process, a witch hunt. 
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Before mapping cases of corruption, it will be necessary to take a closer look at the 
context of the Romanian political landscape between 2005 and 2008, and the relationships 
between the most important actors. 
 
The Justice and Truth Alliance had two main parties and two main leaders. One was the 
National Liberal Party (NLP), headed by Calin Popescu Tariceanu, and the other was the 
Liberal Democratic Party (DLP), headed by Traian Basescu. After they won the election 
in December 2004, Traian Basescu became the President of Romania and Tariceanu was 
appointed Prime Minister, in accordance with a pre-election agreement. In less than a 
year, however, it became evident that the President and Prime Minister had different 
agendas. 
 
The Coalition won the election by a very small margin from its main opponent, the Social 
Democratic Party, headed by Adrian Nastase. This did not give a comfortable majority 
with which the new government could pass its decisions. Traian Basescu urged Prime 
Minister Tariceanu to resign, in order to trigger an early election that would have brought 
a more consistent majority in the Parliament. Tariceanu initially promised to do this, but 
shortly after, changed his mind and refused. This was the breaking point between the two 
leaders. From that point on, the conflict between them would reveal their different 
agendas.  
 
Traian Basescu was “the darling” of civil society, which supported his campaign and 
decided in its favour. Basescu was the person who placed Monica Macovei in the position 
of Minister of Justice. What also singled him out from the previous politicians was his 
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harsh discourse against the so-called local “moguls”. They were very wealthy 
businessmen with interests that, in some cases, covered strategic sectors: oil refineries, 
media or banks. Traian Basescu proved to be the main supporter of Monica Macovei in 
her fight against them. One such relevant example involved Prime Minister Tariceanu 
himself, who was trying to save his main financial Party supporter from NAPO, which 
opened a case against him. This was Dinu Patriciu, the richest businessman in Romania. 
Patriciu was particularly disliked, not only by Basescu but particularly within DG 
Enterprise, because he managed to acquire, through a dubious process of privatization, 
the second largest oil refinery in Romania and also the second largest in Eastern Europe: 
Rompetrol (Hotnews 17 December 2007). Rompetrol was targeted by the Austrian giant, 
OMV, which had already acquired the first, largest oil refinery in Romania and in Eastern 
Europe, Petrom (interview with Gouboux, van de Kasteele). These details are necessary 
to explain who was playing against whom in the balance of power in Romania, and what 
role accusations of corruption played in this balance. The references to local businessmen 
are also relevant to an imminent discussion of the economic dimension of corruption.  
 
Tariceanu did not manage to keep his main sponsor away from NAPO’s grasp, because 
President Basescu granted his full support to Macovei (for more detail see Gallagher 
2009:210, 233). From that moment onward, a rift opened between Basescu and Prime 
Minister Tariceanu: a rift that was followed by many personal and inter-party skirmishes. 
The conflict escalated when the Prime Minister‘s Party, NLP, exited from the Justice and 
Truth Alliance in 2007: in the same year, Parliament initiated an impeachment procedure 
against President Basescu.  
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When mapping prosecution cases against decision makers, it is essential to make the 
distinction between the opposing powers. On the one hand, we have a coalition, involving 
President Basescu and his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), supported by a cluster of 
NGOs.  These are the same organisations that helped him during the election campaign, 
the Minister of Justice, Monica Macovei, and NAPO (or rather the Chief Prosecutor, who 
was appointed by Monica Macovei). This coalition received support from the European 
Commission. 
  
On the other hand, we have an opposition which felt increasingly threatened by Macovei 
and NAPO’s actions. At the forefront is the oldest and biggest party in opposition, the 
Social Democratic Party, led by Adrian Nastase. This is the main target for the anti-
corruption coalition. Secondly, follows the former ally, the National Liberal Party, led by 
Prime Minister Tariceanu.  
 
In Table 12, the high-level cases brought to justice by NAPO between 2005-2008 are 
mapped. The source is NAPO’s website, which gives an account of its activity for each 
year. The cases listed below are not all the cases that NAPO tackled. They are the ones 
that mattered for Brussels, because they involved politicians from the upper echelon of 
decision making: members or former members of the executives, MPs or former MPs, 
high magistrates or the wealthiest and the most influential businessmen in the country. 
Members of the opposition are marked with red (Social Democratic Party and National 
Liberal Party); members of the Macovei-Basescu coalition in green.  
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Table  4.1: Mapping high-level cases brought to justice by NAPO, 2005-2008 
*Source: www.pna.ro (National Anti-Corruption Prosecution Office changed its name in 2005 to Anti-Corruption 
National Agency). 
 
** The names highlighted in red are from the opposition, showing the party’s selective use of accusations of corruption.  
                                                          
21 The decisions for these cases were taken years after the case was opened and sometimes it was not listed on the 
NAPO’s website for various bureaucratic reasons. Therefore the information about the status of the case, in particular 
the final decisions, have been taken partially from media also available online: www. hotnews.ro/; www.ziare .com/; 
www.nineoclock.ro/; www.mediafax.ro/; www.jurnalul.ro/ 
Year Name Party Position Final decision21 
2005 Vasile Duta  
 
SDP Senator (MP)  
2000-2004 
5 years in jail 
2006 Adrian Nastase 
 
 
Daniela Nastase 
 
 
Dinu Patriciu 
SDP 
 
 
 
SDP 
 
 
NLP 
Prime Minister 
2000-2004 
 
Prime Minister 
Nastase’s wife 
 
Senator 2000-2003 
NLP’s main financer 
2 years in jail 
 
 
4 years in jail 
 
 
7 years in jail 
2007 Serban Bradisteanu 
 
 
 
 
Dan Ioan Popescu 
 
SDP 
 
 
 
 
SDP 
Senator 2000-2004 
 
 
 
 
Minister 2001-2003 
5 years in jail 
(not yet applied, 
as the case is on 
recourse) 
 
All assets 
confiscated  
2008 Ioan Avram 
Muresan 
 
Traian Remes 
 
 
 
Paul Pacuraru 
 
Adrian Nastase 
 
 
 
Miron Mitrea  
 
Serban Bradisteanu 
Democratic 
Convention 
 
NLP 
 
 
 
NLP 
 
SDP 
 
 
 
SDP 
 
NLP 
Minister 1996-2000 
 
 
MP 1996-2000 
Minister 1998-2000 
Minister 2007 
 
Minister 2007-2008 
 
Prime Minister 2000-
2004 
 
 
Minister 2000-2004 
 
Minister 2000-2004 
7 years in jail 
 
 
3 years in jail 
 
 
 
Acquitted 
 
New case 
opened - 
pending 
 
Pending 
 
5 years in jail 
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This selection does not include local leaders: mayors, city councillors, state secretaries 
and advisers or lower ranked magistrates. The reason is that the European Commission 
considered these cases of medium relevance for NAPO activity. Under SDP, NAPO 
brought tens of such cases to justice, however this was not considered satisfactory for the 
European Commission, which was after the ‘big fish’. 
 
The above table displays the bias against the opposition. Between 2005 and 2008, not 
even one case of a high-level politician brought to justice belonged to the Liberal 
Democrat Party, which was President Basescu’s main supporter and, also, supporter of 
the new anti-corruption wing of the judiciary, represented by Monica Macovei and the 
General Prosecutor of NAPO. The majority belonged to the SDP, the main opponent and 
the largest and most cohesive Romanian party after 1989. The rest were from Prime 
Minister Tariceanu’s Party, the NLP, which, from being Basescu’s ally at the time of the 
elections became his open one year later. 
  
Results 
From 2008 until today, cases against high-level decision makers belonging to the 
opposition have started to pile up. There was a certain breakthrough in recent years, with 
a few high-profile cases coming also from the LDP. However, this needs further analysis, 
since, according to some sources of information, this appears to represent intra-party 
retaliation against some of its less obedient members or a way to ensure (by blackmail) 
party members’ loyalty towards their leader, President Basescu. 
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In conclusion, under the new party in power and its Justice Minister, Monica Macovei, 
the anti-corruption judicial mechanism started to be used to suppress political opponents 
and, in particular, the most powerful opposition party, the SDP.  
 
Conclusion 
Romanian Civil society displayed much the same pattern of behaviour as Bulgaria.    The 
‘fight against corruption’ enabled the creation of mechanisms which were then used by 
civil actors to blackmail the political class into granting them access to power and 
resources. 
 
In this case, the Socialists, who refused to open their power structures to non-
governmental actors, became the main target of accusations of corruption instrumented 
by these actors. SAR and the Coalition for a Clean Parliament selectively used 
accusations of corruption in order to destroy the credibility of one party and to enhance 
the position of their opponents, the Liberal Coalition, which was friendlier towards 
NGOs. 
 
Overall Conclusions 
The behaviour of domestic NGOs in Bulgaria and Romania confirms the fact that the 
fight against corruption was not their real concern. It shows how the anti-corruption 
strategy created the means and the opportunity for these actors to exert pressure on the 
elected political class, for advancing their own influence. 
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Romania is perhaps an extreme example in this sense. The new judicial mechanisms, put 
in place by Monica Macovei for the prosecution of elected officials, became an instrument 
for purging the Socialist opposition. Therefore, the anti-corruption policies had an overall 
effect of undermining the democratic system in Romania.  All these worrying 
developments did not prevent the Commission from maintaining its support for these 
watchdogs of corruption. The exact role of the EC in these cases will be assessed in the 
next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 The Relationship between NGOs and the 
European Commission  
 
Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to explore whether the biased behaviour of the NGOs was 
accidental and derived from the specific backgrounds in Bulgaria and Romania, or 
whether it was generated by the way in which anti-corruption policies were managed by 
the European Commission.   Did civil society behaviour develop independently from the 
European Commission, was it coordinated with or subordinated to the EC’s preferences? 
Although the existing evidence suggests a positive answer to this question, nevertheless 
the relationship needs to be explored and unfolded.  
 
There are two alternative views on this matter. One can interpret the NGOs’ behaviour as 
“an accident”, stemming from the specific Communist legacy of these two countries, 
where the civil society genesis and development was different, compared to those of old 
EU members (Trauner 2007; Ristea 2010).  The literature on civil society in Eastern 
Europe has been labelled as “independent” and  “acting in the public interest” by those 
NGOs which have a pro-EU and pro-neo-liberal agenda, who have been funded by the 
EU and other international donors promoting the same type of agenda -e.g. World Bank, 
IMF, USAID, Freedom House (Ristei 2010, Vachudova 2009; Spendzarova and 
Vahudova 2012; Pridham 2007c; Buniewicz 2009; Epstein 2008, Noutcheva and Dimitar, 
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2008; Sedelmeir, 2008; 2011). The activity of established watchdogs of corruption in 
Bulgaria and Romania come under the same line of analysis:  (Centre for the Study of 
Democracy or SAR, Romanian Academic Society). On the other hand, it is only the 
activity of those NGOs dedicated to domestic political interests that are considered to 
cause problems (Ristei 2010, Noutcheva and Dimitra 2008, Trauner 2007, 2009).  It is 
important to note that the literature on the EU has not recognised the undue influence that 
international donors (including the EU itself) had on the genesis and development of civil 
society in Eastern Europe and the difficulties that this caused. The main conceptual 
problem with this approach is that it then labels this type of civil society as “independent” 
and “genuine”, without discussing the ideological and financial dependency of these 
actors, nor all the consequences derived from this situation. The question thus arises: 
given this context, how independent from the EC were the domestic NGOs in Bulgaria 
and Romania when they reported on corruption? As the analysis of the previous chapter 
shows, it is important to make no assumptions without testing their veracity. 
 
The idea exists that NGOs sponsored by international donors are “independent” and 
serving a just cause.  To assume, without verification, that certain NGOs are somehow 
more benign than others because they are supported by one type of funding body, with its 
own particular agenda, rather than another, lacks analytical depth and borders on double 
standards. 
 
The other view tested here is that the NGOs’ behaviour was not accidental, a random 
action stemming from the specific circumstances of Bulgaria’s or Romania’s political 
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environment. They suggest that the empowerment of non-governmental actors 
(‘watchdogs of corruption’) was a result of the way in which anti-corruption policies have 
been framed and applied by the EC.   
  
The central point that needs to be explored here is the degree of autonomy or dependence 
on the EC/EU of the domestic civil society. The following factors will therefore be 
discussed: the genesis of the main NGOs that counted in the evaluation process; their 
resources; their agenda and the way they framed anti-corruption policies compared to the 
EC.  
 
List of NGOs in Bulgaria and Romania and their donors 
As shown in Figure 5.1, a list of the most important NGOs and their donors between 2000 
and 2008 is presented. The most influential are in highlighted in bold. 
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 Figure 5.1: The  most influential NGOs and Donors from 2000-2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Source: Centre for the Study of Democracy; Romanian Academic Society; The European Commission  
 
 
Genesis 
 
Most of the literature that discusses the genesis of civil society in the former Communist 
countries acknowledges that this was mostly a ‘top-down’ process. That is to say that the 
most important organisations were born, not on the initiative of citizens, but from external 
Romania 
The Alliance for a European Justice in 
Romania (set up in 2004) comprised: 
- The Romanian Academic Society 
- Institute for Public Policies 
- APADOR- Helsinki Committee 
- The Agency for Press Monitoring  
- Civil Alliance 
- The Open Society Foundation 
- The Roma Centre for Social Intervention 
and Analysis 
- Accept 
- The Pro-Democracy Association 
- Association of Romanian Judges 
 
Donors 
The European Union; 
The Council of Europe; 
USAID; 
World Bank; 
The International Monetary Fund; 
United Nations Development Program; 
American Barr Association; 
Soros Open Society Foundation; 
Transparency International; 
Freedom House; 
Amnesty International 
Bulgaria 
The 2000 Coalition (set up in 2000) 
comprised: 
- Centre for the Study of Democracy 
- Applied Research and Communication 
Fund 
- ACCESS Association 
- Foundation for local government 
reform 
- Centre for Economic development 
- The Economic Policy Institute 
- The Centre for Social Practices 
 - Association of Bulgarian Judges 
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pressure, coming from the main international donors mentioned above (Krastaev, Epstein 
2008; Ristei 2010). A look at the NGOs discussed below also confirms this view.  
 
Bulgaria 
The 2000 Coalition and its research branch, the Centre for the Study of Democracy, were 
formed as a result of suggestions made by the EC’s delegation to Sofia in 1997, according 
to interviewees from the EC delegation22.  In fact, the idea, the structure of the Coalition 
and the effort of putting it together was almost entirely the product of work by the EC 
Delegation, together with a few international donors, who were very active in Bulgaria at 
that time: the Open Society Foundation (Soros foundation), Transparency International 
Bulgaria Chapter, USAID and the World Bank (Centre for the Study of Democracy 
1998)23.  
 
The Coalition played an important role in designing the Anti-Corruption Plan, which was 
much appreciated by the European Commission in its Reports, as we have already seen. 
However, when the Socialist Coalition, led by Prime-Minister Stanishev, took power in 
2005, the Coalition was dissolved because it was considered that its mission was finished. 
Bulgaria was at the end of its negotiations for accessions.  
 
What was left after the dissolution of the Coalition was its research branch: the Centre for 
the Study of Democracy.   Since 1998, the Centre has delivered one of the most influential 
Reports on anti-corruption yearly to date, which has been quoted by various EU research 
papers on corruption.  Until 2004, the Corruption Assessment Reports were issued under 
                                                          
22 Interviews with members of the EC Delegation in Sofia, 1997-2004. 
23 Interviews with members of the Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD) 
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the umbrella of the 2000 Coalition and most of the funding for these assessments came 
from the government (Kostov 1997-2001 and Simeon II 2001-2005).24  
 
After the elections in 2005, when the Simeon II Alliance was replaced by the Socialists 
of Stanishev (2005-2008), the governmental funding was stopped and was replaced by 
the American USAID.  
 
In conclusion, the most influential NGO in Bulgaria, the CSD, was created as a result of 
pressure from the EC, in the context of Bulgaria’s accession to the EU. Its genesis was 
triggered by the necessity of complying with the EU anti-corruption conditionality. 
 
Romania 
The situation in Romania was slightly different. Unlike Bulgaria, there was no coalition 
of NGOs between 2000 and 2004. The Alliance for European Justice emerged in 2004, 
arising from the necessity of supporting a new party, the Liberal Alliance for Justice and 
Truth, already commented upon in the previous chapter.  Nevertheless, it was 
acknowledged by the EC Delegation in Bucharest that the Romanian Academic Society 
(SAR) was the leading domestic NGO with which the Commission collaborated 
regarding its anti-corruption conditionality. 
 
SAR was set up in 1998 and had a double function: to act as a think-tank, delivering 
assessments and studies on the state of government in Romania (the so-called Policy 
                                                          
24 Interviews with members of the CSD 
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Warning Reports); and by being actively involved as ‘watchdogs of corruption’, as we 
have already seen, in 2004.  
 
Although SAR was a private initiative of some Romanian academics and members of 
civil society, all its projects were funded by international donors or in collaboration with 
IOs with branches in Romania: USAID, Freedom House, World Bank and Open Society 
(SAR 2001; SAR 2004)25. Unlike CSD, SAR’s Reports were not exclusively specialized 
on corruption.  However, they were the most active NGO in the area of the prevention of 
political corruption.  A case in point was their campaign against the Socialist Party during 
the 2004 elections, as previously discussed.   
 
The Alliance for a Clean Parliament was set up during the elections of 2004. The ACP’s 
activity and partial role in the results of the elections have been discussed in the previous 
chapter.  Suffice it to mention that it helped the Liberal coalition to win, while using 
accusations of corruption against the Social Democratic Party, led by Prime Minister 
Nastase. The Coalition accused the SDP of corruption, however, as it overlooked that 
many  important candidates on the lists of the Liberal Alliance, led by the future President 
Basescu, were also involved in corrupt practices, which had been known to the press for 
some time (see previous chapter). 
 
Although SAR was the leading NGO and the most active in organizing this coalition, the 
idea of such an action was a joint product of SAR, the Romanian Soros Foundation (or 
Open Foundation Society) and Freedom House, while the funding came exclusively from 
                                                          
25 Interviews with members of the EC delegation in Bucharest; an interview with one member of SAR; SAR’s 
website 
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Soros Foundation, Freedom House and the Balkan Trust (Coalition for a Clean Parliament 
2005: 2-3). 
  
In conclusion, the formation of the most important NGOs and think-tanks in Bulgaria and 
Romania confirms the general view that this was a process that was directed from above, 
for reasons that had less to do with the actual needs of the population than with the 
external agenda of integration into EU structures. 
 
Funding 
An essential aspect for NGOs is their access to funding. Most EU literature on civil 
society in Eastern Europe has taken it for granted that the majority of leading NGOs in 
the former Communist countries are funded by the same string of international donors, 
without regarding this as a problem. Looking to Figure 5.1, it can be seen that this is the 
case for Bulgaria’s and Romania’s civil society. Through the European Citizen Action 
Service (ECAS), the NGOs, which are validated by the EU, are entitled to public funding, 
which is an important source of their income. 26  
 
a) Bulgaria 
Until 2001, international donors provided 90% of funding for those NGOs that were 
recognized by the EU (see the Figure 5.1). After that, around 60% was provided by the 
Simeon II government (CSD 2003:87). As discussed in the previous chapter, public 
funding decreased under the Socialists of Stanishev, to something under 40%.  This 
occurred at a time when things were already becoming difficult for civil society, when 
                                                          
26 http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=330 
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international donors started to relocate to the Western Balkans. Until this point, 
international funding remained one of the most important sources of money for CSD 
projects (CSD 2010; CSD: 2013). 
 
b) Romania 
Romania is like a mirror story to the situation in Bulgaria. From 1996 (when SAR was 
set up) until 2004, 90% of its funding came from international donors (FDSC 2007; World 
Bank 1998). When the Socialists, under Prime Minister Nastase, were replaced with the 
Liberal Coalition in 2004, the situation changed. SAR and the Coalition for a Clean 
Parliament start receiving more money from the public budget. Between 2005 and 2007, 
more than fifty per cent of their income came from public funds (FDSC 2007). 
  
 In conclusion, the civil society organizations with a focus on corruption in both countries 
have displayed a high dependency on international funding. However, the two liberal 
coalitions in Romania and Bulgaria who received favorable assessments from these 
NGOs, diversified their funding to a certain extent – particularly in the Bulgarian case. 
Overall, these organizations remained heavily dependent on international funding.   
 
Promoting the EU agenda 
The reputation of an organization depends on the type of agenda it carries out. In this 
case, the NGOs’ main aim is to gain a passport towards European acknowledgement and 
funding. The European Commission explains which NGOs are acknowledged by the EU, 
which can be accepted for the EU’s programmes (thereby accessing EU funding), which 
can be used as information relays or whose expertise is required.  The main conditions 
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are that such civil society organizations have to promote a “true European political 
entity”, to “contribute to promoting European Integration in a practical way and often at 
grass-roots level”.  They also have to “contribute to the implementation of EC policies”, 
and to implement Community programmes and projects…” (European Commission 
2000). In short, access to EU recognition and funding means to serve the EU’s interests 
and agenda. 
 
Framing corruption 
Bulgaria 
The Centre for the Study of Democracy was the idea of the EC delegation to Sofia, as 
previously mentioned.  The Centre explains that its reports on corruption follow the 
framework of the Action Plan decided by the 2000 Coalition. The Action Plan is the 
document which lays down when and how the country is going to adopt and implement 
the anti-corruption policies requested by the Commission. The Corruption Assessment 
Report follows the structure and approach of the Action Plan adopted by the Policy Forum 
of Coalition 2000 in November 1998. The Report contains a general evaluation of the 
state and dynamics of corruption in Bulgarian society and of anti-corruption efforts in the 
year (CSD: 2000; 2001; 2002; 2003; 2004). The main role of the CSD’s Reports, 
therefore, is to add substance to an existing structure, which follows the anti-corruption 
framework put in place by the EU. This means that the CSD has little autonomy in 
changing the structure of anti-corruption policies or the priorities it agrees.   
 
Table 5.2 exemplifies how the structure of the CSD Reports follows the anti-corruption 
framework put in place by the EC.  On the left side, we have the summary content of the 
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CSD Reports, 2000-2004, and on the right side, is the content of the Commission’s 
Progress Reports during the same period.  
Table 5.2: Structure of CSD reports / EU commission reports on corruption 
Structure of CSD Report on Anti-
corruption reforms in Bulgaria 
between 2000-2004 
European Commission Progress 
Reports structure for Bulgaria between 
2000-2004 
1. Institutional and legal environment 
for curbing corruption:  
Public Administration Reform and 
the role of the State –  
Legislative Framework 
1.   Reform of Public administration   
√ Present in all Progress Reports from 
2000-2004.  
2. Reform of the judiciary:  
Criminal Law and Procedure; Civil 
and Administrative Law and 
Procedure; Reforming the 
Organization of the Judiciary, 
Training of Magistrates. 
2.   Reform of the judiciary   
 √ Present in all Progress Reports from 
2000-2004. 
3. The fight against corruption in the 
economy:  
      Corruption and Privatization   
3. Public procurement and public 
tenders 
Present  in the Progress Reports from 
2001, 2002, 2004 
4.  Dynamics of corrupt behaviour and 
the change in public attitudes towards 
corruption (public awareness). 
4. √ Public awareness reported in the 
Progress Reports for 2000, 2001, 
2003, 2004 
5. The role of civil society: NGOs and the 
media 
5. √ NGOs activity comprising: 
surveys/assessments, participation in 
the Anti-corruption Plan  
Progress Reports for 2001, 2002, 
2003 
6.   International Cooperation against 
corruption: 
Legislative dimensions  
Institutional Aspects 
6. √ Signing International agreements 
concerning the fight against 
corruption:  
All Reports. 
 
The Reports of the CSD do not change the structure of the Anti-corruption strategy, nor 
do they come up with any new issues outside the already existing framework.  It was not 
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the CSD but the EU that decided what needed to be assessed and reported on. Therefore, 
the NGO had no freedom to change, amend or adapt the evaluation framework imposed 
by the EU. 
 
Hiding or highlighting problems and achievements of the Bulgarian anti-corruption 
effort: The EC and CSD’s reports 
 
The CSD Anti-corruption Reports for each year are always released after the 
Commission’s Progress Reports. For example, the Commission Progress Report on 
Bulgaria’s achievements for year 2003 was released in November. The CSD Report for 
the same year (2003) was released in spring 2004 (CSD 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 
2005). The CSD report often quotes from the Progress Reports of the Commission.  The 
most problematic areas for Bulgaria have been: organized crime and high-level 
corruption. These became the most important issues after 2006/7 and they represent the 
central part of the CVM to date.  The table below contrasts the reporting of the EC and 
CSD on similar issues. This covers the period of negotiations for accession (2000-2004), 
shows the intermediary reports from 2005-2006, and continues with the Cooperation and 
Verification Mechanism until 2008.  
 
NB: the CSD content reports on the situation of corruption related to the previous year  
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Table 5.3 
Comparison of the way in which EC and CSD (Bulgarian NGO)  
reported on organized crime 
 
ORGANIZED 
CRIME 
COMMISSION PROGRESS REPORTS CSD ANTI-CORRUPTION 
REPORTS 
2000 Not mentioned as a problem Not mentioned   
2001 Not mentioned as a problem Not mentioned   
2002 Not mentioned as a problem Not mentioned   
2003 Not mentioned as a problem Not mentioned   
2004 Not mentioned as a problem Not mentioned   
2005 Mentioned as a problem Not mentioned   
2006 Becomes Benchmark 6 in the CVM One chapter dedicated to it 
2007 Benchmark 6 in the CVM – major problem One report dedicated to it 
2008 Bulgaria gets fined 
Organized crime is one of the reasons 
A chapter dedicated to it 
 
 
Table 5.4 
Comparison of the way in which EC and CSD (Bulgarian NGO)  
reported on killing contracts, as a worrying phenomenon within organized crime 
 
 Killing 
contracts 
COMMISSION PROGRESS 
REPORTS 
CSD ANTI-CORRUPTION 
REPORTS 
2000 Not mentioned   Not mentioned   
2001 Not mentioned   Not mentioned   
2002 Not mentioned   Not mentioned   
2003 Not mentioned   Not mentioned   
2004 Not mentioned   Not mentioned   
2005 Not mentioned Not mentioned   
2006 Part of the   Benchmark 6 in the CVM Mentioned as an important 
issue 
2007 Part of the Benchmark 6 in the CVM – 
major problem 
Mentioned as an important 
issue in the report on Organized 
crime 
2008 Bulgaria gets fined 
Killing contracts aggravating reasons 
Mentioned as an important 
problem 
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Table 5.5 
Comparison of the way in which EC and CSD (Bulgarian NGO) 
reported on Corruption 
 
HIGH LEVEL 
CORRUPTION 
Implementation: 
Prosecution/ 
conviction/ 
Judicial reform 
COMMISSION PROGRESS 
REPORTS 
CSD                              
ANTI-CORRUPTION 
REPORTS 
2000 Not mentioned as a problem Not mentioned   
2001 Not mentioned as a problem Not mentioned   
2002 Not mentioned as a problem Not mentioned   
2003 Not mentioned as a problem Not mentioned   
2004 Not mentioned as a problem Not mentioned   
2005 Not mentioned as a problem Not mentioned   
2006 Benchmark 4 in the CVM (major problem) Mentioned as a problem 
2007 Benchmark 4 in the CVM – major problem Mentioned as a problem 
2008 Bulgaria gets fined 
High level corruption is one of the reasons 
Mentioned as a problem 
 
 
All three tables show the way the European Commission and the CSD highlighted or 
ignored an issue. Organized crime, with killing contracts and high-level corruption, have 
been among the most important topics, since Bulgaria has become a member of the EU. 
The tables disclose that the European Commission has the power to decide when an aspect 
should be ignored or when it should be highlighted. The CSD reports always follow suit. 
They never take the lead to highlight or ignore something that the Commission does not. 
For example, the CSD report on 2006 was actually issued in 2007, six months after the 
European Commission issued its CVM Report.  Suddenly, high-level corruption became 
an issue of major concern, although for five years it had been virtually ignored. 
 
192 
 
 
Conclusion 
The main Bulgarian think tank has little autonomy in reporting on corruption. It is the European 
Commission that decides the structure of the reports and chooses the topics that need to be 
addressed. The CSD merely adds more information on the areas already identified by the EC. 
The most important finding is that biased reports on corruption for Bulgaria were not initiated by 
the CSD. It was the Commission that decided which issues need to be highlighted or ignored and 
when. The timing of the two reports shows that the CSD had no initiative in raising concerns on 
any specific aspect.  The Commission was therefore generating double standards, while the CSD’s 
main role was to amplify them and add more substance to an already existent structure. 
 
Romania 
The Romanian Academic Society has been the leading think-tank and the most active 
NGO to play a crucial role in promoting the Liberal Alliance into power, while 
undermining the position of the well-established Socialist Party.  It is also constructive, 
therefore to compare and contrast the way in which SAR has portrayed and highlighted 
the anti-corruption fight in its reports. Unlike CSD in Bulgaria, SAR did not report on 
corruption with the same regularity.  Nevertheless, its reports were acknowledged in the 
European Union. 
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Table 5.6 
Comparison of the way in which EC and SAR (Romanian NGO) 
reported on Corruption 
Structure of SAR Reports on Anti-
corruption reforms   
EC Progress Reports structure for 
Bulgaria, 2000-2004 
1. Institutional and legal environment 
for curbing corruption:  
Public Administration Reform and 
the role of the State –  
Legislative Framework 
1.   Reform of Public administration   
√ Present in all Progress Reports from 
2000-2004.  
2. Reform of the judiciary:  
Criminal Law and Procedure; Civil 
and Administrative Law and 
Procedure; Reforming the 
Organization of the Judiciary. 
Training of Magistrates. 
2.   Reform of the judiciary   
 √ Present in all Progress Reports from 
2000-2004. 
3. The fight against corruption in the 
economy:  
      Corruption and Privatization   
3. √ Public procurement and public 
tenders 
Present  in the Progress Reports from 
2001, 2002, 2004 
4.  Dynamics of corrupt behaviour and the 
change in public attitudes towards 
corruption (public awareness). 
4. √ Public awareness reported in the  
Progress Reports for   2003, 2004 
5.   Role of Civil Society 5. √ NGOs activity comprising: 
surveys/assessments, participation in 
the Anti-corruption Plan  
Not mentioned for Romania 
6.   International Cooperation against 
corruption: 
Legislative dimensions  
Institutional Aspects 
6. √ Signing International agreements 
concerning the fight against 
corruption:  
All Reports. 
As in the Bulgarian case, the SAR reports on corruption in the framework already set up 
by the EC. 
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In table 5.7 is shown how SAR started highlighting aspects of anti-corruption policies 
only after they were pinpointed by the European Commission. The most important 
priority was that of bringing to justice high-level decision makers, who, in this case, 
were all from the opposition party, the Socialists. 
Table 5.7 
High-level corruption: 
Developing judicial mechanisms for the repression of political class 
 
 
Year 
COMMISSION 
PROGRESS REPORTS 
 
SAR  Reports 
2000 Not mentioned   Not mentioned   
2001 Not mentioned   Not mentioned   
2002 Mentioned as a problem N/A   
2003 Mentioned as a major problem Mentioned as a major problem   
2004 Becomes the leading problem N/A   
2005 Major problem Major problem   
2006 Becomes Benchmark 6 in the CVM N/A 
2007 Benchmark 6 in the CVM – major problem One report dedicated to it 
2008 Insistence on bringing to justice as many elected 
officials as possible 
Insistence on the same topic  
 
The EC, civil society and judicial reform in Romania 
The reports of judicial reform, under two governments, the Socialists and the Liberals, 
illustrate that the Commission initiated biased approaches on anti-corruption policies and 
that the domestic NGOs were only fleshing out a programme put in place by Brussels.   
Since 2002, judicial reform has been increasingly at the centre of the Commission’s 
attention. The main target of the reform was the prosecution and conviction of elected 
officials: in short, political corruption.  At the centre, was the National Anti-corruption 
Office, designed to investigate and prosecute cases of corruption among high-level 
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politicians. The Commission wanted NAPO to be placed outside any political interference 
or check. In accordance with this request, NAPO had to be completely detached from the 
Ministry of Justice. This was the main point of the reform.   
 
 In addition, NAPO was supposed to have a special place, compared to the ordinary 
judiciary bodies. Also, the Commission granted extraordinary powers to the General 
Prosecutors, who had the right to start investigations at the highest level. 
  
Table 5.8 (below) epitomizes the evolution of justice reform (in its anti-corruption 
dimension) and NAPO re-organization. It shows the three main transformations, under 
three Ministers of Justice: Rodica Stanoiu and Cristian Diaconescu, during the Socialist 
government (2000-2004), and Monica Macovei from the Truth and Justice Alliance 
(2004-2007). The paragraphs in red indicate those measures with which the European 
Commission did not agree, while the green paragraphs indicate those measures which 
were taken according to the European Commission’s wishes. The last paragraph shows 
the European Commission’s evaluation of the measures taken under each Minister of 
Justice: the red ones show discontent, the green ones show agreement. The rationale of 
this scheme is to highlight the EC's lack of consistency according to its own criteria.  
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Table 5.8 
 The avatars of the institutional body responsible for the prosecution of high-level decision makers 
 
SDP (2000-2004)           DA Alliance (2004-2008) 
Rodica Stanoiu  Cristian Diaconescu                      Monica Macovei 
    
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appointing the Head of NAPO and its 
members 
Formally appointed by the Romanian 
President but shortlisted by the Ministry of 
Justice, who appointed and dismissed the other 
prosecutors (Commission 2002:21).  
The Ministry of Justice had the power to 
appoint or dismiss prosecutor members of 
NAPO (Commission 2002: 21). 
Investigating high-level corruption 
Only the Ministry of Justice and the General 
Prosecutor could order an investigation into 
the wealth of high-level officials (Commission 
2003:21). 
Commission’s opinion: “The independence 
of NAPO is jeopardized by the Ministry of 
Justice” and by “the coordination role that the 
General Prosecutor has been given over PNA 
activities” (Commission 2003:21). The 
Commission and the other international 
watchdogs requested the autonomy of PNA. 
The Superior Council of Magistracy was 
considered “responsible for safeguarding the 
independence of the Judiciary” (Commission 
2003:20). 
 
Appointing the Head of NAPO and its 
members 
The Superior Council of Magistracy (CSM) requested 
their appointment and dismissal. Based on CSM’s 
request the President officially nominated or 
dismissed them. The Ministry of Justice made 
recommendations to the CSM (TI 2005: 3; Freedom 
House 2005: 80). 
The Ministry of Justice no longer appointed or 
dismissed prosecutors. It was the Head of NAPO (The 
general Prosecutor) who did this with the approval of 
the CSM (Commission 2004:21; Freedom House 
2005: 80-81). 
Investigating high-level corruption 
The General Prosecutor had the right to start an 
investigation at the highest level. NAPO became an 
autonomous body, separated financially and 
hierarchically from the Ministry of Justice. 
Commission’s opinion: “This three-law package 
which is not yet effectively implemented, is intended to 
improve significantly the independence of justice“ 
(Commission 2004:18). Yet, “there has been no 
reduction in the perceived levels of corruption and the 
number of successful prosecutions remains low, 
particularly for high-level corruption” (Commission 
2004: 20) 
 
 
 
Appointing the General Prosecutor of NAPO, 
January 2005 to November 2006 
The Romanian President formally shortlisted them 
but the Ministry of Justice made the proposal with 
consultation from the Superior Council of Magistracy 
(OUG 134/2005; TI2007:18).  
The head of NAPO was directly responsible to the 
Ministry of Justice who can dismiss the General 
Prosecutors and all the other Prosecutors from 
NAPO, “should their performance become 
unsatisfactory”(Commission 2005:10) 
From September 2005 NAPO changed its name and 
became the National Anti-corruption Department 
(DNA). 
Investigating high-level corruption 
The General Prosecutor had the right to start an 
investigation at the highest level.  
DNA was attached to the High Court of Cassation and 
Justice but with a “clearly distinguished budget”. 
Commission’s opinion: “represents a significant 
step forward … to create an independent, professional 
and effective justice system” (Commission 2005:10) 
and “there have been an increase in the political will 
to tackle corruption” (Commission 2005:13). 
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Table 5.8 displays striking inconsistencies in the European Commission’s approach. In 
2003, the EC was criticizing the subordination of NAPO to the Minister of Justice. In 
2004, the government changed both the Ministry of Justice and the law, removing NAPO 
from the Ministry of Justice’s influence. However, the Commission complained that 
NAPO did not deliver on cases of corruption. In 2005, Monica Macovei yet again 
subordinated NAPO to the Ministry of Justice: the European Commission praised the 
reform and the political commitment to rooting out corruption.  
  
The table shows changes relating to NAPO.  However, the same contradictions can be 
encountered in the way the relationship between the Supreme Council of Magistracy and 
the Ministry of Justice evolved under the two governments. This relationship was at the 
core of the much wanted reform of justice.  
 
The European Commission  complained, in 2003, that the Minister of Justice at that time, 
Rodica Stanoiu, had discretionary powers to replace and remove magistrates from the 
Supreme Council of Magistracy (SCM) and prosecutors (European Commission 
2003b:18). The SCM was considered important by the EC, in guaranteeing the 
independence of NAPO. The table above highlights how in 2004, NAPO was only 
accountable to this organism. In 2005, Monica Macovei went back to the old state of 
affairs, and the Ministry of Justice had the right to appoint and dismiss its members. At 
the time, one voice criticized Monica Macovei’s reform. Paradoxically, it was the adviser 
employed by the European Commission itself to improve the quality of justice in 
Romania, the German judge, Dieter Schlafen. Schlafen noticed exactly the same 
inconsistency discussed here: Macovei’s reform in the area of justice defied the requests 
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of the European Commission. The changes that she brought to the laws regarding the 
functioning of the Superior Council of Magistracy were considered as reverting the 
reform of 2004, which set up the independence of the SCM from the influence of the 
Ministry of Justice. In short, the advising magistrate declared himself “appalled by the 
extraordinary pressure that the Ministry of Justice would place on the SCM, which was 
supposed to be the guaranteed of an independent justice and NAPO” (Hotnews 200527; 
Gallagher 2009:185). The response of the European Commission was that these were his 
personal opinions and did not represent those of the EC (Hotnews 2005). 
 
The EC’s answer is not very surprising. According to interviewees in the DG Enlargement 
and DG JHA, and according to Monica Macovei herself, the 2004 reform was not her 
creation but emanated directly from Brussels.  From the moment of its appointment, 
January until May 2005, the newly appointed Minister of Justice was in constant contact 
with members of the Commission from JHA. According to these interviewees, the 
Minister requested detailed guidance concerning the reform of the judiciary in Romania: 
“ we were in telephonic contact on a daily basis with the Minister of Justice from 
Romania. She was asking for guidance in conducting the judicial reform. Ms Macovei 
wanted to prove that Romania was determined to follow the EC’s requests. Otherwise, 
postponement clause could have been activated”.  This explains why the Commission 
praised a reform which was going so blatantly against its wishes, clearly expressed only 
a year before (2004). In fact, “the daily consultation” was confirmed in a public speech 
by the then Prime Minister of Romania, Tariceanu, who mentioned that: “ All the reform 
                                                          
27 Hotnews 2005, “Consilierul Satelit Dieter Schlafen a fost pus la colt de UE” (transl. The satellite adviser Dieter 
Schlafen was shamed by the EU”, 13 May 2005, on http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-arhiva-1228267-consilierul-satelit-
dieter-schlafen-fost-pus-colt.htm [12 March 2012] 
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measures were introduced after a close consultation with the EU officials”. He openly 
called the reform “a European reform”. 28 Tariceanu also admitted the unprecedented 
pressure of the EC regarding the most sensitive aspect of the anti-corruption fight: sending 
politicians to prison. The Romanian Prime Minister disclosed that the EC had sent a 
warning letter addressed to the Romanian Government, which deplored the fact that, until 
2005, no high-profile politician had been prosecuted and convicted. 
 
This story of judicial reform in Romania shows two things. The contradiction was not just 
an accident, tolerated by the EC, but was generated by it. This confirms the already 
obvious pattern of double standards and inconsistencies, initiated and generated by 
Brussels. This incident reveals also that the EC was not so much interested in creating a 
judicial system, free of political interference.  What mattered to the EC was who was in 
power and who was controlling it, rather than any principle of a free judiciary. In this 
case, it was the Liberal Coalition, supported by the civil society and its Minister of Justice, 
an ex-member of a reputed NGO that had received the trust and support of Brussels, even 
before proving themselves, pushing its own agenda of power, replacing one authority 
with another.  
 
Once again, the EC showed that the issue of solving corruption came second to the issue 
of who was empowered because of fighting corruption. It also illustrated that Brussels 
had the leading role in determining the path that the anti-corruption policies had to follow. 
Neither the newly appointed government, favoured by the EC, and its civil society 
                                                          
28 The official site of Chamber of Deputies: http://www.cdep.ro/pls/steno/steno.sumar?ids=5884&idl=1 or   on 
http://www.amosnews.ro/arhiva/discursul-lui-calin-popescu-tariceanu-privind-asumarea-raspunderii-guvernului-
aspra-legilor-14-06. 
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supporters displayed much autonomy in this case, either. It was the EC who decided the 
structure of the judicial reform before 2005 and again decided to contradict itself a couple 
of months later, by coming up with a counter-reform. The domestic actors, the new 
government and the civil society simply put into practice the EC’s requirements. 
 
Non-partisan investigations versus ‘witch –hunting’ 
Chapter 4 showed how the fight against corruption was used to purge the political 
opposition. This was performed in both cases by a coalition between civil society and 
political actors. Both Liberal Coalitions of Bulgaria and Romania were willing to take on 
board the anti-corruption policy, to the letter, and to open the decision-making, among 
other aspects, to non-governmental actors. In return, the watchdogs of corruption became 
regime enhancers. They helped the Liberal coalitions to improve their image in Brussels, 
win elections and, essentially, purge their opposition. All this was achieved at the expense 
of rooting out corruption. 
 
In the Romanian case, the main question raised here again, is whether the EC had a role 
in the witch-hunting that targeted one party: the Social Democratic Party. Was the 
Commission aware that the Coalition for a Clean Parliament was selectively using 
accusations of corruption?  Had the EC noticed that the allegations of corruption from 
2005 onwards were partisan and that, until 2008, all politicians prosecuted and convicted 
were from the opposition?  
 
The interviewees from DG Enlargement and the EC Delegation in Bucharest clearly 
stated that the Socialists of Prime-Minister Nastase had a bad reputation in Brussels. 
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According to them, what made the difference between Romania and Bulgaria was that 
the Socialists and their Prime-Minister regarded civil society with suspicion and 
condescension.29  Unlike the Bulgarian government, who understood their importance in 
the logic of accession and who treated them as partners, Nastase, and in particular his 
Minister of Justice, Rodica Stanoiu, regarded such actors as intruders, spies paid from 
outside that needed to be ‘put out to grass’.30 
 
The answers from the interviews show that the European Commission shared with the 
watchdogs of corruption the same negative opinion about Nastase’s Government between 
2000 and 2004.  Moreover, the study of the leading Romanian NGO, the Romanian 
Academic Society (SAR), showed that the Commission was not just a passive witness to 
how this particular Party had become the favourite target of accusations of corruption. It 
was the EC that required more and more high-level politicians to be sent to jail, on 
accusation of corruption. It was the EC that took the initiative in establishing an anti-
corruption institution, dedicated exclusively to the prosecution of high-level corruption. 
 
The case of the 2004 elections has been already discussed here. However, it has been 
explored from the perspective of the civil society only, for the sake of clarity. According 
to the interviewees from the EC Delegation in Bucharest and from Freedom House, the 
idea of using accusations of corruption in their campaign was a result jointly stemming 
from international donors (such as Freedom House and Soros Foundation), the EC 
Delegation and leading Romanian NGOs, in particular SAR. 31 As a result, the campaign 
                                                          
29 Interviewees in the EC Delegation in Bucharest, Romania. 
30 Interviewees in the EC Delegation in Bucharest, Romania and interviewees in the DG Enlargement, 
European Commission, Brussels. 
31 Interviews in the EC Delegation in Bucharest, interview inside Freedom House. 
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was funded by the same international donors: Balkan Trust, Soros Foundation and 
Freedom House (Coalition for a Clean Parliament 2005:2). The Coalition actions received 
an unusually large coverage in the international media: from the BBC, Reuters, Financial 
Times, Le Monde, Zeitung and Die Presse (Coalition for a Clean Parliament 2005: 2). It 
was the European Commission, together with other international donors (Freedom House 
and Soros Foundation), who generated the idea of the project and granted it financial and 
logistical support, as well as international media coverage. 
 
It has been difficult to establish to what extent the EC was aware of the selective way in 
which the accusations of corruption had been used in this particular case. However, the 
interviewees from the EC Delegation in Bucharest agreed with the campaign’s results, 
which made the situation much more ‘black and white’: “The results showed that far more 
unfit candidates belonged to the ruling SDP (Social Democratic Party)”, while the 
Alliance of Truth and Justice was found much “cleaner”.  However, the issue of 
politicians being convicted, who came exclusively from one party, was well known within 
the Commission. 
 
The previous chapter has explained that, between 2005 and 2008, all the convicted 
politicians came from one party, the PSD, which was now in opposition. As we have seen, 
from as early as 2004, the argument that the SDP was the main source of corruption was 
not valid.  As already discussed, upper ranking politicians from the Liberal Coalition – 
the party that won the elections in 2004 – were involved in practices which could and 
should have triggered either their exclusion from election lists or investigation by the anti-
corruption agency NAPO (later known as DNA). Also, the very fact that all the politicians 
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who were prosecuted and convicted between 2004 and 2008 came from opposition parties 
should have sent a clear signal that the anti-corruption judicial mechanisms had become 
an undemocratic instrument for purging political opposition. 
 
The Commission was well aware and very well informed about each case involving high-
level politicians, as the Commission itself informs us in its Cooperation and Verification 
Mechanisms from 2007 and 2008: : “No real progress has been made in ten key cases 
involving former ministers. This is partly due to Parliament having blocked the 
investigation and partly to dismissal of the cases by the High Court of Cassation and 
Justice, which overturned previous decisions.” The ten politicians mentioned by the 
Commission were all members of the opposition parties, as table 4.1 (from chapter 4) 
shows. The Commission never questioned the fairness of a process where only the 
opposition was accused of corruption. Importantly, it was the Commission that urged the 
Liberal Coalition to intensify the process of bringing to justice members of the opposition 
party: “Failure to move on these cases undermines the positive efforts undertaken at pre-
trial level.”(Commission 2008b:4). It went on to say: “Although the National 
Anticorruption Directorate (DNA) continues to show a consistently positive track record 
for prosecution of high level corruption cases, court sentences remain lenient and 
inconsistent.” (Commission 2008b:4). The main culprit was found to be Parliament 
because: “efforts by DNA to continue investigations in some important cases have stalled, 
as Parliament has not recommended that judicial procedures be launched. The reluctance 
of the judiciary and Parliament to allow investigation of these high profile cases results 
in a loss of public confidence. Parliamentary debate on the amendments to the Criminal 
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Procedure Code, aiming at restricting the collection of certain evidence, creates legal 
uncertainty and negatively influences ongoing investigations” (Commission 2008:4-5). 
 
 Finally, the Commission urged that: “Independent investigation of former ministers and 
members of Parliament by the judicial authorities must be allowed to proceed” 
(Commission 2008b: 4). The “Former ministers” were members of the political party that 
was previously in power, the Social Democrats.  
 
In conclusion, the Commission was not only aware that accusations of corruption had 
only one target, the opposition, but it was the Commission itself that urged the Liberal 
Coalition in power to intensify and speed up the process of bringing to justice members 
of the opposite party.  In fact, this approach continues until today.  In its 2014 Anti-
Corruption Report, addressed to all EU members, the EC mentions the Romanian anti-
corruption agency (DNA) as a model to be followed, due to its high record of conviction 
of high-level politicians:  
“DNA…has built a notable track record of non-partisan investigations and 
prosecutions into allegations of corruption at the highest levels of politics…In the 
past seven years, the DNA has indicted over 4,700 defendants…Nearly 500 
defendants were convicted through final court decisions, almost half of them 
holding very high level positions”(Commission 2014:14).  
 
The European Commission describes these investigations and prosecutions as “non-
partisan”. However, this is certainly not evident from any examination of the names and 
Party membership of those politicians who were sentenced to prison, or from the way 
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these convictions were recorded by the DNA itself.  On the contrary, the phenomenon of 
‘witch-hunts’, first uncovered during the 2004-2008 time period, is still continuing. The 
2014 Anti-Corruption Report cites the Romanian DNA as having jailed around 250 
politicians in the last seven years (since 2008).  According to the same source, 80% of  
convicted politicians who held a position in the Government were MPs from the main 
opposition parties.  The Social Democratic Party had a record number of its members 
convicted and sent to jail (approximately 70%), followed by the National Liberal Party  
(with 20%)32. 
 
  
   
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
32The information is available in the archives of DNA available on:  
http://www.pna.ro/comunicate_condamnari.xhtml 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
 Using Corruption as a Means to Increase 
Control on Member States 
 
Introduction 
This chapter represents the third part of this research. The first part demonstrated that 
eliminating corruption did not appear to be the real purpose of the EC’s anti-corruption 
policies in Bulgaria and Romania. The systematic double standards and the contradictions 
displayed in practice by the Commission demonstrated that progress in the fight against 
corruption was not what mattered most to Brussels.  
The second part explores who and how was empowered/disempowered as a result of the 
implementation of the EU anti-corruption policies in these countries before and after the 
enlargement.  It reveals that Instead, accusations of corruption were used as a 
‘blackmailing tactic’ against the domestic political elite to ensure that non-governmental 
and international organizations, self-styled as ‘watchdogs of corruption’ secured access 
to funding resources and promoted their powers of decision making.  Also accusations of 
corruptions were used by centre right parties with a neo-liberal agenda in Bulgaria but 
particularly in Romania to purge their opposition.  
The main conclusion until now has been that the crucial aspect about these illiberal 
developments is that they could not have been possible without the intervention of the 
EC/EU.  By “intervention” here is meant two things: a structural intervention which 
regards the way Brussels devised the anti-corruption policies and a concrete intervention 
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which concerns the way the EC pressed these countries to apply these measures in 
practice.  
The institutional, legislative and judicial anti-corruption framework made possible  the 
partisan trials that took place against a certain part of the political elite, as it has been 
discussed. 
 More importantly the partisan trials, the urge for the purge of one side of the political 
realm (the leftist one) came as a result of the EC pressure along this line, as explained in 
chapters four and five.  
The analysis from the first and second part of this research has come up with two 
important fundamental conclusions: anti-corruption policies seem to be rather a pretext 
for enforcing EU influence in Bulgaria and Romania, for re-structuring the power balance 
in the country, where the main winners are a cluster of actors who share the same 
characteristics. 
The third and last part of this research takes the particular case of Bulgaria and Romania 
to a higher, more general level of analysis. In the first, part it explores to which extent is 
their case relevant for the new anti-corruption framework that the European Commission 
tries to apply at the level of whole EU. In the second part and the most extensive one it 
will be discussed how at the EU level, the EC is building a new anti-corruption framework 
for all its members, apparently inspired by the particular cases of Bulgaria and Romania.  
The largest part of this chapter goes on to analyse how the EU has structurally designed 
the new anti-corruption policies and the way they promote new structures of power in all 
EU member states.  In short, the chapter would explore the idea that this particular case-
study is important for understanding the role of anti-corruption policies in the promotion 
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of a new European order, at the expense of the old order (or whatever is left of it), based 
on the powers of nation states. This chapter will also discuss how and why this has been 
allowed to happen.  
 
 
  
  
 In short, the Bulgarian/Romanian case confirms the worst expectations of the main critics 
of the EU: corruption seemed to be used as a pretext for promoting the interests and 
influence of the EU primarily. The chief loser, in terms of power and – very significantly 
– of legitimacy and credibility, is the political class of these countries, or rather a certain 
part of it, in this case the centre –left parties. 
 
It would seem legitimate, however, to question to what extent their case is sufficiently 
relevant to challenge the mainstream view on corruption.  Would it be correct to assume 
that the contradictions and the double standards displayed by the Commission in this 
particular case are sufficient proof to establish the view that the genuine intention of the 
EU was not to solve the problem of corruption but use it as a pretext for promoting its 
own power agenda, in general? 
After all, it is well known that Bulgaria and Romania do have a real problem with 
corruption, worse than any of the other new EU members, and far worse than the case of 
old member states with two exceptions (Italy and Greece).  
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 6.1 From the particular to the general: the relevance of the 
Bulgarian/Romanian case for the new EU anti-corruption 
framework  
 
For Bulgaria and Romania, at least, in the context of the EU, this mission has proved 
disingenuous. Exercising detachment from the official discourse and rationale provides 
the advantage of being able to focus without obstruction on the consequences of these 
policies for individual countries.  The EC has managed to introduce the simplistic 
prejudice that corruption is a polarised war between two sides – the camp of the ‘knights 
of anti-corruption’, which is the ‘good’ camp and their opponents – mainly domestic 
politicians. This Manichaeistic view has blurred our perspective on what is really 
happening in terms of power and control, following the introduction of these policies. 
 
6.1.1 The Bulgarian/Romanian case: from exception to EU 
norm 
What can actually guarantee that the behaviour displayed by the Commission in the case 
of these two countries is relevant for other EU members, especially for those who are 
considered as having a lesser problem with corruption?  After all, the loss of power and 
legitimacy experienced by the domestic political class of these countries could have been 
generated by their own internal weaknesses, which may have exposed them to this type 
of outcome anyway. In short, this particular case might not be considered sufficient to 
demonstrate that these policies have been purposefully and structurally designed to shift 
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the power from nation states to supra-national structures and actors that are not 
accountable to the general public nor validated thorough a democratic process. 
6.1.2 The case of the first EU anti-corruption Report (2014). Questioning 
its rationale based on the Bulgarian/Romanian experience. 
  If Eastern Europe was presented as a special case for introducing anti-corruption policies 
for the first time, then the more extreme cases of Bulgaria and Romania were considered 
a good reason for the EU to push its anti-corruption policies upon all 27 EU Member 
States . Thus the Bulgarian/Romanian case did not remain just a parochial, isolated event 
with limited significance for anti-corruption policies, however 
In 2009, the Stockholm Programme  adopted by the European Council, declares 
corruption a “transnational threat that challenges the EU internal security”.  It follows 
immediately that the EU needs to take charge “since   the problems associated with 
corruption cannot be adequately solved by Member States alone” (European Council 
2009). The European Commission is established as the main manager of the process, in 
charge with developing the anti-corruption mechanisms.  
  In 2011, the Commission lays down the decision to establish an EU Anti-corruption 
reporting mechanism for periodic assessment of all EU members: EU Anti-corruption 
Report which will assess periodically the anti-corruption efforts in the EU 27 (European 
Commission 2011: 8). In 2014 the Commission would release its first EU-Anti-
Corruption Report (Commission 2014).  
 As early as 2011 , the Commission admitted  that the Bulgarian/Romanian case   had a 
“spilling over” effect  which inspired the EC decided that the innovation of Cooperation 
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and Verification Mechanism is replicating to a larger level:  “To date there is no 
mechanism in place at EU level to measure in a coherent manner the enforcement of anti-
corruption policies. The only EU monitoring toll that also covers anti-corruption issues is 
the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism for Romania and Bulgaria which has 
managed over time to maintain or revive a certain momentum for reforms” (Commission 
2011: 9)”. 
In its first Report on Corruption for all 27 Members from 2014, the Commission makes 
clear that: 
“The EU anti-corruption report also builds on the Cooperation and Verification 
Mechanism (CVM), a post-accession follow-up mechanism for Romania and Bulgaria 
that is managed by the European Commission… While these two mechanisms serve 
different purposes, the current report draws on the extensive knowledge and lessons 
acquired in the CVM process and makes references in the two country chapters 
accordingly.” (Commission 2014:38). 
“The extensive knowledge and lessons acquired” in the Bulgarian/Romanian case are 
indeed mirrored in the way the Commission constructs its anti-corruption policies. The 
policies that are now to be applied to all member states are almost identical copies of the 
anti-corruption policies and specific requests made by the Commission to Bulgaria and 
Romania. The structure of these new Reports follows the structure of the Progress 
Reports, although in a more organized, clearer manner and extensive manner.   In short, 
the anti-corruption framework envisaged for the most corrupt countries has now become 
the norm. This is shown in Table 6.1 which compares the content of anti-corruption 
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policies for Bulgaria and Romanai with the content of anti-corruption framework 
designed for all EU members. 
  
213 
 
 
Table 6.1 
Anti-corruption measures 
Measures envisaged for all EU members 
in the 
first EU Anti-Corruption Report 2014 
 
Anti-corruption conditionality for 
Bulgaria and Romania 
from  2000 to date 
(Cooperation and Verification 
Mechanism) 
1. Political corruption (high-level decision 
makers) 
√ Present 
a)  Prevention  (legislation) 
√ Present 
- financing of political parties √ Present 
- asset disclosure √ Present 
- Conflict of interest Never existed in the EU legislation 
until 2011. Requested from Eastern 
candidate countries since 1998. 
- Transparency of information √ Present 
- Immunity of decision makers The removal of immunity of elected 
decision makers already existent in EU.  
- Anti-corruption agencies – bodies 
specialized on monitoring the 
assets, conflict of interest and the 
finance of political parties. They 
are entitled to refer cases of 
political corruption to prosecution 
and are considered key for the 
“repression” of corruption at its 
highest level 
The Romanian National Anti-
corruption Directorate (DNA), the 
former NAPO referred to in Progress 
Reports, receives favorable comments 
on the number of elected politicians 
prosecuted and sent to jail (around 300 
in eight years).  
b)  Criminalization √ Present 
      Reform of judiciary: 
-  “Independence of judiciary is key”: 
independence from scrutiny by 
elected politicians (MPs and 
Members of the Government) 
√ Present 
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- Faster, easier procedures for 
prosecution and conviction 
√ Present 
- more powers to prosecutors – 
special treatment for those who 
target political corruption. 
√ Present 
Main criterion of judging the 
efficiency of the system: the more 
cases of political of corruption 
prosecuted the better; the higher 
their ranking the better  
√ Present 
2. Role of NGOs /IOs/public experts 
√ Present 
    Public awareness campaigns √ Present 
    Monitoring and expertise –  
- issuing  studies and surveys 
- collecting  data for the EU 
√ Present 
- Surveillance of political class  
- (reporting on how the five legged 
legislation is implemented) 
√ Present 
3. Economy 
√ Present 
Public procurement – targets high-level 
corruption 
√ Present 
Organized crime – is linked with high level 
corruption  
√ Present 
 
*Source: European Commission (2014), EU Anti-corruption Report 
*European Commission Progress Reports for Romania and Bulgaria 2000-2005 
*European Commission Cooperation and Verification Mechanism for Bulgaria and Romania 
(2007-2014) 
 
 
  
The Bulgarian/ Romanian case has been a model for the current anti-corruption policies 
in several ways.  Table 6.1 shows that the Commission has replicated the structure of anti-
corruption conditionality, which initially targeted only the candidate countries with the 
highest levels of corruption.  It was not only the structure or content that was copied. The 
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EU Report highlights which aspects are accorded priority. Again, they mirror those 
emphasized in the Romanian/Bulgarian case, as will now be explained. 
Most of the Report is dedicated to political corruption, or corruption among elected 
politicians (MPs and members of Government): “Political corruption is a top priority: a 
fundamental challenge regarding anti-corruption polices is… a clear harmonization of 
criminal liability of elected officials for corruption offences.” (Commission 2014: 9)  
With the exception of petty or local level corruption, all other dimensions presented in 
the EC Report target corruption among elected politicians – that is, high-level corruption. 
Whereas, in previous anti-corruption policy during the Enlargement, high-level 
corruption represented only one item among many, it now hugely dominates the anti-
corruption strategy: almost all policies target the domestic political class.  Section B, 
“Control mechanisms and prevention”, refers to regulating asset declarations and conflict 
of interest across the EU.  Regulation is necessary because of the “weak and scarce 
sanctions applicable to elected officials” (Commission 2014:12).  Section C, entitled 
“Repression”, discusses ways of making the prosecution and conviction of cases of 
corruption “more efficient and speedier” (Commission 2014:13). To this end, the 
Commission requires the establishment of specialized anti-corruption bodies, with the 
dual role of investigation and prosecution. It makes clear that these specialized bodies are 
to target elected officials by choosing five examples of successful strategy, drawn from 
already existing agencies. Among them is the former Romanian NAPO, famous for the 
large number of high level officials it managed to bring to prosecution and conviction. 
Also, the reform of judiciary means two things in the Commission’s view: first, any 
political check on it has to be removed, in order to ensure its independence; second, it has 
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to be made efficient in order to ensure the prosecution and conviction of elected 
politicians. 
The Report’s Public Procurement section IV also poses a problem for decision makers, 
stating that: “The individual country assessments of this report point to public corruption 
as one of the areas most vulnerable to corruption, as illustrated by high-level corruption 
cases involving one or more countries” (Commission, 2014:21). Organized crime 
naturally relates to political corruption. Tackling organized crime is equivalent here to 
prosecuting elected decision-makers (Commission 2014: 19).     
 Apart from the structure of the Report we see that the Commission gave priority to 
exactly the same items that were prioritized in the Bulgarian/Romanian case. 
 High-level political corruption was never such a preoccupying issue in the anti-
corruption conditionality of the first Enlargement (2004). However, high-level corruption 
became a predominant concern with Romania and, after accession, with Bulgaria as we 
have already seen. In the 2014 political corruption among elected politicians is the central 
point of anti-corruption framework.  
It was in the Bulgarian and mainly Romanian case that the Commission placed a special 
emphasis on the repressive dimension: the trial and conviction of high-fly decision 
makers. The insistence on  removing almost any political control  over the judiciary, the 
creation of specialized anti-corruption agencies focused on high-level corruption with a 
special regime  and, in general, the creation of  an extensive repressive judiciary 
mechanism directed against political class are all  items that were  requested by Brussels 
in the special case of the two former communist countries. 
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At the centre of the “repressive” mechanism lay the so-called anti-corruption agencies 
specialized on tackling high-level corruption (Commission 2014: 13). It is important to 
mention that from all the countries that have such institutions, the Romanian DNA 
occupies a central place as a model to be followed in the Commission’s Anti-corruption 
report. Although other such agencies from other countries are mentioned, the 
Commission expands on the characteristics of this particular one. The aspects that attracts 
positively the Commission’s attention are the ones regarding the high number of 
politicians sent to jail, five hundred, from which half of them hold “very high level 
positions” (Commission 2014: 14). The second aspect considered key is the fact that the 
Romanian agency has unusual   extended powers   that encompass other actors with a role 
in the surveillance and repressive mechanisms: “Key to these results has been DNA’s 
structure which incorporates, apart from prosecutors who lead and supervise 
investigations, judicial police and economic, financial and IT experts” (Commission 
2014: 14).  
The analysis of the Bulgarian/Romanian case has demonstrated that taking for granted 
both the EU official rationale and the content of the anti-corruption policies designed by 
Brussels  is a flawed approach which provides a twisted and incomplete image on the 
matter. 
Consequently, the 2014 new anti-corruption framework provided by the Commission 
already raises some questions. Some of such questions are triggered by the analysis of the 
Bulgarian/ Romanian case, some others however, are generated by inconsistencies in the 
EU’s argument. 
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The first aspect regards the rationale provided by the Commission for “spilling over” the 
anti-corruption policies from the particular case of Bulgaria and Romania to the level of 
the whole EU.   Why a matter of special concern in the case of two countries should 
become a matter of EU concern for all 27 member states, after all? In other words, what 
is the rationale for “the spilling over effect”? In other words, replicating the anti-
corruption mechanisms as shown in the case of Romania and Bulgaria at the level of the 
whole EU. 
Corruption as a matter of EU concern was introduced for the first time in the case of East 
European candidates to membership in 1998. The Commission made clear the reason for 
this innovation:  their levels of corruption were much higher than the ones in the old 
western democracies (Commission 1998). The explanation offered for this situation was 
their communist legacy and their transition to the market economy.  This explanation 
offered by the EU and IOs such as World Bank became a fixture in the academic literature 
as it has been already discussed in the Chapter two (Commission 2003a; World Bank 
1997; 2001).  
However, with the exception of Greece and to a certain extent of Italy, there has never 
been raised such concerns about the rest of the old EU members who neither had high 
levels of corruption nor had a communist past and a difficult transition to the market 
economy. In fact, to this day, with the exception of Greece, the old Member States, well-
established western democracies enjoy high ranking in the assessments made by IOs such 
as Transparency International (Transparency International 2010, 2011, 2013). The 
Commission itself admits as much in its 2014 Report when it cites the Eurobarometer 
results which indicate that in five   of Member States perceptions of corruption are 
“significantly below the EU average” while other six countries are “good performers in 
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the Transparency International indexes”. (Commission 2014: 6).  Therefore, the argument 
that the phenomenon of corruption took a turn in the last decade and it start spreading to 
other countries that did not have such high levels of corruption, is not an argument.  The 
general and vague rationale offered by the Commission in the opening of its 2014 
document – “corruption seriously harms the economy and the society as a whole….The 
Member States of the EU are not immune to this reality”-  is not satisfactory.  
What makes the Commission’s rationale even less satisfactory is the replication of anti-
corruption policies and mechanisms that were tailor made for extreme cases on countries 
that are far from having such high levels of corruption or similar type of corruption (For 
example, it is indeed   difficult to explain why the focus on high –level corruption  which 
addressed the phenomenon of state capture in Bulgaria and Romania should remain  
central in an anti-corruption framework which regards countries such as Finland, Sweden 
or UK who reputedly do not have such a problem, according with the EC itself 
(Commission 2014: 6).33   Or why should the most radical type of anti-corruption agency, 
the Romanian DNA, be presented as a model worthy to be followed in contexts that regard 
countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium or France which are also at the 
forefront of TI ranking?  
The absurdity of this situation is better understood if we imagine an instance where both 
patients with cancer and with a mild cold receive chemotherapy.   
From an ontological perspective, if we are to apply the technocratic logic of efficiency 
and rationality or if we are to accept the pluralistic view on power that animates the 
                                                          
33 The Eurobarometer survey on perception of corruption cited by the EC in its 2014 Anti-corruption report says that: 
“Answers confirm a positive perception and low experience of bribery in the case of Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg 
and Sweden” , while, UK “shows the best results from all Europe” (Commission 2014: 6) 
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existing literature on corruption in the EU would be very difficult to come up with a 
credible answer to the main question raised here: why the European Commission decided 
to frame its new anti-corruption policy for all 27 EU members by trying it out on extreme 
models: the member states with the highest levels of corruption?  
The decision to come up with one-size fits all (despite of Commission’s reassurance that 
this is not the case) is not the only problem. The Commission decided to apply anti-
corruption mechanisms whose efficiency in the Bulgarian/Romanian case raises serious 
questions if we are to follow what the EU and other IOs report on. 
In Bulgaria, after fifteen years of EU anti-corruption policies and seven of Cooperation 
and verification Mechanism, the most dangerous and rampant organized crime moulded 
after the Russian one is still in place, according with the EU sources (Euractiv 2013). In 
fifteen years of EU, surveillance and pressures only one mafia mob was convicted 
(Commission 2013a). In 2013, the European Parliament calls Bulgaria “the weak link in 
democratic standards and a threat to European values across the continent, due to its 
inability to tackle corruption” (Euractiv 2013).34 Also after seven years of CVM, Bulgaria 
has not improved at all in the Indexes of Transparency International where its ranking is 
the second lowest from all EU (70
th
 place in 2013 from 178 countries) far behind the 
average of the 27 EU countries. We do not discuss the reliability of these sources here. It 
only matters that such ranking are generally accepted and cited by the mainstream. 
 
Romania boasts with some five hundred politicians sent to jail in the last six years. But, 
if we are to listen to the European Commission itself, this is not satisfactory because the 
                                                          
34 http://www.euractiv.com/future-eu/parliament-debates-state-democra-news-517633 
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Commission expresses “serious concern over the political situation and the ability to 
comply with fundamental principles of the Union” (Commission 2012 b:2). Tougher 
monitoring was also envisaged for Romania with the next monitoring report due by the 
end of 2013. In indexes of corruption, Romania scores only slightly better than 
Bulgaria, if we are to believe Transparency International and it maintains its position at 
the bottom of the EU ranking on levels of corruption (e.g. 69
th
 place in 2013). 
 
When CVM was set up, the general idea was that this was a temporary mechanism, which 
would be removed after the benchmarks are met. The very fact that the CVM is still in 
place after all this time makes questionable its efficiency in terms of rooting out 
corruption. 
 
One of the reasons mentioned insistently by the EU in regard to anti-corruption effort is 
that corruption decreases the popular trust in the democratic institutions: the Government 
and the Parliament. This is one aspect where the seven years of CVM failed drastically. 
Not only that levels of trust in the democratically elected politicians did not increase but 
in fact they deteriorated if compared with the time span when the EU anti-corruption 
policies were not in place. In 2007, Romanians’ trust in their political parties, MPs and 
government was the lowest among all EU members, old and new together (Eurobarometer 
2007). In 2008, it was the turn of Bulgaria to record the lowest trust in its elected officials 
(Eurobarometer 2008).
39
 To date (2014-2015), the situation has not changed.
40
 The poll 
from 2015 in Romania shows that Romanians have most distrust in their Political Parties: 
12.5% trust them. They are followed by Parliament, with 16.5%, and the Government 
with 28.6%. These figures are no better than those of 2004, when the ranking of distrust 
followed the same pattern: Political parties the 
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lowest (16.8%) – slightly better than nowadays though. Parliament and the Government 
were also given low scores: 18.9% for the former and 20.5%, the latter. Up to date, 
Romania has the second lowest levels of trust in its democratically elected institutions 
from EU, after Bulgaria (IRSOP 2015). 
 
On their side, Bulgarians are the most sceptical about their political class from all the EU 
citizens. Bulgaria’s Democracy Index keeps going down, being ranked 52nd in the latest 
Economist Intelligence Unit study (EIU, 2011). Up to date, Bulgaria maintains the same 
low levels of trust (Eurobarometer 2013). 
 
These disappointing results are coming from EU official sources, from mainstream 
rankings such as Transparency International. They are in the open, made available for 
everybody and they do not necessitate an in depth analysis. 
 
So, even at a very shallow level of analysis the EU anti-corruption framework‘s efficiency 
tested in the case of these two countries is highly debatable. 
 
The present in-depth analysis however has depicted a much gloomier reality regarding 
the efficiency of these policies. Not only that important aspects of corruption have not 
been corrected or minimized (e.g. organized crime in Bulgaria or political corruption), 
but the whole democratic process of these countries was in fact weakened by the partisan 
usage of accusations of corruption against left-wing parties. This is particularly the case 
for Romania. Where corruption was used as a pre-text for purge of left-wing opposition 
(Social Democratic party).  At the centre of process rests exactly the institution that has 
been chosen as a model for the rest of countries, by the EC: the Romanian anti-corruption 
agency (the DNA) which displayed a clear partisan way of dealing with corruption to the 
point that its activity reminds of a political police directed against the opposition. 
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However, the puzzle of the not –so –new anti-corruption framework for all 27 EU 
displays one further contradiction regarding the rationale offered by the Commission. 
 
In an attempt to come up with a more consistent argument as to why such policies need 
to be adopted by all the EU members and why was chosen this moment, the 
 
Commission offers the argument of the recent economic/financial crisis: “ The financial 
crisis as put additional pressure on Europeans and their governments…Citizens expect 
the EU to play an important role in helping Member States to protect the licit economy in 
times of economic crisis and budgetary austerity”. Moreover, the 2020 EU’s growth 
strategy “also depends on institutional factors such as good governance, rule of law and 
control of corruption” (Commission 2014: 3). 
 
However, the economic/financial crisis did not start in the public sector and was not 
triggered by governmental activity. It is a fact widely acknowledged that the crisis was 
generated by the private sector and in particular by the banks. At best, it can be said that 
a certain type of corruption in the private sector could be kept responsible for the 
economic doldrums. Nevertheless, the EU understands to shift the responsibility and the 
attention from the private to the public sector by introducing a new factor: political 
corruption and corruption in the public sector. 
 
In conclusion, the EU anti-corruption effort for all 27 Members States poses some 
important challenges for scholars on corruption. These challenges cannot be solved by 
the existent dominant approach in the EU academic literature on this topic. The main 
theoretical trait of the existent scholarship on corruption in the EU is dominated by a 
pluralist view on power, despite its apparent theoretical variety. The main problem with 
this ontological stance is that it takes for granted the official rationale brought forth 
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by the Commission. Accepting the official rationale in this case means to accept the 
technocratic discourse of the EU which argues that the sole purpose of its anti-corruption 
efforts is to solve a systemic problem that affects the public welfare. The result of such 
technocratic argument is that it removes questions of power and interests. More to the 
point, it exonerates the promoters of these policies (the EU/EC) of any suspicions of 
power interplay and hidden hegemonic agenda and it plays down the important question 
of who won and who lost as a result of these policies. In short, the pluralist framework of 
power professed by most studies in the EU area creates an inherent bias towards accepting 
uncritically the official view. Therefore, the pluralist view on power is neither equipped 
to spot the contradictions and inconsistencies of the official discourse nor is it able to 
come up with credible explanations when such inconsistencies are signalled. This 
essential disadvantage of pluralism has been already exposed in the Bulgarian/Romanian 
case. The case of the new anti-corruption framework for all 27 EU seems to replicate the 
same dilemmas. 
 
Consequently, the analysis of the specific case of Bulgaria and Romania is key for 
understanding the meaning new anti-corruption framework of the EU. First, they draw 
attention upon fundamental inconsistencies and contradictions of the official rationale 
provided by the EU. Second, they indicate which is the most useful ontological approach 
for explaining such inconsistencies. Until now the chief and almost sole objective of the 
mainstream research has been to enquire on the efficiency of the anti-corruption policies 
in rooting out corruption, as it has been already discussed. All the other effects of such 
policies in the targeted countries have been subordinated to this dominant question. This 
means that although occasionally there have been noticed negative effects on the 
democratic system and on the power balance inside the state 
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 such observations have not been taken further, have been dismissed as not important, or 
have not even considered problematic (Spendzarova and Vachudova 2012; Vachudova 
2009; Noutcheva 2007; Ganev 2007). That is because the benefits of anti-corruption 
policies have been considered much more important than the sacrifice of some politicians, 
political parties or than the worrying phenomenon of popular lack of trust in the 
democratic political system in general, for example. 
 
The analysis of Bulgarian/Romanian case places a different spin on the topic. In fact, it 
inverses the priority. It is not very relevant to discuss the EU anti-corruption policies in 
terms of how efficient are they in rooting out corruption. That is because it is not evident 
that rooting out corruption is the genuine scope of the EU. Instead evidences derived from 
this case –study show that the importance of such policies rest in their impact on the state 
powers and institutions, in the way such policies reshape the classic democratic system. 
 
Consequently, the findings in the Bulgarian/Romanian case feed into theories, which 
reject the pluralist view on power. Such is the case of Critical Political Economy, the 
umbrella term that labels a cluster of studies inspired by a neo-gramscian view on what 
European Union is, as already discussed in chapter two. The assumption of power and 
interests it is also emphasized by the critics of the technocratic mode of governance, who 
also come up with the argument that the technocratic discourse represents a smoke screen 
for hiding the real intentions and interests of powerful actors. Both paradigms share a 
couple of fundamental assumptions: from both perspectives the interpretation of EU anti-
corruption policies excludes the official rationale and in both cases the narrative on 
corruption would be regarded as a construct designed to promote the interests of the EU 
and international organisations, also in both cases the neo-liberal bias of the anti- 
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corruption framework would be interpreted as a vehicle that carries on hegemonic power 
and interests disguised under the benefits of neo-liberal norms and values. However, at 
the central of the Critical Political Economy and of neo-gramscian inspired research is 
the issue of the transnational capital. In this paradigm it is considered that the EU and its 
neo-liberal restructuring have been primarily designed to promote the interests of the big 
business that goes global as opposed to the interests of working class and of domestically 
rooted business interests.  
 
In conclusion, the discussion regarding the new anti-corruption framework for all 27 MS, 
would go along the following lines. The main question is: who is designed to lose and 
who is designed to win in terms of structural power. The discussion would explore the 
way the EU constructs the definition of corruption and the role played by the neo-liberal 
bias in this construct. The anti-corruption mechanisms displayed in the 2014 EU report 
on Anti-Corruption would be assessed from the perspective of the main research question: 
whose powers/influence are minimized or maximized by these mechanisms. 
  6.2. The Anti-corruption framework for 27 EU or re-shaping the state 
 
powers and attributions. 
 
 
The Bulgarian/Romanian case has already indicated that the main losers of this game is 
the state, the public sector, the classic democratic system no matter how framed this might 
be. It also revealed that while the powers of the democratically elected institutions have 
been severely restrained the influence of the EU supported by a cluster of IOs and 
domestic NGOs have increased. 
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In the following would be analysed from a power perspective the anti-corruption 
mechanisms laid down by the EC in its first Anti-corruption report for all 27 Member 
states in 2014. 
 
 
 
 
6.2.1 The definition of corruption and the neo-liberal bias 
 
 
What gets modelled and measured depends on how corruption is defined (Jain 2001). The 
EC admitted that "there is no uniform definition of ...corruption" (Commission 2003:3) 
and decided to borrow its definition from the United Nations. The reason for this, stated 
by the EU, is that: “It appears more appropriate to use a broader definition, such as the 
one of the Global Program against Corruption run by the United Nations – abuse of power 
for private gain – including thereby both the entire public and private sector." 
(Commission 2003:6). 
 
 
Despite the choice of a broader definition, including both public and private actors, when 
the EC was addressing the Eastern candidate countries, it focused almost exclusively on 
the first part of the definition: public actors and public institutions. In its communication 
on a “Comprehensive EU policy against corruption”, in the Annex regarding "Ten 
Principles of improving the fight against Corruption in acceding, candidate countries..." 
(Commission 2003:25), the Commission focuses, with one exception, on actions in the 
public sector and state institutions: access to public office (principle no. 4), integrity, 
accountability and transparency in public administration (principle no. 5), codes of 
conduct in the public sector (point 6) and rules regarding cover links between politicians 
and business interests (point 7). Only one point refers exclusively to the private sector, 
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but in language which endeavours to persuade it to aim for good practice, rather than 
threatening any reprisals: "incentives should be developed for the private sector to refrain 
from corrupt practices" (Commission 2003:25). 
 
 
 
 
The same situation is mirrored in the EC’s 2014 Report on Corruption for all the EU 
member states. All sections refer to, or are linked with, political corruption and corruption 
in the public sector. Section A is titled “Political Dimension” and it is concerned 
exclusively with political corruption; Section B refers to control mechanisms and, as we 
will see, all such mechanisms target elected politicians, with the only exception of petty 
corruption; section C, “Repression”, is only about the prosecution and conviction of 
elected officials; section D, concerning “Risk Areas”, is again focused on public officials 
– whether elected or not elected (in public administration) and in local governments. The 
only other exception is regarding foreign bribery (Commission 2014: 8-20). 
Consideration of the economic side of corruption is reduced to the issue of 
Public Procurement exclusively. Public procurement is also said to relate to “weak 
governance”, which “hinders market competition”. Again using public perceptions 
recorded by Eurobarometer, the main actors responsible for corruption in public 
procurement remain elected officials and high-ranking officials from public 
administration in general: 45% of Europeans interviewed believe that bribery and the 
abuse of positions of power for personal gain are widespread among officials awarding 
public tenders” (Commission 2014). 
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Consequently, although de jure the Commission comes up with a broad definition of 
corruption, de facto it is all about corruption in the public sector, creating mechanisms of 
surveillance, monitoring and repression that target public officials – in particular, elected 
officials. It is only the public sector and public officials that get assessed, monitored and 
surveyed. Special anti-corruption bodies, designed to prevent and prosecute in cases of 
corruption, are created for high-level decision makers. 
 
So, the way the EU frames corruption strengthens considerably the neo-liberal scepticism 
about state and public sector efficiency.The purpose of neo-liberalism is to downsize the 
public sector and limit the powers of the state, particularly its regulating powers. The neo-
liberal’s main argument against the state is one of efficiency: “When government… tries 
to rearrange the economy… the cost comes in inefficiency. Government should be a 
referee, not an active player ‘’(Friedman 2002:82). 
 
However, the narrative on corruption brings the neo-liberal bias against the state on a 
different level. Until now the neo-liberal argument against state’s regulator powers was 
that of inefficiency and it was mostly confined to its role in the economy. 
 
Corruption is a phenomenon which, apart from its negative economic outcome, carries a 
strong moral significance, too. The government is not just “naturally” incompetent in 
administering the state’s affairs and therefore “inefficient”. Corrupt behaviour 
presupposes deliberate action against public welfare. Consequently, the state is also seen 
as morally unfit to have extensive powers, since it is spotted as the main locus of 
corruption. Therefore, framing corruption as a structural problem which is generated 
almost exclusively by the state and the public sector, has a powerful de-legitimizing 
effect. 
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The second novelty is that the state is deemed “unworthy” to exercise its powers not just 
in the economic realm but also in the political one. Anti-corruption measures as envisaged 
by the 2014 EC Report refer predominantly to the reform of state political institutions and 
functions with the exception of public procurement. This brings the de-legitimization of 
the classic state’ s power to an unprecedented level.  The neo-liberal dimension of 
corruption has not gone entirely unnoticed in the literature (Holmes, 2006: 2009; Chang, 
2002: Hodgson and Jiang, 2007).  The full implications of the anti-corruption framework, 
however, have not been fully grasped or much explored. 
 
 
6.2.2 Awareness campaigns or shaping the public perceptions. Legitimizing non- 
 
elected/transnational actors and de-legitimizing the elected political class 
 
 
An item which has never missed from any EU strategy on corruption and which has been 
placed at the centre of it has been the awareness campaigns and the quantitative appraisal 
of public perceptions on corruption (Commission 2003a; 2011, 2014). The 2014 Report 
opens with a Eurobarometer evaluation of public perception of corruption in all member 
states (Commission 2014: 5). The Commission always mentions the public perceptions 
on corruption in the opening of all its papers addressing corruption, as we have already 
seen in the Bulgarian/Romanian case and during the Eastern Enlargement in general 
(Commission 200a,b; 2001 a,b; 2002 a,b; 2003 a,b,c; 2004 a,b, 2007 a,b). Public 
perceptions plays an important role in legitimizing the influence and the demands of an 
entity (the EC) which has neither been democratically elected by the public of MS nor is 
a part of the domestic political arena. 
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Grigorescu (2006) came up with concrete evidence, showing that there is no connection 
between levels of corruption, on the one hand, and public sensitivity on the other. In 
countries with far higher levels of corruption (e.g. Russia, Burkina Faso, Bangladesh), 
the anti-corruption rhetoric is much lower or even muted. In short, it is the concerted 
effort of IOs and the corporate media that shape such public perceptions (Grigorescu 
2006). The disconnection between perceptions and actual levels of corruption is indicated 
by the Commission itself in its 2014 report, where it states, for example, that: 
“In the case of the UK, only 5 persons out of 1115 were expected to pay a bribe 
(less than 1%), showing the best result in all Europe; nevertheless, the perception 
data show that 64% of UK respondents think corruption is widespread in the 
country”. 
These findings are very important because they expose the true purpose of the awareness 
campaigns – to shape public perceptions by keeping their attention artificially focussed 
on an issue (corruption in this case) and on international actors, rather than the public.  
The choice is defined, framed and continuously advertised by bodies such as the European 
Commission, parts of civil society and the mass media. More importantly, due to such 
campaigns, the public has been groomed into perceiving corruption as the main threat to 
the economic and political system. Secondly, public opinion has also been directed to 
believe that the sole source of this phenomenon is the public sector, and the main actors 
responsible for it are the elected public officials.  
 
The awareness campaigns have had several significant impacts. Firstly, they exacerbated 
public distrust in their democratically elected national institutions, which were at least 
theoretically publicly accountable. This happened in both Bulgaria and Romania but the 
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intensity of the awareness campaigns was increased. It has been observed that “the most 
dangerous effect of corruption is not the change of individual politicians. It is rather the 
growing popular distrust of the democratic changes induced by such high-level scandals 
(Grigorescu 2006: 519).  Since MPs and members of the Government are legitimized by 
public elections, the lack of public trust towards them means they automatically lose 
legitimacy de facto. 
 
Secondly, if state institutions are increasingly losing legitimacy, the actors who support 
the anti-corruption campaign are gaining it. High levels of public concern about 
corruption have been used as the main legitimizing argument for the Commission to make 
further demands, which interfere with domestic policy-making – in an unprecedented 
way, in the case of Bulgaria and Romania. Aspects, which years ago would have been 
exclusively under the control of domestic decision-makers, are now changed at the 
request of the Commission: immunity of MPs; asset declarations for elected politicians, 
conflict of interest; judicial reform; the request of sending to jail high-level politicians. 
Such requests, now normalized under EU conditionality and CVM would have been 
considered unthinkable two decades ago. They would have been unthinkable because, if 
we remove the official rationale of rooting out corruption what remains in place is an 
unelected entity, non-accountable to the Bulgarian/Romanian/EU public and alien from 
the national background of these countries, claims the right to keep accountable the 
domestic, democratically-validated political elite and moreover, to demand their 
punishment. 
 
Consequently, the lack of legitimacy must be an essential issue for the Commission which 
needed a way to compensate the lack of it. Raising public awareness, and thereby shaping 
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public perception, has been essential in establishing a legitimacy which resembles with 
that provided by the classic, original system. Political class is validated through public 
vote. Consequently, it is the public that can legitimize or de-legitimize any political actor. 
So, the awareness campaigns have the role to capture, to monopolize and manipulate 
public opinions in the direction wanted by its manipulators. 
 
The Bulgarian/ Romanian Progress Reports consistently displayed this outcome. The 
Content Analysis has revealed how the sentence, “the public perceives corruption…” 
became a fixture. This contentious strategy was copied in the first EU Anti-Corruption 
Report, where, in out of four sections; one is exclusively dedicated to “surveys on 
perceptions of corruption and experience of corruption” (Commission 2014: 5) 
 
As we have already noticed in the case of Bulgaria and Romania, the nation state has been 
outnumbered in this competition. The ability to shape perceptions means that one can 
control the public agenda by imposing external priorities. Another important outcome is 
that, since political parties depend on public opinion in order to win elections, they are 
forced to take into consideration the priorities that have been inserted into the public 
mentality through the distortion of “awareness campaigns”. 
 
From a power perspective, it can be said that the “awareness campaign”, which always 
accompanies all anti-corruption strategies, is designed to capture and shape public 
perception on reality. 
 
Another outcome of awareness campaigns is that they re-fuel public interest and 
discontent, due to their continuous exposure. New “worrying” aspects are discovered, 
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highlighted, advertised and discussed. Consequently, public opinion is prepared to accept 
that it is necessary to take increasing measures against a never-ending phenomenon. In 
short, the awareness campaigns create legitimacy for continuous intervention into 
national state affairs and for taking increasingly tough measures against domestic public 
authorities. The excessive focus on corruption maintains high on the public agenda and 
in the public attention. The result is that, no matter how far the anti-corruption measures 
are taken, they never go far enough or are good enough to satisfy the EC. 
 
 
The invention of CVM in the case Bulgaria and Romania perfectly illustrates this aspect 
of the EU anti-corruption strategy.  It was for the first time in the history of the 
Enlargement that very tight surveillance and assessment continued afterwards. From a 
temporary and exceptional measure, the CVM became permanent and the Commission 
transform in a norm to be applied to everybody, as already discussed. In the special case 
of Bulgaria and Romania as well as in the case of all 27 MS, the Commission came with 
the same argument of public opinion’s high perceptions of corruption, followed by “the 
not enough” argument: “EU 
 
 
Member States have in place most of the necessary legal instruments and institutions to 
prevent and fight corruption. However, the results they deliver are not satisfactory across 
the EU. Anti-corruption rules are not always vigorously enforced, systemic problems are 
not tackled effectively enough, and the relevant institutions do not always have sufficient 
capacity to enforce the rules”. (Commission 2014:2) 
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6.2.3 Restraining the domestic political power. The preventive mechanisms 
 
 
Like in the Bulgarian/Romanian case the preventive mechanisms are mostly represented 
by the five legged measures: reducing the immunity of elected politicians; assets 
declarations; control of party financing, transparency of information and conflict of 
interests (see chapter 3 for a more detailed description) 
 
The Commission is particularly interested in two aspects: making easier the removal of 
immunity for the elected decision-makers and second, the creation of surveillance and 
control mechanisms which should ensure that the five measures are enforced on the 
political class. Regarding officials’ asset disclosure, the Commission wants “specialized 
independent anti-corruption/integrity agencies that have the necessary powers and tolls 
to check the origins of assets of concerned public officials against a wide range of 
databases” (Commission 2014: 11). The Romanian case provides a precedent as to how 
far is the EC prepared to push the powers of such agencies. In its 2012 Report the 
Commission complains that ANI, the National Integrity Agency had been denied the 
powers of to confiscate unjustified assets from politicians without passing the process 
through the usual justice system designed in this sense. (Commission 2012: 15) The 
(natural) reason for such a refusal was that this would go against the Constitution which 
stipulates that such decisions belong to the judicial realm. In fact, the Commission goes 
even further and demands that this agency should have the power to directly request the 
removal of elected official’s immunity. 
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In short, the Commission request went against the fundamental principle of check and 
balances among the democratic institutions by requesting to be granted judicial powers 
to an administrative body. 
 
In its 2014 Report, the Commission insists on the creation of further such administrative 
bodies or agencies which should ensure a “an effective monitoring mechanism or clear 
sanctioning regulations”. The Commission complains that “supervision and sanctioning 
of illegal party funding are still note regular practices across the EU and more efforts 
are needed to ensure consistent implementation” (Commission 2014: 10). 
 
Summing up, the five legged legislation designed to restrain some of the rights (e.g. 
immunity) of political class is accompanied by the insistent demand on the Commission’s 
side for the creation of a plethora of specialized administrative bodies, independent of 
any political check which should have extensive powers of monitoring and surveillance 
over the elected officials and, as the Romanian precedent shows, which might be expected 
to act as a judiciary body by demanding the raise of immunity or the resignation of an MP 
or member of government. 
 
6.2.4 Repressive measures and mechanisms. The judiciary/prosecution receives 
 
unprecedented powers. The undermining of the check and balance system in a 
 
democratic state. 
 
 
Section C from the EC 2014 Report concerns the most sensitive aspect of anti-corruption 
policies: the conviction of elected officials or cases of political corruption. 
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Like in the case of Bulgaria and Romania, the Commission focuses on the judiciary 
system and on the idea of creating special anti-corruption agencies focused exclusively 
on the prevention and prosecution of cases of corruption (Commission 2014: 13). 
 
As mentioned before, the extreme example of DNA (the Romanian National Anti-
Corruption Directorate) is brought forth as a model. The Commission is particularly 
insistent on the large number (five hundred) of elected politicians that were sent to prison 
as a result of the activity of this agency. (Commission 2014: 14). 
 
The Commission insists on decoupling such specialized judicial agencies from any 
political check that is usually performed either through the Parliament or the Ministry of 
Justice due to “particular concerns that have been raised in some occasions regarding the 
exposure of prosecution services to political interferences in cases of corruption” 
(Commission 2014: 15). 
 
In other words, the Commission demands to remove the classic check and balance system 
performed by the three institutional pillars in a democracy: the executive, the legislative 
and the justice in two ways. First, the executive and the legislative lose their powers of 
controlling and checking upon the activity of one side of the justice system-the 
judicial/prosecution one. Second, in reverse, the judicial/prosecution side is granted 
unusual large powers over the political side of the power. Thus, the classic system of 
check and balance which ensures (at least theoretically) that there will be no abuse of 
power on either side stops functioning. 
 
The reason invoked by the Commission in support for this radical approach is based on 
 
“specific  cases” that emerged in “certain  occasions”. Changing a fundamental 
democratic  principle Because of some  particular  cases,  is  a  reason which can 
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euphemistically be  labelled  as “flimsy”  and  no  sound democratic system  can be 
 
subjected to such structural changes based on special cases. However, the Commission 
seems to follow the old policies: making the particular or the exception, the norm. 
 
6.3 Conclusions 
 
 
General assessment of the new-anti-corruption framework for all 27 
EU Member states 
 
The case of the new EU anti-corruption framework confirms the following initial 
assumptions made here. 
 
First, it confirms that the special case of Bulgaria and Romania was a springboard for 
testing anti-corruption mechanisms and policies, which are now, pushed front as a 
common norm for tackling corruption. 
 
Second, similar with the Bulgarian/Romanian case, the rationale provided by the EC for 
such measures displays a string of inconsistencies and contradictions which support the 
idea that rooting out corruption is not the genuine scope of such policies. 
Third, the whole structure of the EU anti-corruption framework for all 27 Member States 
exposes the EU intention of redesigning the democratic system. The view projected by 
the 2014 Report is that the anti-corruption policies are used as pretext to: 
 
1. Severely restrain the powers of the domestic political class, democratically elected 
and accountable to the public of the Member State. 
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2. To re-create a state system where those institutions that play a repressive role have 
increased powers: the judiciary, the prosecution, the police. This system undermines 
the old democratic ‘check and balance’ principle applied in any classic democracy. 
 
3. At the internal level, to replace the power of a political elite that has been 
democratically elected and accountable to its public, with an elite which is not elected 
and is not accountable to the public (e.g. prosecutors, members of the anti-corruption 
agencies). 
 
4.  At a general level, to advance the influence of actors who are not accountable to the 
public and/or are not rooted in the domestic context and who advance a neo-liberal 
restructuring of the state along lines predicted by neo-Gramscian theories regarding 
the role of EU in promoting neo-liberal European order. By ‘actors’ is understood 
here a veritable coalition (or historical bloc) among EU structures, IOs, domestic civil 
society with a neo-liberal pro-EU agenda and a certain side of political class which 
can cooperate in order to promote such policies. 
 
From a theoretical perspective, the findings support to a certain great extent the view 
promoted by the neo-Gramscian branch of the Critical Political Economy, with few 
exceptions as is made clear in table 6.2. 
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Table 6.2 
Comparing  Neo-Gramscian assumptions with the empirical findings 
Neo-Gramscian assumptions   
and analysis 
Findings 
There are inherent contradictions 
between the official discourse and 
practical results 
Confirmed in the Bulgarian/Romanian 
case 
Power asymmetry Confirmed  
The existence of organic intellectuals and 
of an embedded coalition 
Confirmed: the alliance between civil 
society international donors and the EU 
 Hegemonic discourse which promotes a neo-liberal agenda:  
  
Minimizing state powers Confirmed 
Promoting actors who are not rooted in 
the domestic landscape 
Confirmed 
Promotion of large capital interests 
 
 
Not fully confirmed, as this was not the 
main target of the research. The nature of 
the topic prioritize the political dimension 
over the economic one 
Class struggle Not confirmed – was not the object of the 
research 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
 Conclusions 
 
Perhaps the most important conclusion of this analysis is that despite an ever increasing 
anti-corruption campaign in the EU, it is not the corruption that seems to be controlled 
but the nation states. The findings show that the anti-corruption policies have been more 
efficient in restraining the powers of the domestic political class and in undermining their 
legitimacy than actually diminishing levels of corruption in the targeted countries. The 
Bulgarian/Romanian case has revealed that the anti-corruption policies were used to put 
in place mechanisms of surveillance, coercion and repression, targeting the domestic 
political powers. Such mechanisms are controlled by the European Commission and by a 
cluster of international and domestic non-governmental actors, who share the same 
agenda and view on corruption. The anti-corruption policies, therefore, are structurally 
designed to politically empower actors who are not rooted in a national context (EU and 
IOs), who are not publicly accountable, except to their donors (domestic civil society), 
and who have not been validated through the classic democratic mechanisms. They 
promote a strong neo-liberal view on the role of the state. Corruption is framed in such a 
way as to de-legitimize the nation state and public officials by rendering them morally 
unfit to rule the country.   
 
Most importantly is that the EU’s cure for corruption brings with it a re-design of the 
power structures inside the state. It breaks the classic checks and balances exercised by 
the three main institutions of the national state: Parliament, the Government and the 
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Judiciary. It does this by isolating the judicial system from any political check (from 
Parliament or Government), as would be normal in a classic democratic system. It also 
destroys the balance of power among the three institutions by conferring more powers to 
the justice and judicial sector. The strong insistence of the EC on the powers of 
prosecutors, and their repressive role against the political class, indicates the formation 
of a new type of state, where repressive and coercive institutions have a disproportionate 
role, compared with the ones democratically validated.  
 
The real control of these new institutional and judicial mechanisms rests with the 
supranational actors, the EU and the European Commission. The Cooperation and 
Verification Mechanism, in the particular case of Bulgaria and Romania, is a case in point. 
These actors are the real arbiters of the anti-corruption game. This is only a logical 
consequence of the fact that the narrative on corruption has been framed by the same 
actors who have been promoting a globalist and neo-liberal agenda, which undermines 
the powers of the classic nation state and promotes a new global order. 
 
Although much of the empirical findings are coming from the particular case of Bulgaria 
and Romania, it has been demonstrated that they have a general value. Their model 
became the springboard on which the European Commission is now building a much 
larger Anti-corruption strategy, which applies to all EU member states. However, the 
structure, the purpose and the means of these European policies reproduce at a larger scale 
the anti-corruption strategy applied at the smaller scale of Bulgaria and Romania. 
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These findings feed into the Critical Political Economy framework, which supports the 
view that the EU carries a neo-liberal restructuring agenda of undermining national state 
powers and of creating new supranational structures. It also feeds into the neo-Gramscian 
hegemonic approach of EU Eastern Enlargement. However, this analysis has focused 
almost exclusively on the political dimension of anti-corruption, in contrast with the 
literature informed by these theories, because the EC has largely framed corruption as a 
political issue, rather than an economic one. It goes without saying that the economic 
implications must be explored. However, these are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Another opportunity for further research would be to understand why domestic politicians 
agreed to policies which were so obviously going against their own interests.  
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